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Editors’ Introduction
This issue brings about a collection of articles which expand the boundaries of the
study of genocide and mass violence. Through the use of an eclectic mix of sources,
these authors have stretched the (traditional) periphery, further engaging in and
critically re-examining cases within each of their areas of focus. Most notably is the
exploration of mass violence through the lens of queer studies and gender, written
by Lily Nellans.
In taking on further developments in genocide studies, the GSP Editorial Team has
reserved several sections within the journal to feature various unique contributions
to the ﬁeld of extreme collective violence, its prevention, and its consequences.
These include Translations, State of the Field, Case Notes, Conference Proceedings,
Film Reviews, and other Special Contributions, which appear irregularly and are
not externally reviewed. Such contributions are welcomed, in addition to the
double-blind reviewed full articles and the book reviews.
In view of embracing this evolution in genocide scholarship trends, we have
decided to add two new sections. This is the ﬁrst time that a literary text will
appear in GSP. The author, Sabah Carrim, is both a scholar (also a member of the
IAGS Advisory Board) and an author of literary and lyrical texts. From 2021 on,
she will be the editor in charge of the Arts & Literature section, which will be
regularly featured in GSP. The submissions are formatted in consultation with the
authors, so they do not have to follow the journal's style guidelines. The texts,
pictures, ﬁlms, etc., will also not be reviewed externally. Instead, the members of
the Editorial Board will discuss the submissions together.
Furthermore, GSP receives submissions that deal with cases of collective violence
that have not been scholarly documented and discussed much in the past.
Accordingly, there is often a lack of relevant discourses to which such texts can be
referred to. As a result, their content is often tied to the sometimes less and
sometimes more convincing proof that the event in question is (or was) a genocide.
The editorial team wants to bring forth the discussion of such works, which are
located on the fringes of established cases and certainly also methodologies.
Therefore, such approaches will appear in the Dossier section in the future.
Finally, since December 2020, GSP has launched its own Twitter account. Here,
information about content, people, and events related to the journal is posted. Visit
us on Twitter @GSPJournal for more updates and to remain connected with GSP.
Christian Gudehus
Fiza Lee Winter
Laura Collins
Daniel Bultmann
JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz
Georgina Holmes
Roland Moerland
Diana I. Popescu
Bablu Chakma
Liam Scott
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Arts & Literature:
The Grey Zone
Sabah Carrim
Texas State University
San Marcos, Texas, USA

About the Art Work
This essay is the result of a combination of interviews conducted with Rithy Panh,
Alexander Hinton, Peg LeVine, and Craig Etcheson by the author, as well as the
ﬁeld notes she collected while attending the IAGS conference in 2019 for which she
was awarded a conference scholarship by the same organisation.
The author would also like to acknowledge Lukas Meissel for his valuable
comments on the piece, especially in the formulation of Ori, a composite character.
The narrative takes place in two iconic tourist and memorial sites in Phnom Penh:
The Killing Fields (aka Choeung Ek) and Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum (aka S21).
About the Author
Sabah Carrim has a PhD in Genocide Studies and Prevention with a focus on the
Khmer Rouge era. She has authored two novels and a few short stories that have
been shortlisted in international competitions.
She is currently enrolled in a MFA in Creative Writing in Texas State University
where she has been awarded the W. Morgan and Lou Claire Rose Scholarship and
the Arch and Stella Rowan Foundation Scholarship.
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The Grey Zone
I’m on a bench, at the fourth checkpoint. Most of us have headsets clipped on,
often awkwardly, in our Procrustean world with one-size trying to ﬁt-all. We are
listening to the story of a genocide. The Khmer voice of a man on the audio
recorder is powerful, all the more since he intimated that he’s a survivor. We are
tourists, foreigners, a vulnerability that’s hardly spoken of. Gullible. It’s probably
the pathos in the man’s voice.
A ﬂy sits on the back of my palm. My immediate thought is to situate it within the
ecosystem of where I am, here at the Killing Fields in Phnom Penh. I explain what I
mean, telling my travel companion Ori, how I’ve imagined what the ﬂy must have
been feeding on, although it’s not true. It would have been true forty years ago
when dead, rotting ﬂesh of bodies lay here. But I like imagining, toying with Time,
toying with thoughts, feeling new feelings. Ori is here for the ﬁrst time, me the
twelfth. My sole concern he thinks, is bacteria. Never mind. I have come here
obsessively, compulsively, thirsting details, thirsting nuances, desiring more. It
could have been done in one session, but I’ve opted for this shabby method. The
most profound thoughts I’ve learned, are generated in moments of passivity and
indolence.
Ori recommends mosquito repellant, or the citronella oil I always carry in my
handbag. ‘No,’ I say, somewhat peevishly, ‘that’s not what I meant.’ Can we stop
being fastidious, we the travellers of the world? Can we get over our ﬁxations with
sanitisers and antibacterial wipes and door handles and taps and bannisters and
people sneezing in airports?
This is a place of overreactions.
Thank god I’m old enough to exercise restraint in voicing my thoughts. Thank god
my thoughts are not audible.
I think of the irony of our lives, identifying and avoiding old traps, stumbling and
falling into new ones, never knowing. And carrying on, stubborn, fastidious.
‘No,’ I repeat, still looking down at the ﬂy. ‘Let it be.’ This ﬂy is part of the
ecosystem of this tourist site, once an orchard. Where the gentle concaves you see
in the ground, the Khmer voice says, are erstwhile mass graves from another era.
The atmosphere is not any bit different from my home in Mauritius, at Sir Guy
Forget Street, with the chirping of birds, the crows of a rooster, the quiet air of a
weekday, a Sunday, a sunny day—because even sunniness has a sound of its own.
Though the grass here in Phnom Penh is different. It’s smooth, motherly, like a
blanket, vividly green, unlike the sharply deﬁned blades of dark green back home.
There it’s young, zealous, impetuous, too keen on knowing, growing, compared to
this, which has known, grown, and understood, and still retained softness and
permeability. And while thinking about this, I become conscious of how my recent
knowledge of the predominance of Buddhist stoicism in Khmer culture has placed
a veil before my eyes, and changed the way I see things, the way I describe them.
We keep speaking of removing layers of prejudice from our thinking which we
somehow manage to do by exposing ourselves to books and people, and scantly of
the ones we add, very subtly while we’re at that.
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If I went on, I could ﬁnd more differences in my entourage. The rest of the
vegetation for example, but never mind that. I don’t know the names, and I envy
those who do, because every new name signiﬁes a new identity. Heightened
awareness. And what could be more empowering than the ability to differentiate
things in a mass of confused mess?
I can’t help ﬁnding it uncanny that right now in the Killing Fields if I closed my
eyes, I could very well be in Mauritius. Because at S-21, now the Genocide
Museum of Phnom Penh, a former primary school converted into a security prison
between 1975–1979, where 14,000 inmates were tortured, it’s entirely different.
There, there are no birds, no chirping, just silence, not even a solemn one, but calm
indifference. One immune to violence, death, the past, the pain. One that carries
on, despite everything, and may I say, even lightly, cheerfully, mocking us.
Craig Etcheson, a Cambodia expert, told me that an NGO or a parastatal body (I’m
not sure which) had wanted to plant ﬂowers at S-21. How horrible, he said, what a
lack of respect. Yes, I replied, how horrible, and shook my head. With hindsight, it
was sheer complaisance—I’ve read that we tend to do that in conversations. After
he left, I asked myself, what if they did? The ﬂowers would have made the air
light, given it cheer, mocking us, our seriousness. And suppose a bird had left its
droppings of the seeds it had eaten, and ﬂowers started growing by an act of
‘nature,’ would it make it less condemnable?
By planting ﬂowers, the planners, the gardeners would only be capturing the same
spirit.
And then life seems to have moved on in many ways. At S-21, they’ve already
tidied up so much. I think of what’s left of the barbed wires, once distinctive
barriers to liberty, escape, now barely noticeable, where the license to enter and exit
no longer hinges upon questions of life and death. I think of the general cleanliness
of the premises, the constant repairs and renovations that conceal more and more
of the horrors of the past. I think of the board with the clearly deﬁned Do’s and
Don’ts that has been rewritten neatly to mark a time in the past when prisoners
were constrained by them. I think of the many times the grass has been mowed,
weeded, manicured. How sterile it smells there. It mustn’t have been like that forty
years ago, in that state of advanced panopticism, where classrooms once
classifying children, were further divided to pen prisoners to be disciplined and
punished, they too innocent, before and after they had been brought out to be
photographed, their nails tweezed out, their heads drowned in tubs of water,
pulled and dragged like cattle, until they concocted confessions, denouncing
friends and relatives, proving Schopenhauer and Nietzsche right that everyone’s
really selﬁsh, and where the totality of their pain and suffering made those
premises smell like an animal farm. Now, forty years later, after the blood stains on
the wall have faded, planting seeds, growing ﬂowers, adding colour couldn’t
possibly make a difference.
I’m not saying Craig Etcheson is wrong. I just don’t see the point in taking sides.
There seem to be arguments to support every damn thing these days. The chaos of
postmodernism.
I wish like Rithy Panh, the Cambodian ﬁlmmaker, who needed to know, to
understand, to energise intuition to produce documentaries, that I could also be
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here at the Killing Fields in the evenings, at night, when there is no gullibility,
when there is a different kind of silence.
You must have heard the crickets at that time, didn’t you Mr Panh? Tell me.
Because I want to feel what the prisoners felt when they were brought here in those
trucks, blindfolded, on that winding, unpaved, and pebbly road over eight
kilometres, from their prison cells in S-21, and hacked to death with axes and
sharpened bamboo sticks in pits dug at the Killing Fields. I read that bullets were
too few and precious to be wasted on them. Is it true? I want to know Mr Panh,
whether you looked up at the sky on those evenings, and saw the same number of
stars I see in Mauritius, or whether your sky there was just blank, like in most of
the polluted cities of Southeast Asia. Tell me, Mr Panh, did you wait until the
noises of the night had died down? Did you wait to feel what it must have been
like for a prisoner to smell the stench of dead and dying bodies, progressing
through pallor mortis, algor mortis, rigor mortis, livor mortis, and ﬁnally
putrefaction? Or still, did you try to feel how it must have felt knowing that one
would die the following morning? And then, as I imagine many to have
experienced, did you wait to feel your heart bursting with hope that it wouldn’t
happen? I want to know, Mr Panh, because I am an academic, a researcher, and I
have kept a comfortable distance from feeling too much. And now that I am
working on a conclusion to my doctoral thesis, I realise there should be none. To
conclude is to abbreviate the thought process, to conclude is to be tired of thinking.
To conclude would amount to a simpliﬁcation, to evidence of my gullibility, an
affront to the memory of the skulls and bone fragments I see segregated, labelled,
and caged in glass boxes, and the chankiri tree where babies and young infants
were smashed to death, where music was played to drown the voices of those
crying, struggling, bleeding.

***
‘If you claim that you don’t know the names of trees,’ says Ori, ‘how did you know
it was the chankiri tree?’
‘It’s in books on the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge regime.’
Smiling isn’t allowed here at the Killing Fields. An unspoken rule understandably.
But I catch myself doing it when Ori takes a picture. I am seated on a bench (a
different one) with thick roots of a tree whose name I don’t know, framing me on
three sides. I look around self-consciously. This feels wrong. It wasn’t like that the
ﬁrst time—I was more serious, more morose. The tourists, those ﬁrst-timers, are
probably appalled by my reaction. The guilt. I feel it so easily when I am here. But
then, I feel everything so easily over here. This is a sacred place, a place that makes
you anxious, uncomfortable. Not because of the rules, no, but the shadows around
them. I’m never sure what’s allowed and what’s not. Can I smile, laugh, answer
my mobile?
Over here, there can be no comfort in experiencing one emotion at a time. Every
emotion is like a runny egg in a tray. At times, you feel guilty for not feeling, like I
felt just now. At other times, for feeling too much—especially when you wonder
whether you’ve been manipulated into experiencing this or that at different
checkpoints. Look at the tourists, stopping where they are told under a covered
shelter erected for the purpose, ruminating over what the Khmer voice tells them
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to ruminate. It’s not that I doubt the story—I despise the manipulation. Poststructuralism.
‘You’re such a rebel. I don’t know anyone who’d think like you,’ says Ori, after I
share my thoughts with him.
‘If I exist, there must be others who feel the same way,’ I reply. ‘They’re just not
saying it.’
Long ago, when I was a teenager, I remember how often I was haunted by bouts of
confusion. My thoughts were jumbled up. It made me restless, moody. I kept
wondering if other people felt the same way. I recall my journal entries:
‘Something’s bothering me, I don’t know what it is, I need to take some time off to
think about it.’ And all efforts were in vain. Today it’s different. My thoughts are
clear. I know when and why I’m depressed, confused, happy, angry, sad. I
empowered myself by learning how to express my innermost thoughts. A language
schoolbooks don’t teach. No longer do I feel estranged from myself—Only from
everyone.
As I said earlier, the problem is not the rules but the shadows around them. That
grey area, the penumbra. The space that gives us leeway to exercise discretion, to
engage creativity, to feel empowered, to feel we exist. The will to power. Sipo
Matador. And Duch, head of S-21, went all the way. When Duch was given orders
to kill, no one told him how to do it. And later in court during his trial, he used it in
his defense. He said he merely followed the rules, obeyed the orders, that he was
innocent—a puppet. He didn’t tell everyone however, how vaguely these
commands were phrased so that he allowed himself to devise intricate ways to
carry them out, to mete out the torture, to issue orders to kill.
A book was found on the premises of S-21: La Torture by Alec Mellor. It was Duch’s.
Some say Duch didn’t know enough about Communist ideology, others say Duch
knew more than Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, those in the maquis. Some say Duch was
cultured, others that he was a simpleton. Some say Duch spoke like a wise man,
others that he was a glib talker. Some say Duch knew the difference between the
works of Michaelangelo and Picasso, others say yes, but only superﬁcially. Some
say Duch was so classy he drank cointreau neat with a slice of lemon. Duch was
intelligent, Duch was effeminate. Duch liked to laugh, Duch never laughed. Duch
was a monster, Duch was just a man. Duch was manipulative, Duch was only
pretending. Duch was a liar. Duch had a sharp memory. Duch was a leader. Duch
was a follower, a lickspittle, constantly in need of someone to hero-worship, like
Son Sen, like Christ. Duch saw himself in the ﬁgure of St Paul. Duch was
charismatic, a teacher who led, who proselytised, who helped cull a typhoid
outbreak. Duch was gentle, a romantic—remember how he loved Kim? Duch was
sick, a sadist—remember how he tortured Bophana?
Duch.
What if Duch was all of that at different moments, like us? Aren’t we dumb and
smart, docile and resilient, deep and superﬁcial? The problem: our bias for ﬁxity of
character. It is said that the ingenuity of Stendhal’s Le Rouge et Le Noir was that it
was among the ﬁrst novels to present a character (Julien Sorel) who possessed a
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diversity of traits that stood in opposition to one another—a practice that outraged
critics of those times, who accused such authors of slander against the human race.
Yes, it’s not the rules, but the shadows that cause confusion, that introduce
complexity in the matter. A side thought: I’ve always wondered about that
compulsive desire—no, that need in me to ﬂout rules. I keep thinking I’d make a
bad employee. I like coasting along borders, exploring them, feeling their limits. A
certain languor invades me after one or two instances of obeying, complying. It’s
tiring to keep doing it well, I tell myelf, because obedience is hardly noticed, hardly
lauded. Perhaps I am under the constant threat of (Batailleian) death and
disappearance, and breaking laws reminds me that I am here. Perhaps I suffer from
the perpetual need to feel I exist.
I’ve thought about it for a long time: It’s not getting caught that gives me a thrill.
It’s deciding what to do with the penumbra.

***
I’ve just landed in Phnom Penh for the ﬁrst time and hired a tuk tuk from the
airport. (This is a moment that took place ﬁve years ago that I am now
recollecting.) Halfway there, the driver passes me a laminated sheet of paper. He
proposes to drop me at the hotel so I can check in and then hire him for the rest of
the day. ‘Twelve dollars,’ he says. I see four faded pictures of tourist sites on the
paper with names printed underneath. The options are Choeung Ek (a.k.a The
Killings Fields), the Genocide Museum of Phnom Penh (a.k.a S-21 or Tuol Sleng),
the Wat Phnom, and the Royal Palace. Like on a menu. ‘Let’s start with the ﬁrst
two,’ I say.
Every other visit to Phnom Penh began exactly like this.
We’ve just arrived at S-21. I’m here for the sixteenth time, Ori the ﬁrst. I’ve stopped
going into the classrooms. Except for the ﬁrst one on the left, in Building A, right
after you enter. (I was about to say ‘It’s my favourite’ but one can’t—shouldn’t say
that.) In it, you see a picture on the wall. It’s what the jail cell looked like when it
was photographed after the Khmer Rouge regime was defeated by the Vietnamese
forces in 1979. In the black and white picture, a half-naked man lies in a metal bed
frame, dead, his body discoloured, bloated monstrously—like the drawing by the
narrator of The Little Prince, of the boa constrictor digesting the elephant. (Am I
allowed to think this? Maybe you can think it, but you should not voice it.) There
are also iron shackles, and rod-shaped instruments of torture. Not far off lies an
ammunition can, a standard feature in all jail cells, once used by prisoners to
relieve themselves. I’ve often wished other cells in that row had similar gruesome
stories to recount. Each with a story of its own, unique for the details, for what it
implied about the modus operandi of the Khmer Rouge regime. Strategically, it
would have made such an impression—as the pieces of bone fragments and teeth
do, left like that, jutting out of the ground along the path we are made to tread in
the Killing Fields. Or those eight thousand skulls, piled on top of one another,
staring at you through glass cages in the Memorial Stupa at the Killing Fields,
drowning you in Repetition, through Homogeneity, weighing you down by the
purport and meaning of the term ‘genocide.’
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It is said that the man who was assigned to re-organise S-21 into a museum, into a
tourist site, followed the structure and technique he had used before in a site also
converted into a museum to exhibit the atrocities of the Second World War.
Ori walks away on his own to explore. I head towards one of the benches,
sheltered by a few trees, where one gets the view of fourteen white raised tombs of
the bodies found in Building A, back in 1979. I take a seat, cross my legs, rest an
arm along the back rest. Then I notice a signboard that says one should sit
respectfully while here. I’m suddenly uncomfortable.
I’ve been thinking that I also have a problem with a different permutation of rules:
those we call ‘generalisations.’ In the manner they impose themselves on you, on
how destructive they are, refusing to yield to exceptions. How they’re presented to
you as all-encompassing dicta and truth propositions. How they become excuses
for unfairly imposed sanctions and last-minute accusations. Yes, rules and
generalisations are often immune to being called into question.
Writing a thesis is a formidable exercise, no doubt. If you’ve done enough research,
most of your propositions or statements of opinion should tempt you into adding a
digression that starts with ‘But’, ‘However’, ‘Nevertheless’. (And possibly another
series of ‘But,’ ‘However,’ ‘Nevertheless’ to that.) What a challenge it is to sustain
the effort over four hundred pages. But there are footnotes, ‘cf.,’ so why not?
Now imagine in real life: We want to get the job done quickly. That’s why we are
drawn to generalisations: thinking is tiresome. Introducing exceptions at every
bend: painful. We seem to want to avoid complexity. That’s why no one allowed
Hannah Arendt to say that a mass killer could have a plainer personality than
they’d imagined. That’s why it took so long for people to understand Primo Levi’s
quixotic notion of the victim-perpetrator. That’s why no one wanted Peg LeVine to
tell the court that not all marriages during the Khmer Rouge era were forced.
That’s why no one wanted Alex Hinton to speak about how justice had been meted
out in other ways than we thought possible—other than through punishment,
retribution, a court of law. That justice in Cambodia, in the aftermath of the Khmer
Rouge era, was delivered just as well through silence. Through the burning of
incense sticks. Through prayers. Over coffee in an informal chat between
perpetrator and victim.

***
Ori walks towards me. ‘One of the survivors of S-21 over there is selling his book.
You can even have a chat with him,’ he says.
‘Oh. Bou Meng,’ I reply.
‘Why don’t you join me?’
‘No…I don’t feel comfortable in that space. I’ve watched him many times, I
wonder if he recognises me by now. I just feel… I don’t know…a sense of
discomfort when I think he’s been doing this all his life. The tourists. The book
sales. Repeating the story of what he endured ad nauseam ad inﬁnitum. He must
be tired, case-hardened, I know it’s money, his livelihood, but I still feel I’d be
bothering him.’
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‘Maybe you’ve been here too many times,’ says Ori. ‘You’re probably numb to all
this. To him.’ Ori is silent for a while. ‘Or, maybe you feel too much.’ Then he
strides away in the direction of Bou Meng’s table.
I mull over what he just said. Do I feel too much? If so, why? Which hormone,
which neurotransmitter could account for it? I smile at myself, I sneer at my
thoughts, my so-called feelings. Posthumanism.
Ori is back after a few minutes.
‘That was strange,’ he says. ‘I bought the book, he signed it, and I didn’t know
taking a picture was also part of the deal. Bou Meng pulled me to his side just like
that. I wasn’t sure whether I was supposed to smile, like you know…when you
take pictures…normal pictures.’
We say nothing, and move towards the exit.
Ori and I are on the verge of leaving the precincts of S-21.
‘You didn’t tell me about your interview yesterday for your PhD, the one with Alex
Hinton,’ says Ori.
‘It was great, except for the clanking noises in the restaurant where we had the
interview. I have no idea what they were up to. Drove me crazy. Couldn’t
concentrate.’
‘Yes, your misophonia.’
‘I mentioned it to Alex Hinton. Miso: hatred, phonia: noise. He asked what sort of
reaction I have when I hear repetitive noises, slurping, and all that.’
‘Ha ha. What did you say?’
‘The truth. That it evokes such anger in me that it makes me want to…'
I suddenly realise where I am. In the grey zone between entering and exiting S-21.
In a space that evokes anxiety about what’s right and what’s wrong. Instinctively I
lower my tone:
‘….kill someone.’
The guilt.
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S-21 as a Liminal Power Regime: Violently Othering
Khmer Bodies into Vietnamese Minds
Daniel Bultmann
Universität Siegen; Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Siegen, North-Rhine Westphalia; Berlin, Germany

Introduction
The central prison of the Khmer Rouge—with its detention center on the compound of the
former high school, Tuol Svay Prey, in the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh—was tasked with
uncovering traitorous networks in the populace and especially within its own revolutionary
movement.1 Together with several buildings in the surrounding area, Tuol Svay Prey—
commonly referred to as Tuol Sleng, the name of a neighboring primary school—became a
torture and execution center codenamed S-21, in which inmates were forced to confess to
working for foreign powers as agents of the CIA, the KGB, or the Vietnamese.2 In the end,
however, as laid out in a party document titled The Last Joint Plan and created from information
from confessions at S-21, the Soviets were considered to be the secret head behind all traitorous
activities, while the US “colluded” and the Vietnamese acted as “implementors.”3 Every
Cambodian resisting the regime was considered a traitor fallen to the territory-swallowing
Vietnamese, who were attempting to ﬁnalize their centuries-old expansionist plan to annex
“Kampuchea,” using the Americans and Soviets as their vehicle. As said in a common slogan,
the bodies of the traitors was considered Khmer, but their minds were deluded by Vietnamese
thoughts: “Khmer bodies, Vietnamese heads.”4 While almost all sections of the populace,
according to the analysis of the party,5 suffered to varying degrees from an infection of
individualist and capitalist thoughts, those in S-21 were regularly labeled enemies, who
“became one hundred percent Vietnamese” in their thinking.6
While the Khmer Rouge used the derogatory Khmer term Yuon for “Vietnamese,” its
use did not necessarily imply that their enemies were working strictly and directly at Hanoi’s
behest. Often, it served primarily to denote a duplicitous, devious, and anti-Khmer mind.7
Hence, in terms of semantics, while a “Khmer body with a Yuon head” possessed a twisted
“Vietnamese” mind, the enemy might nevertheless be forced to confess that he or she was
serving the CIA or KGB. Being Yuon covered “Vietnameseness” and had xenophobic overtones
suggesting a dangerous, invisible, duplicitous, and anti-Khmer otherness. Even though many
Cambodians would claim that Yuon is just an outdated word for Vietnamese (especially if they
sympathize with the current opposition), this article prefers to use the term Yuon or to refer to
“Vietnameseness” coupled with otherness rather than simply translating Yuon as Vietnamese.
Thought reform (which others were subjected to by means of productive labor, selfcriticism, and indoctrination) would not work on such individuals; they were beyond reform.
The problem—and also the thesis of this paper—was that the regime could not solely rely on
visual, social, or ethnic characteristics to ﬁnd and punish enemies of the revolution but also had
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to make treason and, along with this, the Yuon mind visible through violent practice: they had
to “uncover” it through liminal ritualization and violent othering. What one can see in S-21—
instead of a pre-established compartmentalization8—is a constant and ritualized process of
violent and liminal othering. This ritualization of violence explains the structure, the scripts and
procedural logics behind the violent practices in S-21. The whole institution of S-21 and its
violent practices and operations served to reveal a “Vietnameseness” and/or otherness within
the victims and to prove not only their guilt with regard to a singular crime but also a long
history of treason and collaboration with the enemy, as well as a moral shortcoming that put
them outside their own imagined Khmer moral universe and part of a larger scheme. The
victims were made to inscribe their non-Khmer nature and Yuon minds on their bodies and into
their confessed biographies. The initial and, for the ideology of the revolution, problematic
sameness of the victims needed to be reshaped into a profound otherness in terms of thinking,
lifestyle, and biography. Violent practices such as torture, mistreatment of inmates, and
execution needed to signify or—in a more literal sense—transform the inmates into what the
regime believed they had become: essentially Yuon in mind, weak in morality, and traitorous in
practice. This enforced and violent transition into a true “other” was accompanied by a semiotic
process inscribing Vietnamese- and otherness into the victim through a liminal power regime
that served to signify as well as enable a transition to this new status.
Alexander Laban Hinton—inspired by Arjan Appadurai’s theory of ethnic violence—
has thoroughly and accurately described the torture at S-21 as a liminal process or lethal rite of
passage, “an institutional attempt to organize and crystallize difference on politically uncertain
bodies.”9 He shows how politically uncertain bodies in S-21 were treated as polluted and
stripped of their markers of humanity and basic freedoms to “manufacture” an absolute,
ethnically codiﬁed difference that was inscribed in every enforced expression of the inmates.10
This article, while largely in line with Hinton’s analysis, considers additional aspects of
liminality, including its symbolism with regard to Buddhist morality (individualistic greed, lust,
and striving for power), Buddhist hell (dogs and torture practices), and anti-Vietnamese
semiotics as well as discussing the importance of the last stage of the rite at S-21, with mass
graves representing permanent liminality or a halted aggregation phase that keeps victims
trapped as suffering ghosts (called khmouch).
In so doing, the paper also adds to a literature analyzing extreme forms of violence such
as torture or cruelties in concentration camps as liminal practice.11 Liminality, as described by
the anthropologists Victor Turner and Arnold van Gennep, is a stage within initiation rites
serving as a passage from one status to another.12 The key point within this stage, which comes
after a stage of separation from the social body, is that the initiate endures a period of being
outside the social order during which new forms of identity are inscribed into his or her mind
and often quite literally into his or her body. The article thus uses the concept of liminality in
order to highlight that the violent passage endured by the victims in S-21 is not just an act of
othering, making them Yuon, but it follows a certain ritual script; it has a structure, it uses
certain cultural scripts of transition (in this case, for instance, from notions of Buddhist hell),
and it is also characterized by typical markers of liminality. Liminal beings are in a stage betwixt
and in between; they are considered polluted, dangerous, naked (literally and symbolically),
8
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and wild. They are in a space outside of the social realm, in the wildness, and they transition. In
the case of the inmates of S-21, they seem to transition into the status of being Yuon, which at
the same time is the status of being outside of the moral order, of moral otherness.
The violent rite of passage thus—in stark contrast to classic rites of passage such as
entering adulthood, getting married, or death rituals—serves to uncover a “Vietnameseness”
and otherness, while potentially also forcing the victims into a permanent moral liminality—a
point that will be discussed in view of the execution practices of the Khmer Rouge at the very
end of this paper. The victims of S-21 die a death which keeps them in an ambivalent stage of
either becoming Vietnamese and/or of being permanently caught in liminality. The ritual
process serves to separate the victims from being “Khmer;” it visualizes an invisible status as an
enemy standing outside the moral and collective order. The article thus proceeds by ﬁrst
explaining the problematic invisibility of the enemies of the revolution. Then follows a section
on violent practice in S-21 as a rite of passage of separation, ambiguity, and liminality.
Afterward, two sections explain the process of uncovering and inscribing the “Vietnameseness”
of the victims through torture and confessions. The article closes with a discussion of the
aggregation phase, which normally signiﬁes the moment where initiates enter their new status,
but which in this case remains ambiguous and points toward a permanent liminality.
Invisible Enemies of the Revolution
The invisibility of the enemy posed a threat to the revolution, and the leadership of the regime
constantly engaged in attempts to explain to its underlings how to recognize an enemy. While
socioeconomic background was vital in judging the counterrevolutionary potential of people,
such as whether they came from upper and higher-educated classes or as “new people” from
the cities, almost everyone was considered able to become a loyal follower of the regime—and
absolutely everyone was at risk of turning Yuon in mind. Farmers, on the other hand, were
considered purer people and the base of the revolution and therefore had more rights, easier
access to goods, and protections (including from imprisonment). Most decisive, however, was
whether someone resisted the new order. Political resistance made them fundamentally (and
ethnically) different. Thus, traitorous thinking was to be derived from traitorous behavior,
although this might not be as clear-cut as it seems. While it was made clear that letting an
enemy walk free might result in being considered an enemy themselves, cadres had to deal with
vague descriptions of their enemies, sometimes tipping into outright comedy, as in this example
by Khieu Samphan.
We see the enemy acting already, but we say ‘Not a problem.’
This comes from our instructions on not yet being hot. As when
the enemy drinks palm sugar water, and then defecates in the
drinking tube, we say that he is lazy, not that he is an enemy. In
fact, he is an enemy.13
The expression “not yet being hot” already introduces an important ideological theme
of the Khmer Rouge: those puriﬁed into clean revolutionary thought should be clear-sighted
enough to recognize enemies simply by observing abnormalities in their behavior. These classic
Buddhist themes of purity and enlightenment, in turn, also meant that those who failed to “see”
an enemy were not pure and hence might be considered as polluted if not enemies themselves.
Seeing enemies where others might not see them developed into proof of revolutionary purity,
while not seeing them created a high risk of suspicion.
That is why the notebooks of interrogators at S-21 are full of study sessions on how to
recognize enemies. One interrogator, Chan, noted down that “9% [of the population] are weak[,]
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1% very weak[,] 1% are enemies.”14 But how can you know whether someone is a member of
the CIA, KGB, or Vietnamese enemy networks? Another interrogator wrote:
There are two types of enemies the Party arrest:
a) People who conduct anti-party activities of all kinds at the
local level and those who freely make contact with others
beyond the Party’s order.
b) People who appear in connection with [the enemies] in
Santebal reports and have been clearly examined and
investigated.15
The most problematic enemy was the internal enemy: cadres hiding in the party with
the goal of destroying it. These were difﬁcult to ﬁnd. All that could be done was to look out for
indicators of sabotage, such as being lazy, being late for work, and slowing down work in any
way.16 Yet, while some in the populace and within the movement were considered merely a bit
confused, others to be simply sticking to old habits of being and acting with a “free spirit”17
(serei-niyum), and still others as having “accidentally” become enemies, those imprisoned at S-21
fell under the category of enemies to be “smashed.”18 Though the inmates of the security
apparatus, known as Santebal, may not have looked like enemies, they clearly were, and there
was to be no doubt about it: “As for our security department, the enemies are handcuffed;
although they do not have guns and apparently look as if they were revolutionaries, in actuality
they are enemies.”19 Study sessions explaining the party policy towards enemies were not very
helpful, either. Notes from these sessions cycle around repetition of vague instructions to look
“closely” at the biography of the inmates, to be vigilant with regard to one’s environment (even
one’s own colleagues), and to never, ever let a single enemy walk free. The vagueness of the
enemy and the fact that anyone could be one created a constant threat that resurfaced upon
encounters with the sameness of the other. For one, the party had to insist that cadres should
not become “weak,” feel pity, and identify with the enemy. Furthermore, the otherness of the
cadres’ own self might turn them into enemies any time. They constantly saw colleagues being
imprisoned and killed for their impurities and “mistakes” and feared being next.20
Separation, ambiguity, and liminality
The process of interning, torturing, and turning subjects into enemies in S-21 (and beyond)
resembled a transformative ritual, a rite of passage into a new symbolic status: that of being one
hundred percent Yuon in mind. Victor Turner revitalized Arnold van Gennep’s concept of
liminal rituals to describe a three-staged status transition:
Van Gennep has shown that all rites of transition are marked
by three phases: separation, margin (or limen), and
aggregation. The ﬁrst phase of separation comprises symbolic
14
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behavior signifying the detachment of the individual or group
either from an earlier ﬁxed point in the social structure or a set
of cultural conditions (a ‘state’); during the intervening liminal
period, the state of the ritual subject (the ‘passenger’) is
ambiguous; he passes through a realm that has few or none of
the attributes of the past or coming state; in the third phase the
passage is consummated.21
The liminal being is in a state in which it reﬂects on society, its morals, and its own role
in it in order to transition into its new status. While in transition, it is associated with wildness
and ambiguity, as it also draws power from being in touch with worlds beyond. It is betwixt,
nowhere, ambiguous, dangerous, wild, and in-between.
As in all but in other cases usually non-violent and voluntary liminal rituals, transition
for the inmates of S-21 started with separation from the cooperative: a blindfolded transfer
signifying the entering of a realm outside of and invisible to the “normal” order, in a secluded
and secret space.22 In that new space, they were photographed and registered with number
plates and ﬁngerprints, a system stemming from French colonial prisons.23 Then they entered a
realm where they were initially treated—in an interaction between physical and social body
statuses—as socially unclear and hence unclean bodies without clear identity.24 They were
stripped of their clothes (only keeping their underwear) and left shackled, lying close together
with dozens of other inmates or in a tiny cell in their own dirt, washed only irregularly in
“bathing sessions” with a water hose.25 Dirt became part of their personal space.
Correspondingly, they were forced to relieve themselves into an ammunition box. Instead of
separating the liminal dirt into the realm of the wild as a sign of ordered spheres and identities,
they were forced to eat, sleep, and defecate in the same spot.26
Their treatment as inmates resulted in a complete and violent loss of identity and its
articulations. Inmates not only were registered with numbers and addressed by numbers by
their guards but also were unable to move and kept in shackles at all times. They needed to
request permission for any type of bodily movement (sitting upright instead of lying on the
ﬂoor, for instance). They were deprived of control of their time. They were even, at times,
prevented from sleep.27 They were not allowed to talk to others (just centimeters away). They
lived without personal belongings and were unable to perform rituals of any sort. At the same
time, they were treated as only numbers, who shared their space with anonymous and, at times,
sick, dying, or even dead co-inmates. Correspondingly, the detention rooms were also devoid of
character: empty rooms containing only signs of power (shackles, defecation boxes, and boards
on which the cadres wrote behavioral rules inmates were supposed to adhere to).28
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At the same time, the liminal beings were like in rituals described by Turner within
tribal societies considered polluted, ambiguous, and dangerous.29 Interaction between inmates
was suppressed, possibly also in order to prevent contagious spreading of ideas and
counterrevolutionary activities among them.30 Likewise, interrogators and guards were told not
to touch them, such as by beating them with bare hands or feet, but to use wire or wood instead,
and strictly advised not to interact with them, not to talk to them about their background and
life prior internment. Using bare hands on women particularly was thought to risk pulling
cadres into moral offenses and sexual lust, drawing them away from “doing politics.”31
Interrogators were constantly told to keep their “mastery” (mchas) when interacting with the
enemy and to beware of their “reactions” (brati kam), which might endanger them and the
revolution: by being attacked as a result of not paying proper attention; by being drawn into
emotional reactions, such as feeling pity for them; by becoming hesitant, doubtful, or sexually
aroused; by getting angry, losing control, and starting to use violence without political purpose;
and, more directly, by losing vital information or allowing individualistic weaknesses such as
laziness and self-interest to enter revolutionary practice.32 The line between friend and enemy of
the revolution was thin, and the sameness in the other a constant emotional threat that needed
to be controlled and suppressed by commitment, mastery, or—in Khmer Rouge vocabulary—
absoluteness (doch kat). The logic was clear: everyone had residues of individualistic thinking;
puriﬁcation was a constant struggle, not just for enemies of the people but for everyone—and
being confronted with the worst kind of non-revolutionary thinking and behavior demanded
security practices and strict emotional mastery. Without these, there awaited a slippery slope
that leads all too easily to treason.
The liminality of the S-21 is also part of its semantics, as, for example, when inmates
were called “a-preet” by the cadres.33 In Cambodian Buddhism, preet are ghosts caught in hell,
tormented for the evil deeds they committed in life. They must endure torture for millions of
years before they can be transformed into new beings. This liminality also appeared in the
naming of the three interrogation units and styles: cold, chewing, and ﬁnally hot (mainly
depending on the degree of torture involved). This also reﬂected Buddhist notions of
transformation and puriﬁcation as processes of “heating oneself.”34 Finally, beyond
infrastructural convenience, there was a symbolic element indicating liminal transition in
choosing pagodas and schools across the country as places of puriﬁcation and mental
transformation. In addition to being concrete structures that served well for the construction of
prisons, these buildings were deliberately chosen for what were seen as, quite literally,
“reeducation” centers. Evidence for this notion lies in the facts that colonial and prerevolutionary prisons were not used for this purpose and that former school buildings were
chosen even in Phnom Penh.35
Uncovering I: Torture
Torture served to uncover the traitorous mind. In this regard, it differed from the liminal realm
of detention, which was devoid of semiotics inscribing identities to the inmates, as one can ﬁnd
many references to the act of making the Vietnamese mind and otherness of the victims visible
during torture. This becomes especially clear when reading the explanations of an interrogator
about the usage of a technique called paying homage, which indicates the centrality of
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uncovering and, simultaneously, transformation (of consciousness) through torture as a violent
means of othering:
Paying homage to images of dogs is introduced because it has
political meaning – one dog is imperialism, and another dog is
the territory-swallowing Yuon enemy. We forced them to pay
homage of images of dogs in order to test them because when
they were arrested, 90% pretended that they were
revolutionists. Once they pay homage to images of the two
dogs, it means that they accept they are traitors. Concerning
consciousness: we change their consciousness. Concerning
assignment: Do they respect Santebal or not?36
Since interrogators noted that they forced inmates to do it several times or for as long as
half an hour, “paying homage” probably meant that the interrogated had to remain in a bodily
position called “airplane,” a famous torture technique widely applied during the Chinese
Cultural Revolution. Inmates in this position would resemble followers bowing to the dog
image, signifying that they had animal-like masters and belonged to a lineage of a different
species.37 Semiotically reinforcing their misled inner servitude to the Vietnamese, these images
of dogs often had Ho Chi Minh’s head on it. To further signify that they had deluded minds
twisted against the revolution, they were also forced to “pay homage” to chairs, tables, and
walls. Similarly simulating an interplay between master and servant, a guard rode piggyback
on the inmate on the way upstairs to the cell.38
Some of the torture techniques were also considered “Vietnamese,” as highlighted by
Duch during the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: “the […] method was about the suffocation technique
that the ‘Yuon’ used to torture prisoners in order to obtain their confessions—that is, putting a
plastic bag over a prisoner’s head until the prisoner was unconscious.”39 Besides othering and
inﬂicting pain through techniques such as electrocution, pulling of nails, drowning, cigarette
burns, beatings, and pouring salt and soap into open wounds to enable an inmate’s
transformation into a confessor, torture semiotics also involved wildness and liminality.
Interrogators, for instance, had poisonous centipedes and scorpions crawl over their victims or
pulled off their shirts and put them “with the mosquitos.”40 Two techniques signifying their
belonging to a liminal space and moral otherness seem disputed: hanging them from a crossbar,
previously used by students for sports, as well as drowning them upside-down into a water
tank on the patio of the building. While interrogators denied the usage of both techniques,
claiming for instance that the water tanks were only used to store fertilizer (also in interviews
with the author), former prisoner Vann Nath captured these techniques in a painting, depicting
a scene that he claimed to have seen from a window while painting portraits of Pol Pot (see
Image 1).
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Image 1. Water Torture by Vann Nath.41

Especially the upside-down drowning heavily resembles a well-known scene from
Buddhist hell, where the damned preet are held headﬁrst in the same type of water tank.
Representations of torments in the subterranean region under control of Yama (or yumreach in
Khmer) in bureaucratically exact accordance to the lightness or heaviness of evil deeds
committed are well-known and can be found in countless pagodas across country.42 Here are
two pictures, one showing the upside-down hanging of preet in an old mural at Wat Tway
Bongkum (see Image 2) and one showing a modern version of the scenery in the Khmer Rouge
stronghold Pailin (see Image 3).

Image 2. Wat Tway Bongkum.43

41
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Phnom Penh.
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Image 3. Wat Phnom Yat, Pailin.44

In a similar vein, the dog to which many inmates had to “pay homage” as a
representation of a master-servant relationship also plays a prominent role in Buddhist hell. As
scavengers and dung-eaters, dogs are considered especially dirty and belonging to the
wilderness and its realms of violence, death and its potency. They were often seen running
around cremation sites or in some usually rural areas in spaces where dead bodies had been
sacriﬁced to nature before colonial state administration viewed this practice as unhygienic and
“unmodern,” gnawing on human remains.45 This is also why they—and vultures—became part
of the regional Buddhist hell iconography, where they devour the tormented preet (see Image 4).

Image 4. Wat Tway Bongkum.46
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Wat Phnom Yat, Pailin, picture taken by the author, 2015.

45

Compare Jana Igunma, “Meditations on the Foul in Thai Manuscript Art,” Journal of the International Association of
Buddhist Universities 5 (2015), 69–71.

46

Wat Tway Bongkum, picture taken by author, 2017.
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Paying respect to the dogs as animals of the wild, of out-of-orderness, of violence and
death, demonstrates the non-belonging and absolute otherness of the inmates.
Uncovering II: Confessions
The prime instrument for revealing a traitorous mind was, of course, the confession, which in its
ﬁnal version stood at the end of the interrogation process. It marked the dramatic ritual climax
signifying the conversion process into a confessed traitor speaking “truth” to its master.47
However, the confession did not only reconstruct a crime; it was also a meandering tool that
uncovered a traitorous identity conspiring with foreign powers, ﬁrst lured into treason at least
decades before. For many inmates, a confession went through several drafts, each version with
red-inked instructions in the margins by prison chief Duch for the interrogators to ask more
about certain individuals and events, or just exclamations that the prisoner was lying—and, in
one instance at least, that the prisoner was “too hardheaded,” so the interrogator may beat him
to death.48 Confessions had to be repeated until they corresponded to the regime’s master
narrative of traitorous Khmer networks conspiring with foreign powers.
Counterrevolutionary behavior was not accidental (at least for those incarcerated in
S-21), but confession needed to prove that the inmates had weak and amoral personalities, were
part of a larger patrimonial network, and to uncover a sociogram of treason. That way, the
confession traced not only the evolution of the alleged crime but also the evolution of becoming
one hundred percent Yuon in mind. And it served to uncover not only the fact that the inmate
became a foreign agent hiding among the people and within the revolution a long time ago, but
also that he or she was part of a larger counterrevolutionary conspiracy. Confessions all started
with basic socioeconomic information and ran from early childhood until the day they had been
arrested by arrested by Angkar, which translates as “the Organization.” It was essential, as
stated in a Khmer Rouge manual, to show that they were responsible for economic failures.
In growing rice there are two battles. First, the battle with
nature. Second, the battle with destructive enemies. The enemy
destruction begins with breaking stalks when seedlings are
being transplanted; they don’t transplant from the stalk and the
roots at all, they break the stalks to destroy, they destroy during
the harvest, they destroy during transport, and they destroy in
threshing. Raising crops is a technical struggle, a class struggle,
a struggle between revolution and no revolution.49
A large chunk of a confession centered on admitting to economic sabotage or slowing
down the work of a cooperative to discredit the revolution. Usually, however, the reason that
people became traitors in the ﬁrst place—decades ago, when they were young—was said to be
moral weakness relating to individualistic thinking, a poison of the social milieu they had been
part of. Typically, someone else—a close contact, such as a teacher, village chief, or boss at work

47

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books,
[1976] 1990).
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information for the collective ﬁrst; compare for example, Archived Document, “Letter from Duch to Pon,”
Document No. E3/376, Virtual Tribunal Archive, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).
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complete confession was a punishable crime that could lead to the imprisonment and, consequently, death of the
interrogator; Archived Document, “The Activities of Rin in the Ofﬁce S-21,” Document No. D16983, Sterling
Library, Yale University and the Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.
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—told them how bad the revolution was; how people were starving; how it ended all material
possession, freedom, and religion; and that they would hide and build up forces to bring down
the revolution. Counterrevolutionary weakness—making Khmer people receptive to
manipulative speeches by imperialist and capitalist others—was usually framed in ways very
similar to Buddhist moralities, in which individualistic motives such as greed, delusion, and
anger are the root causes of bad behavior. A well-known example for these three individualistic
motives as root causes for immoral action is the regionally highly inﬂuential Buddhist text on
the three realms of the world, Trai Bhūm.50 In a similar vein, non-revolutionary thoughts and
behaviors were, in confession, generally said to be caused by individualistic motives such as
greed (such as craving private property or luxury consumption or “being excited to meet the
family”),51 power (enjoying authority and control over others),52 and/or sexual lust (having
extramarital affairs, stalking innocent women).53 Even interrogators themselves had to be
vigilant not to fall prey to individualistic thoughts that placed personal comfort and pleasures
above the collective:
Must raise the ﬂag [among our cadres] of eliminating the three
types of individualisms:
- Individualism in laziness, lazy in thinking, lazy in
reﬂecting, lazy in interrogating harshly in order to deeply
understand the true nature of a problem, all the way to
being lazy, lazy to walk, lazy to write, lazy to listen, lazy to
speak and instruct, lazy to reeducate. The weakest type of
laziness is just thinking of sleep.
- Individualism in viewpoint: That we see only ourselves as
all good and correct in all then criteria. Meaning that
whatever one thinks is all correct, whatever one does is all
good.
- Individualism in power and authority: Not sticking to the
concrete, not sticking close to the movement, not sticking
close to the masses. And power is the second key factor,
that is, must study from the movement, must grasp.54
The interrogators, guards, medics, and other types of S-21 personnel arrested and
tortured into confession themselves were all accused of sabotaging security work due to greed,
laziness, sexual cravings, or a will to power over others. All confessions followed a uniform
template. They served the purpose of showing that traitors were long-term conspirators and
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that this was a counterrevolutionary activity of great proportions, ongoing for decades. Former
Minister of Information Hu Nim, for instance, declared:
I would like to tell the party, with respect: After Brother No 2
had two work meetings with me, the last day being 10 April
1977, I gave myself to the party. From then on, I have been
doing self-criticism every day. I see that my criminal acts
against the Organisation, against the Communist Party of
Kampuchea, against the nation and people of Kampuchea, are
of great dimension.55
Being on the other side of morality and conspiring against the people made one thing
clear to Hu Nim’s confession personality: “I’m not a human being, I’m an animal.”56 All
confessions ended with a list of traitors that served to reveal networks of enemies (khsae).
Inmates provided lists of names of co-conspirators under torture. Some names were real, and
others made up. Some tried to list names of people who had been previously arrested.57 The
Khmer Rouge were not so much interested in reconstructing a crime but rather reconstructing
moral ﬂaws as a source of treason. They constructed a complete sociogram of a respondent’s life
course alongside everyone the inmate ever knew and, of course, all his or her superiors and
subordinates through time.58 The list of names was often turned into a representation of a
counterrevolutionary network (Image 5).

Image 5. Graph of “CIA Networks.”59
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Torture Machine,” New Statesman, May 2, 1980, 676.
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These networks had to be uncovered, outlined, and tracked. Likewise, their non-Khmer,
animal-like nature belonging to Vietnamese, CIA, or KGB networks had to be shown and
outlined in the confessions. This resulted in at times paradoxical end statements such as this
one, where a former electrical worker declared his guilt and his deserving of death while also
claiming not to have betrayed the revolution:
I am not a member of the CIA. I confessed to being CIA when
confronted with my guilt. I beg the Organization to [kill] me
because I have not followed the revolution. … I deserve to die
because the Organization had [once] trusted me. I no longer
wish to live, make no protests to the Organization, by way of
seeking justice. But I must declare that in my heart I have not
betrayed the Organization at all. I declare my guilt … because I
am dying. Long live the glorious revolution! Long live the
Revolutionary Organization!60
Aggregation in a Mass Grave or Liminality in Death
Finally, othering, liminality, and semiotics of “Vietnameseness” also surface in the concluding
phase of the S-21 liminal ritual, the aggregation stage. For one, the killing of infants by hitting
them against a tree “is part of a well-known lexicon of atrocities purportedly committed by the
Vietnamese during the early nineteenth century.”61 And of course, throwing dead enemies into a
mass grave has the obvious symbolic meaning of signaling death without worth to the
collective. However, there is more to the execution process. The classic interpretation of the
aggregation phase of rites of passage would be a stage in which initiates re-enter society with a
newly attained status and identity.62 The death practices at the execution site Choeung Ek are
either a case of this re-entering or a case of permanent liminality for “passengers”—ghosts, in
this case—that do not transition into rebirth. What is obvious is that mass graves are against
Khmer death rituals. But what are Khmer death rituals exactly, and how do the mass graves
relate to them?
The ﬁrst interpretation would view the mass burials as an aggregation into the social
status of a Vietnamese. Ethnic Khmer Cambodians strongly prefer cremation over burial, with
burial considered a Chinese, Sino-Khmer, and especially Vietnamese practice. Most classic
Khmer religious texts on death rituals “ignore burial as an option.”63 During the mid- until the
late 20th century at least, burying the dead, therefore, has strong non-Khmer overtones, if not a
speciﬁcally Vietnamese iconography. Fitting for this hint at a symbolic dimension to the death
practices is that the many executed ethnic Vietnamese were not killed at Choeung Ek, as
highlighted by Him Huy, who was in charge of transporting victims there.64 Even more
strikingly, Westerners were taken to a place near the prison and—against what the upper
echelons of the party must have considered “Western” practice—burned on orders from
above.65 This ethnic variation further underlines the symbolic dimension of execution and
burial/cremation practices under the Khmer Rouge.66
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Burial is not unknown to ethnic Khmer nor in the religious belief systems of the region,
but it usually relates to either “bad deaths” that have no chance of leading to nirvana or to a
history before crematories, when corpses had been buried until only bones were left and these
remains were later burned. In Khmer traditional beliefs, those who die a tragic and sudden
death become ghosts trapped in the world, experiencing grave difﬁculties in transitioning into
an afterworld or rebirth.67 Hence, killing Khmer violently and leaving them in a state in
between and without later cremation means that—rather than entering a new status as Yuon—it
is more likely that liminality (the transition into the afterlife) is halted, and the victims become
suffering, trapped ghosts known as khmouch. The fact that Khmer view the ghosts of the killing
ﬁelds as trapped even today shows the symbolic dimension of a possibly permanent liminal
existence that might also inform, knowingly or not, the practices of the Khmer Rouge cadres
aimed at punishing the enemy even after his or her death.68 For the dead enemies, torments
went on. Equally, in classic Buddhist conceptions, though not widely popular in Cambodia,
kunapa is the second of four neighboring hells surrounding the eight hot hells: a swamp of
rotting corpses.69 Like other torture regimes and also like concentration camps, the violent
liminal regime of S-21 not only enforces a new status onto the victim through pain, torture and
humiliation, it even symbolically captures the victims in liminality in the afterlife, in this case as
trapped and suffering ghosts. On a symbolic level at least, the victims are even after death
bound to and tortured within the liminal regime of their executioners.
Conclusion: Dead Certainty
For Arjun Appadurai, ethnic violence involves producing a clear difference from uncertain
identities, with its perpetrators aiming to produce a “dead certainty.”70 The lethal rite of passage
toward this certainty in the Khmer Rouge central prison S-21 was infused with semiotics of
Vietnamese and absolute otherness; of Cold War narratives; of network politics (khsae); of a
profound difference in terms of thinking, lifestyle, and biography; of liminal dirt and the loss of
markers of humanity; and of Cambodian Buddhist iconography and a discourse of pain,
delusion, and transition. This article does not attempt to explain why people killed politically
uncertain identities but rather to reveal how violent practices aimed at “manufacturing
difference”71 followed particular scripts that reﬂected consecutive stages of a violent rite of
passage, expressing cultural ideas of Cold War politics, of “Vietnameseness,” and of an
imagined Khmer Buddhist moral universe. The enemy had to bow to the CIA, the KGB, and the
Yuon head of Ho Chi Minh to demonstrate his misguided political and ethnic allegiances. He
had to declare his non-Khmer and traitorous nature within the situation of torture and within
his fabricated confession. Within that confession, he had to declare not only his singular act of
treason at a given point of time, for which he was imprisoned, but also that he had been and
remained part of a larger, long-lasting scheme and that every act of his life was part of a grand
local (as well as worldwide) conspiracy. The enemy had to embody an explanation of the
economic failures of central planning. He had to signify individualistic lust, greed, and striving
for power as the basis of his thinking and acting. And, of course, he had to prove himself
polluted and dangerous, a toxin to the purity of the Khmer collective,72 thereby justifying his
own execution and permanent liminality as a trapped, suffering ghost.
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Introduction
In 2007, The Mothers of Srebrenica, an organization which represents 6,000 women whose
family members were massacred at Srebrenica in 1995, ﬁled a civil action in the District Court of
the Hague against the United Nations (UN) and the Dutch Government. The Mothers of
Srebrenica trial brought international attention to the role in which UN peacekeepers stationed
at Srebrenica played in the massacre of over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys by the Bosnian Serb
Army (VRS) under the command of General Mladić.1 During the same period, the actions of
peacekeepers in Rwanda, particularly those of Lieutenant Luc Lemaire, who by withdrawing
the 90 UN troops under his command, abandoned 2,000 Tutsi refugees to be murdered by the
Interahamwe,2 begged the question of what role UN peacekeepers played in the genocides.3
Were the UN peacekeepers helpless bystanders or were they a culpable party that had the
ability to stop massacres but instead made a conscious decision to allow them to take place?
This article reanalyzes both the situational and operational factors on the ground that
inﬂuenced the decisions of UN peacekeepers during their deployments in Srebrenica and
Rwanda. By approaching these events from a mental health perspective, it is shown that there
are numerous factors which gravely impacted the mental state of UN peacekeepers. These
factors, when combined with the operational limitations which peacekeepers faced, were
ultimately detrimental to their ability to take any serious action to prevent genocide from taking
place. I take a more in-depth look at the aspects of their experiences which the peacekeepers
themselves report as signiﬁcant or deﬁning factors of their deployment and analyze them using
the diagnostic questions asked of returning veterans found in the Deployment Risk and
Resilience Inventory (DRRI-2) Scales.4 The DRRI-2 Scales are an instrument used to assess
veterans’ risk of or resilience against developing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
following their deployment. The use of these scales will aid in shedding new light on the daily
conditions that the UN peacekeepers operated under and which only eyewitnesses who lived
these experiences can describe how they impacted their mental wellbeing and the agency they
felt they could exercise. This article sheds light on previously under-explored stressors that
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would have inﬂuenced the heavily criticized decisions of both UN commands in Rwanda and
Srebrenica in not doing more to prevent injury or death to civilians.
Before discussing at length the impact which the speciﬁc conditions of their deployment
had on the agency of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and Rwanda, it is important to outline the
orders which dictated their actions and which they were expected to carry out as soldiers no
matter the conditions they faced. For the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in
Srebrenica, their mandate was outlined in three UN Resolutions: Resolution 819—issued April
16, 1993, Resolution 824—issued May 6, 1993, and Resolution 836—issued June 4, 1993. These
resolutions outline that the UN peacekeepers were to ensure that Srebrenica and the
surrounding area be established as a safe zone5 where the ill and wounded could be transported
from and to ensure both through forces on the ground and through negotiations undertaken at
higher levels that humanitarian aid could reach the enclave unhindered.6 In Resolution 836, the
security council also condemned all efforts by the Bosnian Serb forces to ethnically cleanse the
city of Bosniaks.7 Therefore, the mandate for UN troops in Srebrenica was to protect the safe
zone, to ensure that humanitarian aid was able to reach the safe zone and it was implied,
although not explicitly stated that UN troops should prevent evacuations of civilians by
Bosnian Serb forces.8 Finally, only in the last resolution issued, UN Security Council (UNSC)
Resolution 836, were UN troops authorized to use force in Bosnian safe zones. Use of force was
only authorized in cases of self defense, in response to bombardment or armed incursion of the
safe zone by any party involved, or if those parties obstructed the transport of supplies to safe
zones.9
Particularly for the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, the growing political concerns of
the UN, which will be discussed at greater length later in this article, played a decisive role in
the creation of both situational and operational factors which compromised the success of UN
peacekeepers in carrying out their missions and ultimately put them at greater risk. Initially, the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) established in October 1993, was
deployed to see that the Arusha Peace Agreement was adhered to.10 This mission was a
challenge for peacekeepers from the beginning due to the presence of Hutu-extremist elements
in Rwanda, the political instability of the Hutu-ran government, and doubts within the UN that
the Rwandan government could successfully implement a transitional government.11 The early
Arusha peacekeeping mission was tied to political progress and peacekeepers on the ground
were confronted by early 1994, with a rapidly devolving political situation culminating in the
assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, reigniting civil
war.12 With the targeting and murder of Belgian peacekeepers and mounting international
pressure, this prompted the UN to make the decision to withdraw the bulk of UN forces in
Rwanda on April 21, 1994.13 UN troops remaining in Rwanda were mandated not only to
contribute to a cease-ﬁre agreement, but to also establish safe zones and provide security for the
humanitarian aid being delivered to civilians. Most pertinent to our discussion, UN forces in
Rwanda were indeed mandated, unlike in Srebrenica, to “contribute to the security and
protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda.”14
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Since its ﬁrst appearance as a psychological diagnosis in 1980, PTSD has come a long
way in terms of recognition as a diagnosis and also in its connection with earlier descriptions of
stress-related disorders including the diagnosis of shell shock during and after World War I.15
However, it is only with recent conﬂicts in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan in the early
21st century that PTSD has become a part of the public and psychiatric discourse prompted by
research with veterans particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom.16 One
characteristic of PTSD is that its onset is dependent on external events. This deﬁning feature of
the disorder has led to a debate over the validity of PTSD as a diagnosis, questioning if the
disorder, which originated in the context of military psychiatry, has become an overapplied
social construct.17 However, especially for historians who study war, genocide, and
displacement, the reciprocal relationship between the psychological factors that drive human
agency and their impact on history demands further exploration. We would be dipping into the
role of a psychologist if we tried to suppose knowing the inner motivations of a person. What
we can reveal as historians are the events and pre-conditions that impact the agency of
historical actors. By looking at decision formation and analyzing the agency of historical actors
through the lens of mental health, historians have a new tool to understand the factors which
impact that agency. This article analyzes the accounts given by the UN commander in Rwanda,
Roméo Dallaire, the UN commander at the École Technique Ofﬁcielle (ETO), Luc Lemaire, the
Dutch Commander in Srebrenica, Thom Karremans, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
volunteers at the UN compound in Srebrenica to better understand, given the circumstances
under which the UN peacekeepers were working, what can we as fellow human beings have
expected from these men?
The tool that I will use to better understand the multi-layered sources of stress which
characterized the experiences of UN personnel in Rwanda and Srebrenica are the DRRI-2 Scales.
These scales function as a series of questions that allow veterans post-deployment to identify on
a number scale how much or how often they were exposed to certain deployment-related
factors. These factors either put war veterans at risk, as in, they put stress on the mental health
of the individual, or help them to be resilient, providing mental support against developing
PTSD.18 These scales were modiﬁed in 2012 to address a wider range of both intrapersonal
factors, such as sexual harassment and also increased concerns, particularly for soldiers
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, of insurgency warfare and exposure to nuclear, biological
and chemical agents. I have chosen the DRRI-2 Scales because it is the most detailed assessment
of a veteran’s deployment experiences, especially in exploring the relationship with the
development of PTSD and witnessing the consequences of war.19 This includes witnessing
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injury or death to civilians, mass displacement, the destruction of homes and communities, and
the desperation of those people affected by the conﬂict. With their mandate to protect and
provide relief to civilians, the UN peacekeeping forces’ reason for being there was not to combat
an enemy force as with a soldier under normal rules of engagement, but to create the conditions
for or help to maintain peace.20 For this reason, scales which do not explore these experiences
would not be of use for the purposes of this research.
The revised DRRI-2 Scales were created to address the shift in warfare speciﬁcally
experienced by the United States military in the Middle East from the Gulf Wars to the more
recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan following September 11, 2001.21 The subsequent changes
were to address that the sustained conﬂicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represented a shift towards
insurgency warfare, which involved smaller groups of paramilitaries who could be dispersed
among the civilian population. For this reason, for troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan,
missions could quickly shift from humanitarian missions to delivering lethal force.22 From this
brief overview of the background of the DRRI-2 Scales, there are a few obvious limitations in
applying these scales to understand the risk and resilience factors present for UN troops in
Rwanda and Srebrenica. The ﬁrst and most obvious being that the UN rules of engagement
limited the use of force to such a degree that it was rarely, if ever, used.23 So, while their mission
could shift between providing humanitarian aid and protection to coming under heavy ﬁre, UN
troops were not at risk of causing accidental civilian deaths by mistaking them for enemy
targets, unlike US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.24 Another key limit in the application of the
DRRI-2 Scales in Rwanda and Srebrenica is that the scales do not capture to what extent
decisions made at a higher level by UN headquarters in New York impacted the success of
missions on the ground. The indecisiveness and lack of international support in terms of
ﬁrepower or pressure from the UN high command and from its member states during both
peacekeeping missions was a critical operational risk factor which ampliﬁed the isolation and
sense of unattainability for UN troops in both locations to carry out their respective mandates to
protect safe zones and to safeguard civilians. This lack of support of relief forces, ﬁrepower, and
a united diplomatic and military response were not inhibiting factors, or certainly not to the
degree seen in Rwanda and Bosnia, for the deployments focused on in either the original DRRI
or the revised DRRI-2 Scales.
Despite these limitations, using these scales for the purpose of compiling information
regarding the deployment experiences of UN peacekeepers suits the scales’ original intended
function. The DRRI-2 Scales were created not as a diagnostic tool themselves, but to “provide a
research inventory of risk and resilience measures” to assess deployment-related factors and
what their implications are for the long-term health of veterans and servicemen.25 However,
creating or using such a catalogue of experiences based on their implications for an individual’s
mental wellbeing is often overlooked in historical approaches as a key force behind historical
agency. It is these personal and unseen consequences of experiencing traumatic events that
often give way to the large-scale events that shape history.
In Rwanda and Srebrenica, the massive operational restrictions stemming from the
higher echelons of the UN was a decisive factor which greatly restricted the actions that UN
peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica could take to protect civilian lives. However, what
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remains under explored in the historical analysis of these events is how those operational
restrictions and higher level “politics” of UN peacekeeping limited the perceived or actual
decisions that peacekeepers could take at the time to prevent genocide. By reﬂecting on the
daily conditions, experiences, and limitations described by UN commanders on the ground in
Rwanda and Srebrenica through the questions presented in the DRRI-2 Scales, we can better
understand their impact on agency.
The revised DRRI-2 shows six categories out of a total of seventeen which have the
highest correlation with the development of PTSD. These are: Difﬁcult Living and Working
Environment (56%), Perceived Threat (55%), Postdeployment Stressors (55%), Postdeployment Social
Support (46%), Combat Experiences (45%) and Aftermath of Battle (43%).26
For the purposes of my research, I will focus on what the DRRI deﬁnes as “missionrelated factors”—these are factors which have the potential to cause stress during a soldier's
deployment.27 Of those six critical sections, I will also limit my focus to the question sections
that have been discussed at length by Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, (then) Lieutenant Luc
Lemaire, and Colonel Thom Karremans and clearly constitute deﬁning aspects of their
respective deployments with the UN in Rwanda and Srebrenica.28 Therefore, I will not be
including the section that focuses on Postdeployment Social Support, nor will I discuss the section
on Postdeployment Stressors. Furthermore, I will not be analyzing several questions from the
section on Combat Experiences (Section D of the DRRI-2). This is due to the fact that questions 1,
2, 8, 12, 13, 16, and 17 of this section ask if soldiers were involved in scenarios where they ﬁred
their weapon, launched an assault on enemy troops or otherwise used violence to subdue a
perceived enemy threat.29 These questions are therefore irrelevant to the UN peacekeeping
forces in Rwanda and Srebrenica, as they were under strict orders not to use force to achieve
their mission.30 Additionally, a further four questions in this section that ask whether or not
soldiers witnessed a member of the unit of civilians being seriously wounded or killed are
discussed at length under the sections Perceived Threat and The Aftermath of Battle (which has
been identiﬁed in this article as Post-Combat Experiences and therefore will not be discussed at
length in the Combat Experiences section). I will also note for each section discussed in this
article, if any further questions are not relevant to this research and why, the most notable being
questions relating to exposure to nuclear, biological and chemical agents (NBCs).
Difﬁcult Living and Working Environment
The ﬁrst section I will be exploring is Section C of DRRI-2, which focuses on the environment in
which soldiers were deployed and the conditions of their daily lives during deployment. It is by
analyzing the accounts of the day-to-day environment that the UN personnel in both Rwanda
and Srebrenica had to operate in and the questions asked by DRRI-2 Scales that we can gain
some understanding about how those conditions impacted the mental state of UN troops.
Section C focuses on analyzing aspects of the deployment environment and living conditions
which after a period of time would have a negative impact on someone’s mental health. These
include questions such as: Could you sleep? Did you have enough food? Was the climate of
deployment uncomfortable? Could you shower when needed and were you living in sanitary
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conditions? Were you allowed do the things needed to get your job done? Could you get as
much privacy as you needed?31
In Karremans’ testimony against VRS General Ratko Mladić at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in July 1996, he describes the conditions of
the UN enclave in Srebrenica as it was cut off by the VRS blockade one year before, from April
to July 1995.32 Karremans’ testimony reveals that if he or the other Dutch soldiers in Srebrenica
ﬁlled out Section C of the DRRI-2, many of their responses would reﬂect a high degree of
exposure to adverse conditions in their living and working environment. Karremans’ testimony
describes an atmosphere of desperation experienced by UN troops in the ﬁnal weeks before the
forced evacuation from the Srebrenica enclave. He describes that due to the blockade, refugees
under their care were starving and without adequate medical attention while UN troops lived
off their combat rations for a considerable period of time.33 Their ability to perform necessary
daily tasks such as showering or more critically, carrying out their mandate to provide aid and
relief to Bosnian refugees were crippled by the fact that they operated without electricity for
weeks. This lack of electricity was compounded by the fact that the Dutch battalion also
experienced heavy rain which lead to cold, damp conditions and also several roads leading into
the enclave became impassable.34 Finally, in terms of humanitarian aid being allowed into the
enclave, the period between April and July of 1995, represents a distinct break with the ability to
negotiate the entry of humanitarian aid that the UN and other relief organizations in Srebrenica
previously enjoyed. Karremans makes it clear that the freedom of movement agreement for
humanitarian aid decided in 1993 no longer applied to Srebrenica by this period.35 This,
compounded with impassable roads and lack of fuel for vehicles, meant that UN troops were
physically trapped inside the Srebrenica enclave. Furthermore, the restriction of movement
meant that for the UN soldiers inside the enclave, there was a critical lack of supplies, of
personnel, and also no relief troops for current UN personnel who had been trying to improvise
under the critical conditions inside the enclave.36 Finally, before Karremans’ ﬁrst meeting with
Mladić on July 11, he acknowledges in his ICTY testimony that he and the other UN troops in
Srebrenica had had no sleep for the previous ﬁve days. This was due to the intensiﬁed shelling
of the city by the VRS and the resulting displacement, death and injury within the enclave and
in the surrounding area.37 With the retreat of UN troops and refugees to the Potočari enclave,
living conditions were very similar in that they were exceptionally overcrowded; there was little
water in hot conditions and UN convoys which provided the only chance for medicine, food or
even for timely evacuation on the ground, were not allowed through Bosnian-Serb blockades.38
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Karremans’ account of the daily conditions within the Srebrenica enclave is supported
by various personnel with MSF.39 Those working for MSF describe the logistical nightmare of
trying to provide food, medicine, and adequate shelter for the enclave which was critically
overpopulated with refugees and consistently bombarded by heavy artillery ﬁre from BosnianSerb forces.40 There are numerous references to the VRS barring vital humanitarian aid from
entering the city, amounting to as much as seventy percent of supplies not reaching the
enclave.41 MSF coordinator, Eric Stobbaerts, estimated that the city was ﬁlled with almost four
times its pre-war population.42 He also describes that the only food available in the Muslim
enclaves were ﬂour, oil, tinned meat, and powdered milk, causing severe immune and
nutritional deﬁciencies.43 What the MSF testimonies do is help to give an idea of how the
environment created by the Bosnian-Serb blockade and bombardment of the city impacted
Karreman’s ultimate decision to allow the forcible displacement of the Muslim population from
the city in July 1995.44 It is also important to note, unlike the timeline of events in Rwanda,
which constituted a much shorter timeframe, the city of Srebrenica experienced these conditions
in increased severity over a period of three years.45 This of course, constitutes a prolonged
exposure to increasingly desperate conditions in the city as evermore refugees ﬂed to the
enclave, more people became injured due to shellings and a critical lack of shelter, food and
water. The threat in Srebrenica that existed for months, if not years, prior to the UN’s
withdrawal, was that people were being left to starve, freeze, or die of disease and the UN, due
to the Bosnian-Serb blockade, could do little logistically to fulﬁl their mandate to maintain the
safe zone.46 To give an idea of just how injurious the daily conditions were to the health and life
were of those within the Srebrenica enclave, it was calculated by the Court of Appeals which
retried the Mothers of Srebrenica case in 2007, that the victims of the Srebrenica massacre had a
mere thirty percent chance of survival if they had been able to remain within the UN enclave
after July 12, 1995.47 This horriﬁc reality of daily life in the UN enclave in Srebrenica left
Karremans with little choice but to withdraw on July 11. It is made clear through the MSF
reports already discussed in this section, that Karremans and the UN personnel under his
command faced grave challenges in protecting human life within the enclave due to the
obstacles that were present in providing adequate humanitarian aid and adequate living
conditions.48 As will be discussed in the following section on perceived threat, the chance of
successfully carrying out their mandate only would have continued to decrease for
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peacekeepers as and if more shelling had occurred directly targeting the enclave following the
initial barrage on July 11.49
Regarding the conditions of the UN enclaves in Rwanda, Dallaire reported that UN
enclaves in Kigali already began to run out of food in April.50 They also reported that water was
an ongoing struggle as more people, especially wounded people, ﬂooded in.51 It is also evident
from Dallaire’s documentary, that UN safe areas, for example the one at Amahoro Stadium in
Kigali, became, in his words, “like a concentration camp.”52 Amahoro Stadium at its most
critical point, swelled with an estimated twelve thousand people seeking the protection of UN
troops. Dallaire describes that people were being protected by the UN who surrounded the
stadium, only so they could die inside due to lack of food and water.53 Furthermore, Dallaire
described the horrendous smell which was a result of having nowhere inside the stadium for
the dead to be buried.54 For the most part, in terms of movement on the ground, UN troops in
Rwanda, unlike in Srebrenica, did have the freedom of movement necessary to accomplish daily
tasks.55 However, Dallaire reports that when it became clear that the United States, Canada, and
even the UN were not willing to lend any support to the mission in Rwanda, it gave a complete
sense of isolation to the mission. Without any support, Dallaire reported that he felt
surrounded.56 The sense of isolation and being surrounded by the enemy that Dallaire
described became literal as the Interahamwe took, at one point, three sides of the city of Kigali.57
This sense of isolation to the UN missions in both Srebrenica and Rwanda was also a critical
factor in increasing the perceived threat to peacekeepers and will be discussed further in the
following section.
Based on the accounts provided by Karremans and Dallaire which describe the
conditions and environment they experienced during their respective deployments in
Srebrenica and Rwanda, it is likely that they and other personnel under their command would
acknowledge to having high exposure to the stressors presented in questions 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13,
and 14.58 Furthermore, due to the intense shelling of both the UN enclave in Srebrenica and the
UN Headquarters in Kigali, Karremans, Dallaire, and most likely many of the men under their
command would indicate, in answering question 8 of Section C, that they suffered frequent
exposure to loud noises during their deployment.59 The frequency of bombing or shelling on
UN enclaves will be discussed at length in the following section on perceived threat. The
comparison of DRRI-2 and the accounts of Karremans and Dallaire show that they were
exposed to many stressors that originated from the daily environment in which they worked.
Their descriptions show that they were in extremely uncomfortable conditions for months on
end and that environment also became increasingly restricted as a physical space. Therefore, it
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is only logical that Karremans, Dallaire and any peacekeeper holding a position of command in
Rwanda and Srebrenica would not entertain any options that would either prolong or intensify
the desperate conditions that they were working in. This includes the decision made by
Karremans to agree to a withdrawal of UN troops from the Srebrenica-Potočari compound on
July 21, 1995.
Perceived Threat
Section G of the DRRI-2 titled Deployment Concerns, focuses on the dangers that soldiers felt they
were exposed to during their deployment.60 There are several questions in this section that focus
on biological concerns such as infectious disease, medicines available, and exposure to NBCs
which, from Karremans, Lemaire, and Dallaire’s accounts of UN deployment in Bosnia and
Rwanda, are not discussed as primary points of concern. Due to that fact, I will not discuss
threat of infectious disease or exposure to NBCs as stressors that impacted the spectrum of
action in which the UN operated in. However, what UN peacekeepers’ accounts can attest to is
the perceived threat from shelling, direct threats including assassination and in the case of
Rwanda, other artillery such as Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), from various elements
present in the two conﬂict zones. Through Dallaire and Karremans’ testimonies, it is apparent
that even as a peacekeeping force, the lives of UN peacekeepers faced numerous threats during
their deployment.
Karremans and the UN peacekeeping force in Srebrenica were aware, due to the
restriction of movement in or out of the enclave due to bad weather and the Bosnian Serb
blockade, that if the city was shelled, they would not be able to organize a timely evacuation.61
Karreman's ICTY testimony demonstrates that he felt the conditions inside the enclave were
inhumane and that due to the restriction of movement in or out of the enclave, refugees and UN
personnel alike, were trapped inside the enclave.62 Beginning on July 6, 1995, the city came
under direct assault by the VRS under the command of General Mladić. The area surrounding
the enclave fell under heavy shelling from the artillery which completely surrounded the city.
This lasted until July 11 when the UN enclave itself was shelled directly, constituting an
immediate threat to the lives of all inside the enclave.63 The shelling between July 6 and July 11
displaced an estimated 40,000 refugees,64 roughly 19,000–25,000 of which ﬂed to the Potočari
compound approximately six kilometers northwest of the city.65 It is important to note that even
if the defense of the Srebrenica enclave was no longer attainable, that upon leaving, the UN’s
mission was compromised not only in terms of their ability to protect refugees, but also by
moving to a position which rendered them more vulnerable to attack.66 In terms of UN troops
being able to respond with use of force to VRS attacks, the only option for Karremans at
Srebrenica was to request close air support from NATO. During the period between July 6 and
July 11, NATO only provided close air support starting at 2pm on July 11.67 However,
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Karremans testiﬁed that he felt NATO support was “too little, too late” and in fact, lead to
further aggression and threats made by General Mladić to shell the enclave at Potočari.68
There are also numerous examples of threats and intimidation tactics which contributed
to the perceived threat to the Dutchbat. In one of their meetings, General Mladić directly
threatened to shell UN troops and the thousands of refugees under UN protection if Karremans
was not able to stop NATO air strikes against the VRS.69 Karremans’ testimony also indicates
that he felt Mladić had the military capability to carry out this threat and that there was no
safety from Bosnian Serb shelling either at Srebrenica or later at the enclave at Potočari.70
During their ﬁrst meeting and even before, via radio communication, General Mladić indicated
that if the air strikes against his troops were not stopped, he was willing to directly shell the UN
compound and the immediate surrounding areas which risked not only mass refugee but UN
casualties as well.71 Mladić’s threat of shelling is also further conﬁrmed by the Nederlands
Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) report on Srebrenica. The NIOD report states that
the VRS’s mortars and guns were directly visible from the entrance gate to the Potočari
compound and would have caused “carnage among densely packed masses of refugees.”72
These numerous factors left Karremans and the other UN troops both powerless and extremely
vulnerable to attack because they had no effective means with which to engage the VRS if ﬁred
upon.73
At the critical point of evacuating refugees out of Potočari beginning on July 12,
Dutchbat troops have been accused of “aiding” the separation of male refugees which
ultimately allowed for the massacre of one hundred to four hundred men from the Potočari
compound.74 Very much so, the VRS forces controlled this event. Not only by design, through
ensuring that they provided the only transportation which could access the compound, but also
by disarming UN troops during the evacuations. Going beyond simply forcing peacekeepers at
gunpoint to discard their weapons and ﬂak jackets, one VRS soldier “demonstrated” that the
UN ﬂak jackets could not stand up to their armor-piercing rounds.75 So not only was there
physical disarming of UN troops, this one instance served as a further psychological
reinforcement that even if they had this protection (which had now been removed from them),
UN troops did not stand a chance in a combat situation against the VRS. If they did not comply
with the evacuation of refugees under VRS terms, even if they witnessed the separation of ablebodied men from refugee line-ups, there would be no barrier to them being eliminated should
they resist.76
In Rwanda, General Dallaire believed the Interahamwe were emboldened by stories of
how the UN presence as a peacekeeping force sent to protect the civilian population in Bosnia
was essentially disregarded by Bosnian Serb forces. Dallaire also felt that the Interahamwe’s use
of intimidation in attacking and even killing UN personnel was also a viable tactic to encourage
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UN forces to withdraw rather than risk casualties.77 Therefore, unlike in Bosnia, the
Interahamwe had no hesitation in directly targeting UN personnel with bombs, grenades, land
mines and other forms of ﬁrepower. In his documentary, Dallaire casually laughs during his
ten-year anniversary return to Rwanda “[e]ven driving down this road without someone taking
pot shots at you is already an improvement.”78 Dallaire also noted the fear among UN staff at
headquarters in Kigali when the building came under direct bombardment with grenades and
machine gun ﬁre starting in mid-April 1994. These bombardments carried on for months and
extensively disrupted the day to day workings of the UN forces, as all personnel were forced to
retreat to the ground ﬂoor of the UN headquarters building during the bombardments.79
Based on Dallaire’s account of the UN mission in Rwanda, there was an omnipresent
threat to life due to unidentiﬁed persons, but almost certainly the Interahamwe, who ﬁred at
UN trucks whilst out on the streets performing their duties and also direct bombardment on the
UN headquarters in Kigali. Another example of intimidation tactics used by the Interahamwe
which was perceived as a threat to peacekeepers’ safety were described by Lemaire at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1997.80 In his testimony, Lemaire
commented that during the period where refugees were gathering to the UN safe zone at the
ETO (also referred to as the Don Bosco School), there was a constant presence by the
Interahamwe monitoring their activities.81 He noted that they would watch the enclave from the
crossroads 300-meters up the road from the school; and as time went on, those groups got
bigger, up to ﬁfteen people sometimes with weapons. In addition, vehicles full of Interahamwe
would regularly drive by. Gunﬁre could be heard regularly in the area and was attributed to
murders being committed by the Interahamwe. Lemaire himself described the presence of the
Interahamwe as “being surrounded.”82 For Lemaire, it is quite possible this perception of being
surrounded was fueled even further by the fact that unlike in Somalia, where Lemaire and a
portion of his men had served, when enemy individuals approached in close proximity, UN
troops could not ﬁre at them if necessary.83 In his ICTR testimony, Lemaire describes that the
rules of engagement for Rwanda put peacekeepers in close proximity to paramilitary forces,
particularly at roadblocks, in highly threatening situations and that due to the rules of
engagement, they were forced to yield in these situations. Lemaire felt that the new rules of
engagement, which only allowed for use of force in cases of legal self-defense, resulted in less
effective ways for the UN to carry out their mission and defend themselves. In this case, this
change in the rules of engagement particularly if any UN troops had served in Somalia where
they were heavily equipped and were authorized to use force if necessary, made the perception
of being surrounded as powerful as if they had actually been encircled by paramilitaries.84
In addition to the threat that shelling posed to the lives of UN troops, another added
piece of leverage that General Mladić and the VRS took over Karremans and the UN command
was that they secured UN hostages.85 The timeframe in which those hostages were taken
indicates that this move was strategically planned by the VRS. Between July 8 and July 10,
General Mladić attacked numerous UN checkpoints near the UN enclave at Srebrenica, so by
the time Karremans was ordered to his ﬁrst meeting with Mladić, Mladić had 55 UN soldiers as
hostages.86 Naturally, the meetings with Karremans are signiﬁcant because during those
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meetings on July 11 and 12, Karremans was informed that all Bosniak refugees would be
forcibly evacuated from the region.87 Furthermore, the targeted massacre against Bosniak men
and boys also began on July 12, two days after the UN hostages were secured. It is highly likely
that if General Mladić’s intention to remove or ethnically cleanse the area of all Bosniak
Muslims had been compromised, the lives of those UN hostages would have been under grave
threat.88 Therefore, it is clear that the lives of Karremans, his men stationed at the enclave in
Srebrenica, and the hostages, who were also under Karremans’ command were under grave
threat by the VRS. By July 12, 1995, Karremans found himself and his unit surrounded, unable
to carry out their orders, with no hope of backup or support and limited to no supplies. This
fundamentally inﬂuenced his decision to comply with the forced evacuation of the remaining
refugees by the VRS. This decision could be viewed as a withdrawal to a defensible location in
order to save some of the refugees Karremans was charged with protecting. It is clear that at
Srebrenica and possibly more so at Potočari, due to the operational constraints, rules of
engagement and enemy threat, he would have had minimal success in protecting civilian lives
or ensuring the safety of his men otherwise.89
In Rwanda, based on the accounts of Dallaire and supporting insight given by his
Executive Assistant in Rwanda, Major Brent Beardsley, the perceived threat posed by the
Interahamwe and other extremist factions, originated from the fact that they, in a matter of a
day, were able to execute a series of seemingly well-planned murders of any government
ofﬁcials who could have soothed the mass tensions that had come to a head after the
assassination of President Habyarimana.90 This included both Hutu moderates and Tutsis
within government of which extremist forces within the military knew exactly where they and
their families could be found and murdered within days, if not hours, of the President’s
assassination.91 Furthermore, extremist propaganda made it clear that there was a distinct antiBelgian sentiment among the Interahamwe and other factions.92 This resulted in a situation
where, unlike in Bosnia, UN soldiers were not just taken captive, they were tortured and killed.
On April 7, 1994, ten Belgian peacekeepers were murdered by Major Bernard Ntuyahaga of the
Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), despite the warning sent by Dallaire on January 11, 1994 to UN
high command in New York expressly stating that there was a plot to murder Belgian troops.93
The murdered Belgian peacekeepers had been sent by Dallaire to guard the house of the
Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingimana, where they were disarmed and transported to
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Camp Kigali and were murdered by Ntuyahaga the same day.94 Dallaire’s command was
heavily criticized for not taking some kind of action to extract the Belgian hostages on April 7.
However, Dallaire felt that he was in an impossible position. Dallaire believed if a UN force had
gone in to rescue the ten Belgian peacekeepers being held hostage, he estimates that would have
risked “twenty, thirty casualties and on top of that, they could just blast the shit out of my
headquarters and my mission would have been over.”95 This indicates that Dallaire did not feel
at the time that he had the manpower or the ﬁrepower to launch a rescue operation without
risking casualties or opening himself up to an attack on his headquarters due to a lack of
presence there. Furthermore, he felt that such a mission would not, due to the likely loss of life,
be supported by the UN high command and its member states.96
The Interahamwe eventually became so emboldened that they threatened Dallaire
himself as the Force Commander of UNAMIR in Rwanda and issued daily death threats that if
he were seen by the Interahamwe, he was to be immediately stopped and killed. This not only
threatened the life of Dallaire himself but also, he reports that any UN soldiers who ﬁt his vague
description were targeted and some narrowly escaped being killed before Dallaire could pull
them off the streets.97 The murder of the ten Belgian peacekeepers, the threats to numerous
peacekeepers while carrying out missions, and targeting Dallaire himself, indicates that UN
troops had numerous reasons to perceive a grave threat to their own lives during their
deployment in Rwanda.
Not only is it evident that the perceived threat to the safety of UN peacekeepers on the
ground greatly limited the range of decisions that Dallaire felt he could make, it also directly
impacted the perceived range of options that the UN and the international community had to
intervene and to stop the genocide.98 In its conception, the murder of the ten Belgian
peacekeepers on April 7, 1994 was intended to and ultimately lead to the withdrawal of UN
forces from Rwanda.99 As a political ofﬁcer with the UN during the genocide, Michael Barnett
even went so far as to postulate that the UN took no afﬁrmative action because of the risk it
posed to the UN’s reputation by becoming further embroiled in an “ethnic conﬂict that spelled
little possibility of success and only danger and failure.”100 Two weeks of deliberation, debates,
statements, and recommendations for action suggested by Dallaire resulted in the opposite of
any afﬁrmative action; instead, the result was the withdrawal of bulk of UN peacekeepers from
Rwanda on April 21, 1994. This decision made it very clear that the inﬂuence or action that the
UN would exercise to prevent violence undertaken by the Interahamwe against Tutsi civilians
in the months to follow would be very limited.101 Barnett maintains that the UN’s decision to
maintain only a small token peacekeeping force was not made to protect civilian lives or to
prevent genocide, in fact, it greatly limited the operational capabilities of peacekeepers on the
ground. The small UN force who remained past early April 1994, remained to preserve selfinterest, to symbolize their continued concern and even to mask their unwillingness to send in
an intervention force.102 The lack of communication, withdrawal of the bulk of the UN
peacekeeping force and indecisiveness of the UN and its member states would have most
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certainly increased the perceived threat and actual threat of the Interahamwe to Dallaire and
UN troops on the ground.
During this period of indecision, lack of communication and endless political
deliberation by the UN high command after the murder of the Belgian peacekeepers, Dallaire
recounted the event of the Belgian withdrawal from the ETO on the outskirts of Kigali.103 Today,
this event is one of the most well-known examples of how the perceived threat of the
Interahamwe felt by UN peacekeepers directly lead to actions taken by peacekeepers to
withdraw or remain passive in protecting Rwandan civilians during the genocide.104 On April
11, 1994, 2,000 civilians who had gathered at the school with the belief that they could expect
protection under the UN were murdered by the Interahamwe after Lemaire withdrew the
Belgian-UN troops under his command. As commanding ofﬁcer, Lemaire requested permission
to withdraw to the airport.105 Dallaire also believed that Lemaire purposefully did not inform
either his commanding ofﬁcer in the Belgian forces or Dallaire that they were protecting
Rwandan civilians at the site.106 In describing the circumstances which Lemaire’s troops
operated under at the school and what lead to their withdrawal, Lemaire addressed numerous
factors that presented a real threat to the troops under his command. These factors included the
severe lack of personnel, the change in the rules of engagement, namely the order to not ﬁre
their weapons except when being ﬁred upon and a lack of armored vehicles, heavy weaponry,
and anti-tank missiles.107 Lemaire believed all these elements played a role in why his troops
could not be effective in stopping massacres already taking place in early to mid-April.108 It is
also important to note that while Lemaire’s decision to withdraw knowingly was undertaken at
the cost of refugees’ lives, it is in part, a consequence of the orders guiding UNAMIR forces in
Rwanda at the time. Peacekeepers’ role at this time was primarily to monitor and report the
situation on the ground, act as mediators and to help uphold the Arusha Agreement under UN
Resolution 872109 and its extension under UN Resolution 909.110
In Rwanda, UN peacekeepers faced an added difﬁculty in identifying who was a
member of the Interahamwe. Major Beardsley referred to it as the “third force.”111 The
Government of the Rwandan Republic and the rebels, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front
were considered the ﬁrst and second forces, the third force that Beardsley refers to was the
Interahamwe. The ﬁrst two powers in Rwanda agreed for peace with the Arusha Accords
signed in 1993; however, the Interahamwe were described by Beardsley as the “youth-wing
extremists” that were determined that the Arusha Agreement would not be implemented.112
Dallaire conﬁrmed that during the Rwandan Genocide were as young as fourteen and ﬁfteen
years old.113 Thus, this indicates that members of Interahamwe were not a clearly deﬁned
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enemy military force. They were a fraction of the local population, and when not in the
Interahamwe’s brightly colored uniform, they were not readily identiﬁable as an enemy when
in plain clothes, especially because they could include children among their ranks. These were
local people, in many cases that turned against members of their own communities. In Lt.
Lemaire’s testimony, he points out that in the days following President Habyarimana’s
assassination, the UN command could not identify exactly who ordered the killing of the
Belgian peacekeepers. Lemaire states that “these potential enemies could be FAR troops,
gendarmerie elements or civilians who were working for Interahamwe because these people on
several occasions individually or in groups in a joint manner put our troops, the Belgian troops
in difﬁculty.”114 Finally, he also discusses the challenges his troops faced in protecting the
refugees at the ETO. Lemaire believed that due to one signiﬁcant aspect of the Rwandan
Genocide, namely neighbors attacking neighbors looking to “settle their scores,” that
paramilitaries would risk invading UN safe zones if it achieved the purpose of massacring
those inside whom they felt had wronged them.115
Based on the testimonies of Dallaire, Lemaire, and Karremans, it is likely that the Dutch
army stationed at Srebrenica-Potočari and the UN troops in Kigali, Rwanda would have
responded negatively to all questions in Section G of the DRRI-2 that do not pertain to NBC’s,
disease or pesticides comprising the following questions: 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12.116 It is clear
that the UN felt that due to their lack of ﬁrepower and heavy artillery and additionally, the
superior tactical positions that the VRS and the Interahamwe had, that the decisions the
peacekeepers could make were greatly limited. Furthermore, in Rwanda, UN peacekeepers
faced the added difﬁculty of the enemy being sometimes previously unidentiﬁed or nonuniformed children, but who, nevertheless, were a threat to the lives of UN peacekeepers.117
These stressors therefore indicate that decisions made by peacekeepers to protect civilians
despite the risks to their own lives, were made through UN peacekeepers putting their
exceptionally vulnerable circumstances aside. It also should not be taken lightly that in both
cases where UN troops have been internationally accused of abandoning refugees to be
massacred during the UN withdrawals from Srebrenica-Potočari and from the ETO school in
Rwanda, that there was not simply a perceived threat, but a real and compounded threat to
life.118 In both cases, the enemy used hostages, direct threats, and showcased their immediate
armed presence by positioning themselves just outside the enclaves for all to see. Every day the
UN spent being exposed to these stressors would have also been spent dealing with the reality
that at any time, they would have no realistic way to defend themselves or the people under
their blanket of protection. Furthermore, both UN forces had no reasonable expectation of
rescue if the situation against them turned violent. This is a situation that few soldiers in
modern military conﬂicts, let alone civilians have practical experience with.
Combat and Post-Combat Experiences
Section E of the DRRI-2 is concerned with post-battle experiences. Its goal is to ascertain to what
degree a soldier was exposed to the suffering or death of civilians or fellow military personnel.
The questions asked in this section take such lines of inquiry as to whether or not a veteran
witnessed the death or dismemberment of either fellow soldiers or civilians, if they witnessed
civilians begging, saw civilian homes or communities that had been destroyed, or if they
handled human remains.119 Both Karremans’ and Dallaire’s forces were deployed to Rwanda
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and Bosnia due to the presence of or perceived risk that mass human suffering was either
imminent or already occurring in those regions as a result of civil war. This section will explore
the instances where both UN forces, in their efforts to maintain UN enclaves or safe areas for
displaced civilians, witnessed numerous examples of human suffering and death in their
respective regions of deployment. In the case of Dallaire, he witnessed personally the aftermath
of the murders of his own troops by the Interahamwe and assisted in the removal of disﬁgured
civilian remains in Kigali.120
At the UN enclave in Srebrenica, the experiences of the UN were deﬁned by the goal of
the Bosnian Serb army to displace the Bosnian Muslim population and through depriving them
of food, electricity, and medical supplies to force both the Muslim civilian population and
peacekeeping operations to leave the region.121 While we do not have a direct account from
Karremans himself on his personal experiences witnessing the aftermath of targeted attacks
intended to displace and kill Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, we do have an idea of what those
working in the Srebrenica enclave would have witnessed regarding this based on MSF
accounts.122 It is almost inevitable that UN troops stationed in Srebrenica witnessed the
displacement of thousands of people as the enclave was overwhelmed with displaced civilians
either from the surrounding area or whose homes were destroyed by the shelling of the city. An
area before the war which housed approximately 6,000 people now held around 23,000.123 MSF
reports emphasize that these displaced civilians were entirely dependent on aid rations for
survival, but also critically lacked water and adequate shelter from the heat or from the cold.124
With only a fraction of aid shipments being allowed in by VRS, it is impossible to imagine that
UN personnel stationed at Srebrenica did not witness instances of civilians begging for food or
other assistance as MSF was operating under the protection of the UN within the enclave.125
Furthermore, due to the shelling of the enclave, the evacuation to the enclave at Potočari and
ﬁnally, the penultimate forced evacuations of all Bosnian Muslims to Tuzla, civilians seeking
UN protection lost their homes, their belongings, and experienced their communities destroyed
—not once, but multiple times.126 This indicates that UN personnel stationed at Srebrenica
would likely indicate a strong exposure to questions 1, 2, and 3 of section E which ask if they
witnessed civilian suffering as an aftermath of war.
Stobbaerts also indicates that UN troops would have been exposed to severe injuries to
civilians or civilian casualties. The MSF report indicates that by April of 1993 alone, ﬁve doctors
at the hospital in Srebrenica had already performed almost four hundred amputations.127 The
MSF team at Srebrenica received a steady stream of war-injured people throughout the over
two-year period that they were posted in the area. However, when the enclave itself was
targeted with heavy artillery, both the MSF team and UN personnel became direct witnesses to
civilians being injured or killed. On July 6, 1995, a total of six rockets, 150 artillery, tank bombs,
120

After the bodies of the ten Belgian peacekeepers were recovered, Dallaire personally visited the morgue to view the
bodies. See Dallaire and Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil, 258. For further examples, see Raymont, Journey of
Roméo Dallaire, 00:52:50–00:53:06; and Dallaire and Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil, 348.

121

The Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, 635–636.

122

For examples of accounts where MSF describe the number of wounded and providing medical relief following
instances of shelling or other attacks, please see MSF International Movement, MSF and Srebrenica: 1993–2003, 48
and 51.

123

Ibid., 36

124

Note that two press releases from MSF, the ﬁrst from December 19, 1994 and the second from July 12, 1995 solidify
this overall picture of the conditions displaced civilians faced in the Srebrenica enclave. See Ibid., 37. See also Ibid.,
56–57.

125

For example, looking at the MSF press release from December 19, 1994, it describes that with the amount of food
being allowed into the enclave, refugees were only receiving approximately 905 calories per day in the Srebrenica
enclave, less than half of the normal recommended requirement. See Ibid., 37.

126

For the MSF description of the shelling of the city of Srebrenica and the mass evacuation to Potočari please refer to
Ibid., 52–53. For further details on the forced evacuation of refugees to Tuzla please see Ibid., 55.

127

Ibid., 21–22.

© 2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.3.1741.

Failure to Protect?: Rwanda and Srebrenica

43

mortar bombs as well as countless shells were dropped on the city of Srebrenica, with two
rockets exploding directly within the UN compound. By the end of the day, MSF reported that
thirteen people were injured and four had been killed.128 This demonstrates that UN personnel
in Srebrenica, though perhaps not as closely as MSF doctors and staff, would have also been
exposed to civilians and possibly even their own personnel, being severely wounded,
disﬁgured, or killed, especially when the enclave came under direct attack. These situations are
represented by questions 4, 5, 10 and (possibly) question 7 of Section E of the DRRI-2.129
In Rwanda, unlike in Srebrenica, it is conﬁrmed by General Dallaire that UN troops
were also directly involved in the removal of bodies and regularly witnessed the aftermath of
massacres against civilians. In his documentary, Dallaire discusses how the smell of corpses that
had been left to rot in houses and scattered on the streets all over the city became so
overwhelming that the UN could no longer do their job at headquarters due to the smell. In his
biography, Dalliare describes the smell of the bodies and lingering aftermath of the massacres
that were already taking place within the ﬁrst ﬁve days of the genocide. He describes his
memory of this in vivid detail: “The odour of death in the hot sun; the ﬂies, maggots, rats and
dogs that swarmed to feast on the dead. At times it seemed the smell had entered the pores of
my skin.”130 In order to continue on their duties, the UN had to gather the bodies from the area
surrounding the UN compound and burn them only a short distance away from
headquarters.131 Another instance where the UN forces in Rwanda directly witnessed the
aftermath of an attack on civilians was on May 1, 1994, at the protected site of the Sainte Famille
church in Kigali. At Sainte Famille, a bomb fell in an area where thousands of civilians were
seeking refuge in a UN protected part of the church compound. When Dallaire and his men
arrived after the bomb fell, they witnessed a scene of devastation—“[s]evered limbs and heads,
children ripped in two, the wounded turning their bewildered eyes toward you at the moment
at which you can actually see the life expire from them, the smell of burnt explosives mixed
with burning blood and ﬂesh.”132 Hundreds of civilians turned to Dallaire for answers, rescue,
and for the UN to protect them. These two accounts are some examples of numerous instances
where General Dallaire and his men directly witnessed the destruction of homes and
communities, saw the severe disﬁgurement of civilians, the bodies of dead civilians, and were
involved with the removal of human remains. This indicates that Dallaire’s immediate
command in Kigali would have also responded negatively to questions 3, 8, 9, and 13 of Section
E of the DRRI-2.133
One instance described by General Dallaire also indicates that he and other UN troops
under his command would also respond afﬁrmatively to many questions in Section D of the
DRRI-2 titled Combat Experiences. In his biography, Dallaire describes an attack on a UN patrol
in June 1994. Dallaire was called to an incident where two of his men had been wounded when
their vehicle was believed to have hit a landmine and were then ﬁred on again while trying to
extract themselves from the vehicle.134 Later, the wounded UN troops were detained by the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), who were allies of the UN in stopping the genocide. The UN
soldiers were robbed by members of the RPF and one UN soldier was minutes from being taken
away and killed. Later, the more severely injured soldier, Major Manuel Soza, became the
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twelfth UN soldier to die during his deployment in Rwanda.135 It was later conﬁrmed by RPF
leader and future President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, that the attack on Dallaire’s men had
been carried out by the RPF, which constitutes as “friendly” ﬁre.136 This incident from June 1994
and Dallaire’s previous wry comment indicating the frequency of shots ﬁred at UN vehicles in
Kigali, indicate that certain UN personnel in Rwanda would likely report exposure, if not
frequent exposure, to the situations indicated by the following questions in Section D of the
DRRI-2: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11.137
The situations discussed in this section involving the exposure of UN troops in Rwanda
and Srebrenica to the suffering, injury, and death of civilians as well as fellow peacekeepers
have various implications for their mental wellbeing. One implication is these experiences can
trigger a sense of danger and heightened risk reminding peacekeepers that they worked in a
daily environment where the risk to their own life was quite high. Furthermore, every dead,
maimed, desperate, displaced, starving, or dehydrated individual could also be a reminder of
the failure of UN troops in carrying out their mandate to protect and preserve lives within the
safe zones. Herein lies one of the great limitations of not having a set of scales like the DRRI-2
Scales speciﬁcally tailored to UN peacekeeping missions. With both sets of DRRI scales having
been written to assess the impact of conditions and circumstances faced by the US military in
the Middle Eastern theatre,138 there are numerous aspects of the scales which are not applicable
or do not adequately address key deployment-related factors which were also a source of stress
and therefore limited the range of decisions possible for UN peacekeepers. One example
discussed in this section is the politics of preservation that stemmed from UN use of force in
Somalia, particularly with the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, which lead the UN security council
to review the authorization to use force to coerce cooperation.139 The negative impact of the UN
peacekeeping mission in Somalia heavily dictated a change in the rules of engagement that
peacekeepers would be expected to operate under in Srebrenica and Rwanda, which was
namely, to use persuasion rather than force to achieve their missions.140 However, Lemaire
expressed several times in his ICTR testimony that he felt the change in the rules of engagement
and the unwillingness of the UN to heavily arm its troops in Rwanda had a profound negative
impact on their ability to carry out their mission and stop the genocide.141 Lemaire also
describes that he felt Dallaire’s recommendations as to the number of troops needed and critical
recommendations to the UN in New York to change the rules of engagement to allow the
peacekeepers to intervene and stop the distribution of weapons were ignored.142
Fundamentally, the unwillingness of the UN to allow for use of force in certain situations and
the numerous examples of the UN and member states’ failure to provide timely military
support when requested left peacekeepers surrounded and unable to adequately defend
themselves if they came under attack.143 The overriding political concerns of the UN and its
member states in the 1990s provided an insurmountable obstacle to the success of peacekeepers
in protecting safe zones and the people within them. These types of stressors have the
possibility for many individuals to develop feelings of self-doubt, a negative view of the UN
whom they looked to for leadership, support, relief and the blanket blue helmet protection,
hopelessness, exhaustion, hyper-vigilance, and of course, fear for their safety which would have
all greatly impacted their decisions in the ﬁeld. Without the security or even possibility of relief
135
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forces, adequate weapons, or supportive military maneuvers and under the kinds of daily
conditions described in this article, can we have reasonably expected peacekeepers to have
made different decisions that would have prevented genocide from taking place? Could we
have expected them to remain in indefensible areas, surrounded by enemy ﬁre and where
peacekeepers themselves were, on certain occasions, directly targeted and would have been
killed if they had taken any action to prevent massacres from occurring? Was it possible to
expect this under conditions which are known to make soldiers in other cases, who are able to
use force if necessary, seriously vulnerable to developing serious and long-term mental health
problems?
Conclusion
The DRRI-2 Scales and other diagnostic tools for assessing risk or resilience to developing PTSD
provide an invaluable tool for researchers seeking to better understand the human agency
behind traumatic events such as genocide. By applying the DRRI-2 Scales to the experiences of
UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda and Srebrenica, we can better understand how the daily
conditions during their deployment negatively impacted their mental state and the range of
perceived options they could take under those conditions to protect civilian lives. Through
analyzing those daily conditions and comparing them to various questions from the sections of
the DRRI-2 Scales that speciﬁcally focus on deployment stressors, we are able to break down the
experiences that the UN peacekeepers had during their deployment to understand their
cumulative negative impact on the mental health of peacekeepers. However, the use of these
scales does have certain limitations in terms of how much they can contribute to understanding
the particular conditions and limitations that peacekeepers faced in Rwanda and Srebrenica.
What it should prompt however, is the development of certain frameworks of analysis that
consider factors such as daily living conditions, sustained exposure to combat environments,
exposure to injured or wounded persons, operational limitations, and perceived threat to life
when judging those who witness acts of violence, massacres, or genocide taking place. We
expected the UN peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica to have stopped or prevented acts of
genocide, but was it actually possible for them even as soldiers to achieve this under those
circumstances? In truth, we expected trained soldiers with inadequate ability to subdue enemy
threats in highly dangerous, stressful, and ultimately indefensible positions to somehow
overcome these circumstances and make decisions that would have put their lives and possibly
the lives of those under their protection at risk with little chance of success.
It is clear that the mental health of UN peacekeepers, which shaped the decisions they
made on the ground, faced multi-layered and persistent sources of stress that had to be
managed on a daily basis. The eyewitness testimonies explored in this article have shown the
daily conditions in which UN peacekeepers operated was a persistent source of stress. These
included lack of water, food, sleep, freedom of movement, and also exposure to horrendous
smells, including that of rotting corpses and loud noises from artillery ﬁre. UN peacekeepers in
Rwanda and Srebrenica were forced to try to carry out their mandate whilst operating under
these conditions for months on end with no relief and no area to retreat to for rest. Additionally,
UN personnel were faced with the daily reality that carrying out their mandate to protect put
their own lives directly at risk. In Bosnia, the primary threat to life for UN peacekeepers was
mainly the bombing or shelling of the surrounding city, later escalating to target the UN enclave
itself. In Rwanda, threats to life came from numerous sources including the bombing of the UN
headquarters, land mines, and deliberate targeting of UN peacekeepers on patrol and other
daily threats and intimidation. In both cases, UN peacekeepers were also taken hostage for
purposes of gaining leverage over UN decision-making; however, in Rwanda, peacekeepers
were executed as a further threat to the remaining peacekeepers and to prompt the withdrawal
of international troops. Additionally, the safety of UN peacekeepers and those they sought
protect were under constant threat due to the fact that both peacekeeping operations were
undermanned, under-equipped, and were greatly restricted in the acts they could take to
defend themselves, the safe zones, and the civilians inside. Finally, UN peacekeepers regularly
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saw the severe injury, desperation, death, and displacement of civilians who were the victims of
civil war and genocide. They faced the daily reality of only being able to partly carry out their
mandates to protect and help civilians due to numerous operational constraints and lack of
support from the higher echelons of UN command and its member-states. In the case of
Rwanda, UN peacekeepers witnessed and even were forced to handle the corpses of murdered
Rwandans and in some cases, their own men, with shocking regularity and intensity. It is my
opinion that anyone seeking to critique the actions or non-actions of UN peacekeepers in
Rwanda and Srebrenica should re-examine their conclusions based on the current research and
headways made in understanding the implications of multi-layered stress that soldiers to
varying degrees experience in conﬂict zones and the risk that this poses to the mental health of
the individual.
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How can I continue living in such a town with such people, waiting for
someone to beat me or even kill me? You can’t even go out on the street
without someone giving you mean looks or shouting something at you just
because you are not wearing high heels or a short dress.
—Sanja, a lesbian woman from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015.1
Introduction
Since the end of the country’s genocide in 1996, life has been difﬁcult for queer people in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Eight people were injured by homophobic protesters at the country’s
inaugural gay pride festival in 2008. In 2014, a hate group attacked Sarajevo’s Queer Film
Festival, wounding three. Two years later, a group of men stormed a popular gay bar yelling
homophobic slurs, throwing bottles, and threatening to detonate a bomb.2
Anecdotal evidence gathered throughout my travels in the country during 2015, 2016,
and 2017 suggests homophobia has steadily worsened since 1996. People I spoke with linked
the increasing violence to an uptick in nationalism following the genocide. However, it is
difﬁcult to begin conﬁrming their suspicions because little research on the connection between
queerness and genocide exists. Matthew Waites’ 2018 article “Genocide and Queer Politics”
constitutes the most signiﬁcant contribution to queer understandings of genocide to date.
Waites describes his article as “the ﬁrst systematic critical analysis of genocide with respect to
queer politics.”3 Waites uses queer theory, speciﬁcally as drawn from Foucault and postcolonial
studies, to destabilize understandings of groups in genocide discourse. He concludes that if we
include sexual orientation and gender identity in our understandings of protected groups, then
violence against queer people in Nazi Germany, Uganda, and the Gambia can accurately be
described as genocidal.4 Waites discusses the heteronormative foundations of both genocidal
violence and genocide discourse, but most other research on queer politics and genocide does
not go beyond the questions of whether violence against queer people constitutes genocide and
if sexual orientation and gender identity should be included in the deﬁnitions of vulnerable
groups.5 While this is a worthwhile discussion, I am also interested in how queerness interacts
with and is implicated in genocides already clearly deﬁned as such according to the law, i.e.
those directed at racial, religious, national, and ethnic groups. As such, in this paper, I pose the
following question: How can scholars of Genocide Studies learn from the queer theoryGenocide Studies nexus?
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To answer, I demonstrate how three distinct queer theory concepts can be layered with
Genocide Studies to reveal novel insights into some of the ﬁeld’s preeminent questions.
Speciﬁcally, I draw on queer intellectual curiosity, heteronormativity, and reproductive
futurism. I begin this article by brieﬂy introducing queer theory. Then, in section one, I contend
that Genocide Studies should pay more attention to the empirical experiences of queer people
during episodes of genocide. In section two, I argue that when we deploy heteronormativity as
an analytic in Genocide Studies, we can improve our understanding of how genocide unfolds
and what makes it possible. Finally, in section three, I use reproductive futurism to critique
deﬁnitions of genocide that obscure queer life. I conclude that connecting queer theory with
Genocide Studies yields empirical, analytical, and normative insights into the latter. Deploying
queer theory concepts in Genocide Studies ensures the ﬁeld pays attention to queer lives,
something all academic disciplines should strive for, and advances the ﬁeld’s understanding of
genocide as a phenomenon.
An Introduction to Queer Theory
Queer theory emerged from LGBT Studies and Women’s Studies during the 1990s. In popular
culture and conversation, “queer theory” is sometimes used to describe a cogent and cohesive
school of thought. However, queer theory lends its name to a group of diverse and, at times,
contradictory ideas. As Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, two of the original queer theorists
write, “it [queer theory] cannot be assimilated to a single discourse, let alone a propositional
program.”6 All queer theories and queer theorists, however, share a certain queer sensibility.
What do I mean when I say queer? Eve Sedgwick deﬁnes queer as “the open mesh of
possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when
the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be
made) to signify monolithically.”7 Queer is not synonymous with LGBT. Queer is more
expansive and, hopefully, travels across time and culture more easily (though not perfectly).
Berlant and Warner go on to describe the aspirations of queer theorists to open space for
“publics that can afford sex and intimacy in sustained, unchastening ways; publics that can
comprehend their own differences of privilege and struggle; publics whose abstract spaces can
also be lived in, remembered, hoped for.”8 I have made it the goal of this paper to contribute to
the opening of spaces for queer publics in Genocide Studies.
As I mentioned, queer theory is not one monolithic idea. Thus, I have speciﬁed three
queer theory concepts I am weaving with Genocide Studies in this paper. I hope that others,
upon seeing the utility of building bridges between queer theory and Genocide Studies, bring
other queer theories and theorists into the ﬁeld as well. In section one, I explore queer
intellectual curiosity, a term borrowed from International Relations (IR) scholar Cynthia Weber,
which she deﬁnes as
a method that refuses to take for granted the personal-tointernational institutional arrangements, structures of
understanding, and practical orientations that ﬁgure
‘homosexuality’ and the ‘homosexual.’ It investigates how
these ﬁgurations—these distillations of shared meanings in
forms or images—powerfully attach to and detach from
material bodies and are powerfully mobilized in international
politics, challenging the common assumption that
(homo)sexuality is trivial in international politics.9
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Weber’s queer intellectual curiosity is inspired by Cynthia Enloe’s feminist curiosity, which lead
Enloe to ask: “Where are the women?”10 When Enloe ﬁrst posed this question in her 1990s IR
classic Bananas, Beaches, and Bases, she was interrogating why women and their lives did not
appear in research on international politics, and attempted to address this gap. Thankfully,
feminist IR has (sort of) moved beyond the issue of empirically including women in
scholarship. Queer IR has not. I am not faulting queer IR. To the contrary, I am pointing out the
necessity of doing empirical work to answer the question: Where are the queers?11
In section two, I apply the concept of heteronormativity to genocide. Lauren Berlant
and Michael Warner named the concept of heteronormativity in their 1998 article “Sex in
Public.” Heteronormativity identiﬁes the heterosexual couple as the “referent or the privileged
example of sexual culture.”12 However, heteronormativity extends beyond the realm of sexual
and romantic behavior. All parts of society, its institutions, and its understandings privilege and
make compulsory heterosexuality and a binary understanding of gender. “Contexts that have
little visible relation to sex practice, such as life narrative and generational identity, can be
heteronormative…while in other contexts forms of sex between men and women might not be.”
13As perceived failures or successes of heteronormativity attach themselves to subjects beyond
the sexual and romantic, queerness has the potential to morph and “mutate” into a “metonym”
for race, nationality, and religion.14 Through this process queerness and heteronormativity
become integral to the social construction of groups targeted for genocide.
Finally, section three builds from Lee Edelman’s concept of reproductive futurism,
which he lays out in his 2004 book No Future. Of the concepts I am borrowing, reproductive
futurism is the most contested amongst queer theorists.15 Edelman argues “the politics of
reproductive futurism” is “the only politics we’re permitted to know.”16 While Edelman agrees
with other queer theorists that the heterosexual couple holds a privileged role in society, he
adds that the Child that that couple produces holds the most privileged position because “the
Child has come to embody for us the telos of the social order and come to be seen as the one for
whom that order is held in perpetual trust.”17 Our politics and social order are not designed to
beneﬁt us, but a future and imaginary Child. We often make extreme sacriﬁces in the name of
the Child. Edelman deems that which subverts the logic of reproductive futurism, queer.18
Edelman urges readers to adopt what he calls “queer negativity”19 in order to challenge this
social order in which the future is “always purchased at our expense.”20
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“Where are the Queers?”: The Need for Empirical Research
An Empirically Grounded Field
Genocide scholars have long relied upon collecting ﬁrst-hand accounts of events from victims,
perpetrators, and bystanders. Along with individuals’ narratives, researchers use legal
documents, military records, and government communications to reconstruct how and why
genocide takes place. Thus, the experiences of witnesses to and victims of genocide carry
tremendous weight in both the study of genocide and normative attempts to address it. As the
ﬁeld of Genocide Studies has matured, more scholars have begun to recognize the importance
of disaggregating the experiences of people occupying different social positions.21 Yet, the
unique and speciﬁc experiences of queer people during genocide remain absent from this type
of research, limiting our understanding of genocidal processes and our ability to support
recovery.
While Genocide Studies does not lack more theoretical contributions, empirically based
ﬁndings currently constitute the bulk of research in the ﬁeld.22 In large part, this can be
attributed to the ﬁeld’s tendency to focus on a series of case studies, primarily from the
twentieth century, including the Armenian Genocide, the Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda, and
the former Yugoslavia.23 The ﬁrst generation of genocide scholars attempted to explain the
Holocaust using more universal theories. Newer texts focus on case-speciﬁc interactions at
multiple levels of analysis. Genocide scholars today typically build theoretical insights from
“knowledge gained in the archives and in the ﬁeld.”24 A growing consensus believes genocide is
contingent, casting doubt on the need to create a general theory and highlighting the
importance of context-speciﬁc knowledges.25
Three core texts in Genocide Studies exemplify this tendency: Christopher Browning’s
Ordinary Men, Eric Weitz’s A Century of Genocide, and Scott Straus’ The Order of Genocide.
In Ordinary Men, Browning argues that Germans were driven to commit extreme violence due
to the pressures of group socialization. Browning supports this contention with excerpts from
the pretrial interrogations of 210 former members of Reserve Police Battalion 101. These records
allowed him to analyze demographic information, like age and Nazi party membership, about
the members of the battalion. Additionally, 125 of the testimonies were “sufﬁciently
substantive” to allow Browning to reconstruct a detailed narrative of the events that unfolded
when Germany ordered Reserve Police Battalion 101 to the killing ﬁelds of Poland.26 Weitz
similarly relies on the testimonies of individuals in his book. However, he chooses to draw from
the “memoirs, literature, and trial transcripts”27 of victims rather than perpetrators. Unwilling
to separate narrative from analysis, Weitz argues that “convey[ing] the sheer brutality and
horror that people experience as victims,” represents an important part of explaining
genocide.28 Turning once again to the perpetrators, Scott Straus’ account of the Rwandan
Genocide contends that far fewer civilians took part in the violence than previously believed.
He bases his ﬁndings on in-depth interviews with over 200 convicted perpetrators. Straus
21
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argues that their accounts provide “the best method for generating theoretically relevant
information about perpetrators.”29 Plenty of other important works in Genocide Studies rely on
individual accounts, like interviews and memoirs, to support their arguments. These works
demonstrate the critical role people’s experiences play in shaping how scholars conceptualize
and attempt to understand genocide.
Researchers have begun to pay more attention to the ways in which people’s genocide
narratives differ according to their social positionings. The difference between male/female,
men’s/women’s, masculine/feminine experiences has inspired the most scholarship.30 Within
the past thirty years, a sub-ﬁeld examining “gendered” experiences of genocide has emerged.
These scholars’ make the central argument that examining the different ways men and women
participate in genocide leads to insights into gender politics and improves our ability to identify
genocide.31
Studies that look at the empirical differences between men’s and women’s experiences
serve two primary functions. First, they draw attention to the disparate ways perpetrators
attack men and women, making previously hidden patterns of suffering visible and improving
humanitarian responses. Scholars ﬁrst noticed these patterns during the 1990s genocides in
Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Women were systematically raped in both countries. In
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, it is estimated that perpetrators raped 50,000 women in
the ﬁrst year of the violence alone.32 The systematic nature of sexual violence against women in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda led many genocide scholars to conclude that rape
constitutes a strategy of genocide.33 In 1998, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
issued a precedent-setting decision—they convicted former government ofﬁcial Jean-Paul
Akayesu of crimes of genocide, including rape.34 These ﬁndings never would have emerged
without research that paid special attention to the experiences of women. Similarly, in the 1990s,
researchers discovered a pattern of violence unique to men’s and boys’ experiences. Men and
boys are often separated from the rest of the population and massacred. There are at least ﬁfteen
cases of genocide in which this pattern of events has unfolded.35 Highlighting men’s
experiences as unique, as opposed to the norm, revealed an important facet of genocide.
Second, the ways perpetrators treat men and women according to their sex/gender says
something interesting about the causes and mechanics of particular genocides and genocide
more broadly.36 Even when men and women face similar outcomes of genocidal violence, the
ways in which they are targeted reveal how genocidaires conceptualize their goals. Many
people, including scholars, perpetrators, and victims, consciously or sub-consciously interpret
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genocide as a process of destroying the reproductive potential of a group.37 This became most
obvious when men’s and women’s experience were examined separately. A pattern emerged in
which individuals are attacked per their gender role in the family and society, a phenomenon
labeled relational violence by Elisa von Joeden-Forgey.38 Perpetrators target women as mothers,
wives, daughters, and sisters and men as fathers, husbands, sons, and brothers, centering ideas
of family and reproduction in the genocide discourse.
Collecting empirical evidence about sexed/gendered experiences of genocide moved
the common sense thinking in the discipline forward. If the discipline generally accepts that
sex/gender differences matter empirically, it should not be much of a stretch to imagine that
differences in gender identity and sexual orientation matter too. However, despite a common
sense in the discipline that should encourage empirical investigation into queer experiences of
genocide, this type of research has historically been limited.
Here are the Queers: Past and Future Empirical Research
Virtually all of the existing empirical research into queer experiences of genocide concerns gay
men in Nazi Germany. While the campaign against homosexuals appears brieﬂy in many texts
about the Nazis, the ﬁrst sociological and statistical account of the Nazis’ persecution of
homosexuals was not published until 1977. Carried out by a team of German researchers led by
Rüdiger Lautmann, the report analyzed documents from the thirteen camps that incarcerated
homosexuals.39 A decade later, Richard Plant utilized Nazi records and camp archives to
compile a historical account of the Nazi campaign against homosexuals.40 In 1995, Gad Beck
published An Underground Life, a memoir about his life as a gay Jewish man in Nazi Germany.
His represents the most thorough ﬁrst-hand account of these events.41 These texts reveal that
queer people were intentionally targeted for incarceration, torture, and death by the Nazi
regime. From 1933–1944 between 50,000 and 63,000 men were convicted of homosexuality.42
Researchers estimate anywhere from 5,000 to 15,000 of them perished in concentration camps.43
Many people have conceptualized the Nazi campaign against homosexuals as separate
from and unrelated to the regime’s genocides of Jews, Roma and Sinti, and Slavs. The Nazi
campaign against homosexuals appears fairly often in research on Nazi Germany, but not
commonly in research on the Nazis’ genocides. Research on persecution of homosexuals
typically circumvents the word genocide, while genocide research on Nazi Germany tends to
avoid mention of violence against homosexuals.44 However, the evidence suggests persecution
of queer people was intimately linked to the Nazis’ genocidal campaigns. Nazi records show
that homosexuals were murdered and imprisoned in the name of purifying the German race
and punishing those who failed to produce Aryan children. The “campaign against Germany’s
homosexuals must be understood…as but one part of the larger war on eugenic inferiors.”45
Violence against queer people was the other side of the coin of violence against Jewish people
and ethnic minorities. On May 14, 1928, the Nazi Party published its clearest statement on
homosexuality.
It is not necessary that you and I live, but it is necessary that
the German people live. And it can only live if it can ﬁght, for
37
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life means ﬁghting. And it can only ﬁght if it maintains its
masculinity. It can only maintain its masculinity if it exercises
discipline, especially in matters of love. Free love and deviance
are undisciplined. Therefore, we reject you [homosexuals], as
we reject anything that hurts our nation. Anyone who thinks of
homosexual love is our enemy.46
Empirical evidence from Nazi Germany indicates that the persecution of queer people
was an important part of the Nazis’ genocides. Without empirics about the treatment of queer
people during other genocides, no comparative work can be done on this topic. Leaving us
unable to discern for certain if persecution of queer people was unique to the Nazis, or if it is a
common feature of many genocides (though, as I will argue subsequently, it is most likely the
latter).
Moreover, queer victims may face continued persecution following genocide. In West
Germany, for example, homosexuality continued to be illegal until 1969.47 Some gay men were
liberated from the concentration camps only to be transferred to jails. Most were rejected by
their families and communities. As Plant concludes, “for homosexuals, the Third Reich did not
fully end with its defeat.”48 Queer people facing continued violence after the end of a genocide
require special protection and dedicated humanitarian assistance. However, without further
empirical research into queer experiences of genocides, we have no idea what this protection
and assistance should look like, or even how dire the need for it is. If Nazi Germany serves as
any indication, there may be dozens of other ways queer people uniquely suffer during and
after genocide. New empirical research would go a long way towards making their suffering
known—the ﬁrst step to addressing it. Gendering Genocide Studies also led to new ideas about
the mechanics of particular genocides and genocide as a phenomenon. The next section
discusses in depth how queering the ﬁeld has the potential to do the same.
Research on the fate of queer people in Nazi Germany did not appear until more than
thirty years after end of World War II, in large part due to a taboo on discussing queer history.
The archival material was available during almost that entire period, but researchers were
uninterested.49 I fear that our current lack of empirical research may, at least in part, be
attributable to similar reasons. However, valid reasons exist besides anti-queerness that explain
why we are lacking empirical evidence. In the ﬁrst place, researchers face many challenges
when conducting empirical genocide research of any kind. Countries in the midst of and
emerging from genocide are challenging to access and often pose a danger to researchers.
Second, in many post-genocidal countries people put themselves at risk by being public about
their queerness. This may be due to laws banning homosexuality or societal attitudes. Thus, it
may be difﬁcult, and perhaps even unethical, to identify willing research partners. Finally,
queerness as an identity does not travel easily. Labels like “LGBTQ” and “queer” emerged from
Western countries and do not always ﬁt post-colonial contexts; nor should they be made to ﬁt.50
Unfortunately, due in large part to the legacies of colonialism, many recent genocides occurred
in formerly colonized countries. Creating a complicated ethical and theoretical situation for
researchers attempting to do comparative work on queerness in genocide. Ignoring indigenous
understandings of sex, sexuality, and gender or forcing labels created in settler-colonial states
onto people would not advance the ﬁeld but reproduce the violence we are attempting to
address. I raise these concerns not to discourage empirical research about queer people during
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genocide, but to acknowledge the necessity of practicing critical self-reﬂection as scholars and
as a Genocide Studies community before we engage in this research.
There are several places where I think empirical research into queer experiences of
genocide would be revealing. As mentioned in the introduction, an increase in homophobic
violence seems to have followed the genocides in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. If a
connection between new anti-queer attitudes and the genocides exists, it is likely that anti-queer
attitudes and actions were also prevalent during the genocides. As such, empirical research in
the former Yugoslavia could be enlightening. Moreover, because the countries in the region do
not outlaw homosexuality, queer activist groups operate in most countries, and some people are
publicly out, it would be less dangerous to interview queer people in the former Yugoslavia.
Empirical work is also needed in Chechnya. Some scholars contend the two brutal wars waged
against Chechnya by the Russians during the 1990s constitute genocide.51 In the aftermath,
Chechen nationalism and adherence to traditional identities and values experienced a
resurgence. State-directed homophobic violence broke out in 2017. The Chechen government
began arresting, detaining, torturing, and murdering people suspected of homosexual activity.52
Researchers should investigate whether or not a connection exists between the genocide of the
1990s and the current homophobic violence. While researching in Chechnya would be
logistically and ethically challenging, researchers could draw upon the large Chechen diaspora,
which includes queer people who have recently sought refuge outside of Chechnya.
In this section, I argued that genocide scholars have built the discipline’s most
important scholarship from empirical research. More recently, scholars have begun to
disaggregate experiences of genocide according to various differences, including sex/gender.
We must build on these methodological norms in the discipline and empirically investigate
queer experiences of genocide. The existing empirics, drawn from Nazi Germany, suggest this
research would teach us much about what occurs inside a genocide and how to better assist the
most vulnerable in its aftermath.
Heteronormativity as an Analytical Lens for Understanding Genocide
Existing Theories of Sex/Gender and Genocide
Beyond empirically appearing queer people in Genocide Studies, borrowing the concept of
heteronormativity from queer theory can help us better understand the conditions that make
genocide possible. Heteronormativity gives rise to genocidal violence against queer
communities and the ethnic, religious, national, and/or racial groups targeted. Scholars like
Adam Jones and Elisa von Joeden-Forgey who have gendered Genocide Studies have drawn
attention to the way genocidaires utilize hegemonic gender roles, particularly as they relate to
family, to enact their crimes. I agree with Jones and von Joeden-Forgey but argue that we must
include the concepts of sexuality and gender identity in their analysis. Heteronormativity
makes possible the gender roles and familial hierarchies that support genocidal processes.
Heteronormativity has already been deployed as a lens to analyze nationalism, and what is
genocide if not nationalism in extremis? Thus, it should not be too much of an intellectual leap
to apply heteronormativity to genocide. After running through this analysis, it will become
evident that we must further investigate the various and nuanced ways heteronormativity
provides structure and logic to genocide.
Genocide discourse has long been dominated by straight, cisgender men from the
United States and Europe, allowing “patriarchal power and heteronormativity” to mark the
boundaries of the discourse.53 However, the word heteronormativity made its ﬁrst appearance
in the Genocide Studies literature in Adam Jones’ 2006 article “Straight as a Rule:
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Heteronormativity, Gendercide, and the Noncombatant Male.” Rather than provide an analysis
of how heteronormativity functions in the context of genocide, Jones focuses on the way the
existence of hegemonic masculinities contributes to high mortality rates amongst noncombatant
males during genocide.54 He argues that in a culture in which military masculinity marks the
hegemonic ideal, unarmed men of battle-age represent a “failure and/or rejection of
masculinity.”55 However, feminized noncombatant men constantly possess the ability to pick up
arms, (re)adopt a hegemonic model of masculinity, and pose a threat to their enemy. This
contradiction—at once disgustingly feminine and frighteningly masculine—explains the ire and
violence directed at noncombatant men.56 While early on in his article Jones brieﬂy discusses
heteronormativity, he constructs his argument around the “deeply gendered”57 identities men
and women embody in times of genocide. As I will discuss further after introducing von
Joeden-Forgey’s argument, hegemonic gender constructions are not synonymous with
heteronormativity, nor do they offer a complete picture of the concept.
In her 2010 article, “The Devil in the Details: ‘Life Force Atrocities’ and the Assault on
the Family in Times of Conﬂict,” Elisa von Joeden-Forgey elaborates on the concept of relational
violence and introduces the term “life force atrocities.” While her article does not include a
single mention of heteronormativity or heterosexuality, I believe it still brings us closest to an
existing theory of heteronormativity and genocide. She argues that “while directed at the
destruction of large groups, [genocide] is inextricably tied to families.”58 More than any other
social institution, by producing children, educating children in the group’s religious and
cultural norms, and serving as the affective center of daily life, families organize and perpetuate
groups.59 As such, destruction of the group requires destruction of its life force—the family. Von
Joeden-Forgey deﬁnes life force atrocities as violent acts that either invert the “proper
hierarchies and relationships within families and thereby irrevocably break sacred bonds” or
mutilate and desecrate “symbols of group production.”60 Examples of life force atrocities
include forcing family members to murder or torture each other, injuring genitals, rape, and
killing infants and pregnant women. While these cruelties seem strange and perverse, which of
course they are, they appear in genocide after genocide.61 Using the examples of the Armenian
genocide, the Rwandan genocide, and the Holocaust, von Joeden-Forgey concludes that “the
inversion and desecration of sacred familial hierarchies are the primary organizing principles of
the violence…genocidal cruelty aims precisely at the ties that bind men and women together.”62
Yet, this analysis lacks an explanation of why family serves as the organizing unit of most
groups and how perpetrators so easily exploit existing family hierarchies and gender roles.
Integrating the concept of heteronormativity, and with it an attention to sexuality and a
non-binary understanding of gender, into Jones’s and von Joeden-Forgey’s analysis strengthens
both of their arguments. Jones deﬁnes heteronormativity as “culturally hegemonic
heterosexuality.”63 However, as the originators of the term explain, heteronormativity goes
beyond heterosexuality vs. homosexuality.64 Heteronormativity represents a constellation of
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practices, impacting people of all sexualities, that serve as a “tacit but central organizing index
of social membership.”65 While heteronormativity begins with the privileging of heterosexual
sex as normal and right, “[heteronormativity] is produced in almost every aspect of the forms
and arrangements of social life: nationality, the state, and the law; commerce; medicine; and
education; as well as in the conventions and affects of narrativity, romance, and other protected
spaces of culture.”66 The form of hegemonic masculinity Jones draws upon and the family
hierarchies von Joeden-Forgey centers only exist because of heteronormativity.
Heteronormativity rests ﬁrst and foremost on a gender/sex binary separating men and women.
From this binary, men and women adopt distinct and correct roles within sexual and familial
relations. “Evident in most conceptualizations of gender is an assumption of heteronormativity.
In other words, to become gendered is to learn the proper way to be a woman in relation to
man, or feminine in relation to the masculine.”67 Heteronormativity not only leads to divisions
between men and women, but to the subordination of women to men.68 And, importantly, the
oppression of people perceived as not correctly performing masculinity or femininity. As such,
heteronormativity produces the hegemonic masculinities, and subordinate masculinities and
femininities, and family hierarchies that enable genocidal violence against noncombatant men
and life force atrocities. We cannot fully understand genocide when we end our analysis at
gender, for doing so takes heteronormativity, gender’s organizing institution, for granted.69
Applying Heteronormativity to Genocide Studies
At this point, after arguing that heteronormativity has been absent from Genocide Studies to the
determinant of the ﬁeld, I would like to provide an example of what deconstructing genocide’s
heteronormative foundations might look like. I use queer Nationalism Studies as my entry for
the following argument. However, I do not begin to believe my approach is the only way to use
heteronormativity to better understand genocide. Forays into queer Genocide Studies could be
made from the perspective of Security Studies, Military Studies or Terrorism Studies—all of
which have adopted the use of heteronormativity as an analytical lens.70 The purpose of the
next section is not to present a deﬁnitive understanding of how heteronormativity functions in a
genocidal context, but to demonstrate one way in which heteronormativity proves useful in
analyzing genocide. This section poses an open question and issues an invitation to further
investigate the connections between queer theories and genocide.
Nationalism constitutes a form of political identity containing two interlinking
objectives. One is territorial—to maintain or achieve statehood. The second is ideological—to
secure a belief in a collective identity. Nationalists ultimately strive to align the ideological
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community and the territorial state.71 International Relations takes a particular interest in
nationalism because IR scholars are interested in the construction of and conﬂict between
states.72 Feminist IR scholars have revealed the ways in which “group reproduction—both
biological and social—is fundamental to nationalist practice, process, and politics.”73 After all, in
order for the nation-state to exist and continue to do so, there must be members of the nation.
Group reproduction in the modern nation-state is heteronormative because non-reproductive
sex threatens the nation/state building project. States discipline non-reproductive sex “by
insisting that the bedroom is heterosexual and that a primary purpose of family life is sexual
reproduction.”74 Built on a presupposed natural binary of female/feminine and male/
masculine, nationalist understandings of biological and social reproduction construct
“heterosexual coupling as the basis of sexual intimacy, family life, and group reproduction.”75
We cannot extricate heteronormativity from nationalism and state building. As a result,
nationalism more often than not results in the exclusion and oppression of queer people.76
It is not too far of a leap practically or intellectually from nationalism to genocide.
Nationalism always poses a threat to “those whose identity is at odds with the projected image
of homogenous national identity,” namely other national minorities.77 In times of extreme
nationalism or nationalist conﬂict, the result has often been murderous.78 Of course, not all
nationalist projects turn genocidal, but one has difﬁculty imagining a case of genocide that was
not preceded by nationalist sentiments. In fact, some argue that the advent of the nation-state
and its supporting ideology—nationalism—is what makes genocide possible.79 Whether or not
one believes genocide predates the nation-state, the similarities between nationalism and
genocide are undeniable.
As such, if nationalism is heteronormative, and genocide is one nation/nationalism
attempting to eradicate another nation/nationalism, then genocide can be conceived of as
competing heteronormativities. As explained previously, heteronormativity supports the
nation-state and nationalist agendas. Thus, the perpetrators of genocide attempt to perform the
best heteronormativity and weaken the heteronormative foundations of their targets. In
defense, groups targeted for genocide have an interest in safeguarding their own
heteronormative foundations. As a result, heteronormativity becomes strengthened on all sides
during episodes of genocide. This helps explains the gendered/sexed violence identiﬁed by
Jones and von Joeden-Forgey as well as increased violence against queer members of the
perpetrator and victim groups.
As a result of genocide’s heteronormative foundations, perpetrators of genocide
persecute queer people within their own group in the name of strengthening the nation and
encouraging group reproduction. During the bloody breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the
nationalist and genocidal governments of Croatia and Serbia both adopted staunchly anti-queer
stances. In Croatia, an increased attachment to Catholicism accompanied rising nationalism.
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Traditional Catholic morals, including heteropatriarchal gender roles, became more important.
To be a good man meant being a warrior defending homeland and family. Women were meant
to produce children and support male soldiers.80 People who deviated from these assigned roles
and their associated sexualities were demonized, particularly lesbians, who “were labelled as
dangerous and destructive for the new Croatian state and its moral values.”81 While Orthodox
Christian Serbia did not see the same ascendance of Catholicism, queer people faced similar
changing attitudes. Lepa Mladjenovic, a lesbian activist living in Belgrade during the genocide,
recounts being attacked during an action with the anti-war lesbian group Labris.
He pushed me to the wall, broke my glasses and shouted, “You
dirty lesbian, I can throw you in this door and kill you – no one
would know. Clear off!” When I asked him who he was, he
exclaimed, “Don’t you utter your dirty words. The mosque is
the place for you.” Lesbians were dirtying his straight male
street, just as Muslims were dirtying his straight Serb street.82
Mladjenovic's story highlights not only the danger queer people face during genocides,
but the manner in which they quickly become associated with the other group(s)—ethnic,
national, religious, or racial—targeted by the genocidaires. Queers are depicted as traitors to the
nationalist cause.
Perpetrators are less interested in attacking queer individuals amongst the victim
group(s), but they attack all of their victims in ways connected to heteronormativity. As von
Joeden-Forgey explained earlier, genocidaires aim to undo the foundations upon which their
victims’ lives are built by attacking familial hierarchies. Typically, both the perpetrators and
victims understand family through heteronormative gender roles. Perpetrators exploit these
shared understandings to imbue speciﬁc acts of violence with symbolic meaning. In other
words, they are attempting to damage their target group(s)’s heteronormative structures as a
means of weakening their society. During the genocide against Bosnian Muslims, for example,
much of the violence consisted of inversions of/attacks on heteronormativity. Mothers were
threatened with the murder of their children unless they submitted to being raped, usually in
front of their children.83 Men were also subjected to sexual abuse. In one documented instance, a
father and son imprisoned together in a camp were forced to perform sexual acts on each
other.84 It was common for male prisoners to have their genitals mutilated and castrated. A 1994
investigation ordered by the United Nations Security Council found
…one witness saw prisoners forced to bite another prisoner’s
genitals...Another incident relayed in an interview involved
prisoners lined up naked while Serb women from outside
undressed in front of the male prisoners. If any prisoner had
an erection, his penis was cut off.85
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The guards did not come up with these torturous acts out of nowhere. Rather, the
violence becomes intelligible when viewed through the lens of heteronormativity, a social
institution shared by the perpetrators and their victims. If the guards were just interested in
torturing their prisoners, they might have cut off a hand or a leg. But by cutting off their
victims’ penises, the guards attacked the part of a man’s body that makes him capable of
heterosexual sex and reproduction; making him less worthy within a heteronormative context.
And the stigma both men and women endure from being raped only functions in a world in
which women are valued for their sexual purity and men for their ability to penetrate and not
be penetrated.86
The examples from the former Yugoslavia demonstrate that heteronormative logics
enable violence during genocides against queers and non-queers. Beyond what I have shared,
little empirical evidence exists about persecution of queer people or heteronormative violence
against non-queer people during genocides—one more reason to pursue empirical work in
queer Genocide Studies. Thus, I do not pretend to believe that I have proven anything about
genocide’s true nature (if that is even possible or a desirable goal). In this section, I argued
through existing theory and examples that it is reasonable to believe heteronormativity makes
possible genocide and that we can better understand how and why genocide works when we
examine both genocide as a phenomenon and individual cases through a heteronormative lens;
and if heteronormativity enables genocide, perhaps queerness contains strategies of prevention
and mitigation.
Reproductive Futurity and the Erasure of Queer Lives
The Deﬁnition of Genocide and an Emphasis on Reproductive Futurity
Since Raphaël Lemkin coined the term genocide in 1944, its deﬁnition has been highly
contested. In fact, deﬁnitional debates dominate much of the existing literature.87 However,
most deﬁnitions of genocide share an emphasis on the impairment of the group’s biological and
cultural reproduction. I argue that this emphasis excludes those who do not and/or cannot
contribute to a group’s biological and cultural reproduction, or are perceived as such, namely
poorer people and queer people. However, non-reproductive members of groups are still
subjected to genocidal violence by perpetrators due to their membership in the targeted
collectivity. By obscuring non-carriers of genes and culture, genocide scholars have made the
deaths of members of lower economic classes and the queer community somehow seem like
less of a crime. A troubling implication of this type of thinking is that the lives and deaths of
these people also become less important to the victim group during their collective process of
resistance and recovery. Moving forward, genocide scholars should attempt to refrain from
replicating the same heteronormative and anti-queer logics that contributes to both wholescale
genocide and violence against queer people.
The ﬁrst deﬁnition of genocide appeared in Lemkin’s 1944 volume Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe. Lemkin deﬁned genocide as:
…the destruction of a nation or an ethnic group…Generally
speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate
destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass
killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to
signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the
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destruction of the essential foundation of the life of national
groups with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.88
Notice the focus placed not on atrocities committed against a large number of
individuals, but on the health of the nation as a whole. Phrases like “the essential foundation of
the life of nation groups” highlight this focus. An important facet of the nation’s health,
according to Lemkin, is not only its ability to exist, but its ability to continue to exist. Lemkin
conceived of destroying, or attempting to destroy, a culture as a distinct and particularly evil
crime.89 Lemkin’s understanding of genocide as a crime that goes beyond mass killing also
appears in the 1948 United Nations’ Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the
Crime of Genocide, which Lemkin played an important role in drafting. Alongside “killing
members of the group” and inﬂicting bodily harm, Article II of the Genocide Convention lists
“imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group” and “forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group” as crimes of genocide.90 This indicates a continued
conviction that genocide constitutes a distinct atrocity because it interferes with biological
reproduction (preventing births within the group) and cultural reproduction (forcibly
transferring children to another group).
As Genocide Studies evolved from Lemkin and the Genocide Convention, many
deﬁnitions continued to emphasize reproduction. For example, Helen Fein, the founder and
ﬁrst president of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, deﬁnes genocide as
…sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically
destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction
of the biological and social reproduction of group members,
sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered
by the victim.91
Here, Fein clearly highlights the importance of “biological and social reproduction.”
Von Joeden-Forgey also states distinctly that, “Genocide is a historical process that is, at its core
about group reproduction.”92 Philosopher Claudia Card, writing about social reproduction,
concurs.
Speciﬁc to genocide is the harm inﬂicted on its victims’ social
vitality… When a group with its own cultural identity is
destroyed, its survivors lose their cultural heritage and may
even lose their intergenerational connections.93
The above collection of genocide deﬁnitions demonstrates that the future, and the
ability of a group to continue as it presently exists in that future, holds a unique and inﬂuential
position in the thinking of many genocide scholars and the discipline of Genocide Studies as a
whole.
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Who Do These Deﬁnitions Exclude?
The emphasis on genocide as a crime that interferes with cultural and biological reproduction
risks obscuring violence perpetrated against real and perceived non-reproductive group
members. Two communities that fall into the category of non-reproductive, real and/or
perceived, are poor people and queer people.
Lemkin’s and others’ deﬁnitions of genocide rest on the underlying assumption that
distinct cultural groups are intrinsically valuable because they contribute to the richness and
progress of human civilization.94 Lemkin declared “all our cultural heritage is a product of the
contribution of all nations,” citing the contributions of people who hailed from groups targeted
by the Nazis—people like Einstein, Spinoza, and Chopin.95 As his examples demonstrate,
Lemkin associated culture and the potential for cultural reproduction with high culture. It was
elites and intellectuals, according to Lemkin, not peasants, the working class, or the uneducated
who transmitted culture.96 Following this logic, Lemkin would ﬁnd that “the murder of a poet is
morally worse than the murder of a janitor” and that the destruction of a library or mosque is
more abhorrent than the burning of a home or barn.97 Even if unintentional, the classism and
elitism inherent in deﬁnitions like Lemkin’s is apparent.
Much like certain deﬁnitions of genocide render the impoverished invisible,
conceptualizations of genocide that center the future obscure queer people. In his 2004 polemic,
No Future, queer theorist Lee Edelman argues that the political as we know it, is built around
“the afﬁrmation of a value so unquestioned, because so obviously unquestionable, as that of the
Child whose innocence solicits our defense.”98 There is no room to debate whether or not we
should be centering the ﬁgure of the Child. All political debate, and “political” here is broadly
conceived, centers around how best to protect children. Importantly, these discussions usually
center future children, rather than existing, embodied children—hence Edelman’s invocation of
“the Child.” Edelman labels this phenomenon “reproductive futurism,” which he deﬁnes as
terms that impose an ideological limit on political discourse as
such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of
heteronormativity by rending unthinkable, by casting outside
the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this
organizing principle of communal relations.99
Genocide Studies is heavily invested in reproductive futurism. Historically, victim
groups have been conceptualized as organic collectives. Groups eligible for protection from
genocide have only included those that can “reproduce and multiply themselves in a manner
understood heteronormatively as both natural and good.”100 Genocide scholars deﬁne their
subject according to reproduction. They also justify their research in the name of preventing
genocide and saving future generations (i.e. children) from the scourge of genocide.101
Often times, anti-queer institutions, such as laws banning gays and lesbians from
teaching or adopting, are justiﬁed as necessary to protect children. Moreover, until recently, in
Western culture, the idea of queer parents raising children had been unthinkable. As a result of
these logics, Edelman invokes queerness to describe “those not ﬁghting for the children, the
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side outside the consensus by which all politics conﬁrms the absolute value of reproductive
futurism.”102 Queerness—both as a refusal of reproductive futurity and as a practice or identity
—threatens particular social orders and “social order as such, insofar as it threatens the logic of
futurism on which meaning always depends.”103 When we cast genocide as abhorrent because it
threatens our social order, constructed from a logic of reproductive futurism, we also catch
queerness in our net—characterizing it as similarly dangerous and destructive because of the
way it calls the future into question.
The implications of this move are three-fold. First, genocide scholars replicate the logic
deployed by genocidaires. Second, the deaths of queer genocide victims become less important
to both genocide scholars and targeted communities. Third, recovery efforts directed by
supposed international experts ignore existing people’s trauma and reify heteronormative and
genocidal logics.
Initially, genocidaires and genocide scholars deploy the same logic of reproductive
futurism. Perpetrators of genocide take advantage of the norms of reproductive futurism by
justifying their atrocities with arguments about ensuring security and prosperity for future
generations. For instance, in a 1934 speech to German youth, Adolf Hitler declared: “No matter
what we create today and what we do, we will pass away one day. But in you, Germany will
live on…We see in you the promise that our work was not in vain.”104 Additionally,
genocidaires understand that their victims also value children above all else and stake their
hopes on future generations. This explains why perpetrators target children for death and
extreme violence. In Rwanda, the leaders of the genocide speciﬁcally directed assailants to
murder children. Propagandists frequently reminded people that even the youngest posed a
threat. After all, every Tutsi soldier had once been a baby.105 “Of the bodies exhumed by
Physicians for Human Rights at a mass grave in Kibuye province, some 44 percent were of
children under the age of ﬁfteen and 31 percent were under ten.”106
While genocide certainly represents this attitude in the extreme, Edelman argues that
reproductive futurism encourages limiting the rights of existing people in the name of
protecting future children.107 The idea that we must sacriﬁce now for the beneﬁt of our children
and our children’s children echoes across many different cultures and throughout history.
Though it has strong roots in Protestantism, which, as a consequence of colonialism and
imperialism, is an inﬂuential cultural force across the globe.108 It makes sense, then, that
genocidal leaders justify gruesome and extreme violence in the name of future generations.
Framing genocide as an unfortunate but necessary sacriﬁce. As discussed earlier, genocide
scholars also deploy ideas of reproductive futurism by focusing on children and future
generations as the locus of a group’s identity. In doing so, genocide scholars must be wary of
reifying, rather than explaining, perpetrator’s behavior.
Next, the reproductive futurism inherent in many deﬁnitions of genocide makes queer
deaths seem less important, both to scholars and victims. Queer people exist in every group and
in every time period. They are inevitably caught up in waves of genocidal violence. However, if
preventing the reproduction of culture and people is what makes genocide particularly evil, the
logical, though likely unintended, extension of this idea is that killing carriers of culture and
genetics is somehow more genocidal than killing perceived non-carriers. While our
understandings of what types of families are available to queer people are rapidly changing,
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most same-sex couples cannot biologically reproduce and, historically, queer people have been
perceived as infertile. Further, when the family is the center of cultural life, which it so often is,
queer people without children also do not play as essential of a role in passing down cultural
traditions.109 So, by extension of the logic of futuristic deﬁnitions of genocide, the deaths of
queer people are less genocidal than the deaths of non-queer people. Perhaps this logical
conclusion, even subconsciously, plays a role in why so few genocide scholars have done
empirical work with queer victims of genocide.
Moreover, this type of thinking contributes to victim groups turning on or failing to
protect queer members of their community. For reasons discussed in section one, we do not
know much empirically about how queer members of targeted groups e.g. queer Armenians,
queer Tutsis, and so on, are treated by their friends and families in the midst of genocide.
However, it is not difﬁcult to imagine that as targeted groups become more nationalist and
natalist in the face of genocide, they too begin to exclude, isolate, and persecute queer people.
As a result, queer people may have higher rates of fatalities during genocides because they are
cut off from the support, safety, and solidarity community members provide each other. We do
know that in Nazi Germany, while other prisoners detained in similar conditions received aid
and care packages from family and friends outside the concentration camps, homosexual
prisoners did not.110 What happens to queer people persecuted by their community for being
queer and by another community for their ethnicity, nationality, religion, or race? With both
researchers and targeted groups dedicated to ideas bound up with reproductive futurism, we
do not have a complete answer to that question.
Finally, when genocide experts and international humanitarians whose understandings
of genocide are built around reproductive futurism arrive to help rebuild societies after
genocide, they may focus primarily on rebuilding families and efforts to reconcile children of
different backgrounds. In doing so, they inadvertently minimize the trauma of adults and those
who fall outside of normative understandings of family, like widows, rape survivors, and queer
people. They also tend to entrench the heteronormative structures that, as discussed in the
preceding section, create an environment where nationalism and genocide ﬂourish. Since these
experts understand genocide as an event that “disrupts and destroys” family, they place a
“special emphasis” on “rebuilding families and fostering cohesion.”111 “Children and youth, in
whom visions of national development are invested, are central to post-conﬂict state-building
efforts.”112 In Rwanda, for example, the post-genocide government declared its goal was to
become a middle-income country by 2020, resting most of their hopes on the education of the
65% of the population under the age of 25.113 Of course, children, like anybody else, are worthy
of care and concern following genocide. However, when everyone places all of their bets on the
next generation, it can devalue the current generation and human life in the process.
Addressing the individual stress and trauma and cultural stress and trauma caused by genocide
requires extreme attention and nuance.114 By overemphasizing the nuclear family and children,
however well-intentioned, those aiding reconstructing efforts may be robbing others of the care
they need and deserve.
In this section, I made a normative critique of Genocide Studies as a discipline. Many
genocide scholars deﬁne genocide as interference with biological and cultural reproduction. I
applied Lee Edelman’s concept of reproductive futurism to these deﬁnitions and critiqued them
for erasing queer people and others who are or are perceived to be non-reproductive, namely
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the impoverished. As a result, Genocide Studies normalizes, though unintentionally, an
understanding of the concept that reiﬁes genocidaires’ logic, deemphasizes queer lives during
genocide, and contributes to heteronormative reconstructions of post-genocidal societies.
Martin Shaw’s 2007 deﬁnition of genocide provides an example of a deﬁnitional direction to
move in:
…genocidal action can be deﬁned as action in which armed
power organizations treat civil social groups as enemies and
aim to destroy their real or putative social power, by means of
killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom they
regard as members of the groups. Thus, genocide is a type of
unequal social conﬂict between two sets of actors, which is
deﬁned primarily by the type of action carried out by the more
powerful side.115
While Shaw’s deﬁnition is not immune to critique, it emphasizes the destruction of
current, living people based on their membership in a social group. While not explicitly a queer
deﬁnition of genocide, and I do think there is a space and need for a queer deﬁnition of
genocide, a deﬁnition like Shaw’s does not devalue non-reproductive life. Rather, it criminalizes
the taking of or harm to all life. In addition to discussions about including sexual orientation
and gender identity in deﬁnitions of protected groups, we must also have a much-needed
discussion about re-deﬁning genocide in a more inclusive and queer way.
Conclusion
This paper argues for the empirical and analytical utility and normative necessity of building
bridges between queer theory and the study of genocide. I used the queer theory concepts of
queer intellectual curiosity, heteronormativity, and reproductive futurism to demonstrate why
bridging is necessary and what it might look like. While the empirics are currently limited, I
drew examples from Nazi Germany, the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, and Rwanda, to help
demonstrate the need for a queerer Genocide Studies. I did not intend to convince the reader of
any one truth about queering Genocide Studies in this paper. Rather, I hoped to convince the
reader that queering Genocide Studies has value. The constructive arguments I did make, such
as the argument that heteronormativity makes possible genocide, serve as examples of the way
queer theories of genocide might work. When I began scrutinizing the puzzle of genocide and
queerness, I planned to empirically examine heteronormativity as a precondition of genocide.
Early in the research process it became clear the existing literature base and archives are
insufﬁcient to support empirical investigation. We need a robust research program on queer(er)
Genocide Studies that produces a wide array of primary sources and literature investigating the
myriad possible connections between queerness and genocide.
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Introduction
Since Myanmar’s independence, the borderlands have been characterized by periodic and
cyclical violence as ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) have fought against state military
offensives. Despite the evident asymmetry between the well-equipped and extensive Tatmadaw
and the many rebel groups that remain, at least to some degree, poorly organized and
underfunded, war has plagued the borderland communities since independence.1 A barrage of
human rights abuses has come in the wake of the low-intensity, long-term war, waged by the
Tatmadaw who have historically viewed civilian populations with suspicion and often as
acceptable collateral damage. Such a precedent as this has been accepted whilst the military
dominated the state during the period of the military junta. However, as Myanmar has begun
its transition towards a seemingly democratic state, with the triple transition process, there has
been a fall in the levels of direct violence experienced within the borderlands.2 Whilst this could
be considered a positive development, this paper will question the authenticity of these
changes. Though direct violence has reduced, forms of indirect violence and crimes against
humanity have continued. Transition has not ended state sponsored violence but rather
transformed it. As such, there has not been an end to the crimes against humanity for these
communities, but rather the mechanisms by which it is conducted have transformed over time.
The ﬁrst part of this paper will focus on actions against the minority communities
within Myanmar’s borderlands as enacted under the military junta between 1962 and 2008.3 It
will identify how key events changed the relations between the military and these local
populations, including the introduction of the Four Cuts strategy, the major offensives of the
1980s and the ceaseﬁre agreements of the 1990s. The second part will identify how the triple
transition introduced to Myanmar in 2008, and led by the military, has and has not altered the
actions of the military and their engagements with local communities within the borderlands.4
The ﬁnal section will focus on how the process of the triple transition has transformed the
methods used to continue the violence and marginalization of these populations within the
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The Tatmadaw is the title of the Myanmar military forces. Here, the two terms Tatmadaw and military will be used
interchangeably.

2
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process in Myanmar was identiﬁed and outlined by The World Bank in 2012 as part of their interim strategy for
working in Myanmar. See “World Bank Prepares Interim Strategy Note for Myanmar,” World Bank, August 10,
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borderlands.5 This article will build on research and insights collected by the author on several
research trips to the areas under study and with activists working inside Myanmar from along
the Thai-Burma border. By engaging with local perspectives on the continuing human rights
situation along the border, the article is able to move beyond national and internal rhetoric on
transition and democratization that has too often been the foci of international engagement
within Myanmar since 2015.
Myanmar’s government and military have faced myriad threats from ethnic
oppositions, and most recently have been implicated in an ongoing genocide in Rakhine against
the Rohingya people.6 Not to minimize the scale and devastation of the plight of the Rohingya,
the oppression they face from the state both in terms of conduct and reasons for such
oppression present an anomaly in relation to historic state policy. As such, this paper focuses
not on the Rohingya crisis but the experiences of other ethnic groups within the borderlands,
particularly the Karen and Kachin communities based in the east and north of the country, who
have experienced a process of slow genocide since independence. Both these ethnic groups have
faced systematic oppression and been victim to crimes against humanity. Though, at times these
experiences have diverged, there is great commonality between their experiences when they are
viewed over time.7 The Karen and Kachin have mounted large-scale rebellions against the state
with popular support from their home communities. Though their experiences do not match
every minority group within Myanmar, nor does the experience detailed below represent all of
those within each of these communities, their more comprehensive organization and
international outreach has provided an insight into these regions and communities that have
long been neglected.
Burma Under the Military 1962–2008
When Burma was granted independence by the British colonial powers in 1948, it was already a
state in crisis. War ravaged Burma had witnessed several brutal fronts during World War II as
well as two separate occupying forces and numerous bombardments from air and ground
troops.8 Though desired, independence did not bring peace to Burma, with the assassination of
the country’s leader, Aung San and his cabinet occurring just before the historic handover.9
Factionalism plagued not only the cabinet but across the country, with mounting insurgencies
from both communist and ethnic cleavages. Consequently, the military staged a coup d’état in
1962 with the aim of unifying both the government and the country. This responsibility has
become institutionalized within the Tatmadaw, who, at their core believe their role is to
maintain the territoriality of the Union and protect it above all else.10
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It is important to note that there is debate on how independent the institutions of state and military are within
Myanmar given the transition that has been ongoing since 2008. As this paper focuses on state-sponsored violence
and the use of soft as well as coercive power, it accepts the premise that though these institutions are separate, it is
almost impossible to distinctly separate their actions within this environment.
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Armed Struggle in Myanmar’s Borderlands (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019).
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The Tatmadaw solidiﬁed their role as state leaders through the 1974 adoption of the
“Burmese Way to Socialism,” which saw Burma isolate itself from the international stage. This
policy of isolationism ruined Burma’s economy, going from one of the fastest growing Asian
Tigers to applying for Least Developed Country Status (LDC) in 1987.11 Though devastating for
Burma’s peasant population throughout the country, the borderland communities found
themselves in an even more precarious position.
Thirty years of Burmese independence had resulted in 30 years of war within the
borderlands. The mountainous jungle terrain and asymmetrical power structures between the
Tatmadaw and EAOs forced the latter to adopt guerrilla tactics, entrenching conﬂict as part of
daily life and blurring the lines between armed groups and civilians. This entanglement of
civilian and rebel life was identiﬁed by the state and became the target of the Four Cuts counterinsurgency policy adopted during the 1960s.12 It aimed to remove the four supply lines EAOs
required for survival: food, funds, recruits and intelligence.13 Yet, the implementation treated
civilian communities as collateral damage with tactics including mass forced relocation, razed
villages and farm-holds, the widespread use of landmines as well as systematic arrest and
torture policies.14 This was in addition to restrictions and hardships that communities faced
because of the war, such as arbitrary arrests, forced portering, illegal torture and execution as
well as rape of women and children. Further, discriminatory state policies failed to protect other
minority rights, such as the lack of ofﬁcial recognition of minority languages and culture in
favor of the Barmar majority cultural and religious signiﬁers.15 Communities in the borderlands
faced three overlapping types of state oppression during this period: direct violence (as a
consequence of the war); violence as a consequence of state sanctioned counter-insurgency
strategies; and oppression of cultural norms and rights through the prioritization of the Barmar
identity.
This peaked in the mid-1980s when the violence leveled against the Karen population
drove thousands across the border to Thailand. By the end of the junta period, such refugees
and displaced people ofﬁcially numbered over 150,000 along several camps on the Thai-Burma
border.16 In part, this increase is related to the decision by the central command to force
Tatmadaw battalions within the borderlands to “live off the land.”17 This policy saw the central
government and military cease funds for supplies to their battalions, forcing them to extract it
from the civilian population. In the borderlands, where the Tatmadaw were perceived as an
invading force, there was little to no civilian support for these battalions.18 Consequently, to
survive, battalions committed further abuses against civilian communities, conﬁscating their
food supplies, stores, livestock, and equipment as required, often razing villages or killing
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community leaders to eliminate any evidence.19 In this period, communities in the borderlands
faced an additional threat to the lives and livelihoods from the military and they became victims
not only to counter-insurgency policies but over direct competition for resources.
Though a number of ceaseﬁres were signed in the early 1990s, including in Kachin
State, conﬂict continued in Karen. Unable to reach an agreement with the Karen National Union
(KNU), the Tatmadaw launched increasingly ferocious offensives against key locations within
Karen and other regions under the control of KNU forces. This included their capital and
headquarters Mannerplaw, which had grown to be an oasis for pro-democratic forces from all
parts of Burma.20 Consequently, communities in Karen continued to experience the denial of
their rights and structural insecurities from the ongoing conﬂict, counterinsurgency and other
government policies, as well as the lack of ofﬁcial recognition of the cultural rights.
Whereas the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) signed a ceaseﬁre with the
government in the 1990s, though this did not necessarily protect local populations from crimes
committed by the state. As Sadan’s work on the second Kachin ceaseﬁre highlights, in the 17
years of “peace” created by the 1994 agreement, the population still faced high levels of
militarization and remained vulnerable to abuses.21 The military government pursued
aggressive investment strategies within the region, often in areas not under their own control.22
This gave the military remit to enter such areas to secure locations for development whilst
further cutting the KIO off from their own territories and traditional revenue streams.23 For
civilian populations, this meant vulnerability to forced relocations, forced labor, and
conﬁscation of resources as battalions were and remain under instruction to live off the land.
Thus, despite the presence of ceaseﬁres in some borderland regions, communities remained
vulnerable to state violence and oppression as they were within the conﬂict regions.
Under military control, the ethnic minorities in Burma’s resource rich borderlands have
experienced systematic human rights abuses that amount to crimes against humanity. The
forced relocation of 100,000’s of people remains the clearest reminder of this. However,
restrictions on cultural and religious freedoms of these communities, the cyclical violence they
have faced, and the removal of livelihoods and ways of life have culminated in much wider
reaching implications for these communities who feel their whole way of life and existence has
been under threat.
Myanmar and the Triple Transition: A Work in Progress
The acceptance of the 2008 Constitution started a process that would become known as the
triple transition in Myanmar.24 The document itself set out the institutional changes and
structure of what political transition the country would take. It further outlined an economic
plan for market liberalization, ending the state-centric policies of the socialist and junta eras. To
achieve the institutional frameworks and goals set out within it, the need to further transition
from war to peace was clearly underscored. Myanmar’s triple transition had begun.
At the institutional and macro-conception, regime transition in Myanmar has
progressed smoothly, achieving successive goalposts in its quest to democratize. Though the
progress toward regular institutional elections may have been achieved, the representativeness
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of the governments it elects are suspect. The military continue to hold twenty-ﬁve percent of
seats within government and held onto core positions and ministries within the new
government. Further, both elections since 2008 have missed areas deemed too unsafe or
unstable for them to be conducted.25 Demonstrably, the military may have stepped back from
day to day governance, but they have chosen to remain a shadow in the halls of government,
poised to tackle any deemed threat to Myanmar’s development.
Beyond the institutional structures, transition to democracy leaves much to be desired
for local communities. Many in Myanmar continue to struggle to access their political and
human rights along with the resources to fulﬁl their basic needs. Those living in conﬂict zones
in Shan, Karen, and Kachin have been denied voting rights in elections.26 Most notably the
Rohingya in Rakhine were denied the right to vote in 2015 with no national parties ﬁelding any
Muslim candidates.27 This electoral marginalization has contributed to the mounting oppression
of rights minorities within the borderland already face.
When President Thein Sein took ofﬁce in 2010, there was fear that little would change
given his military ties. On the contrary, he oversaw a period of dramatic reform focusing on the
overdue economic liberalization of Myanmar. Under his leadership, the country saw major
increases in development aid and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to help improve
infrastructure and harvest many of Myanmar’s rich natural resource deposits.28 International
funders arrived, buoyed by the belief that economic transition would aid Myanmar’s political
and conﬂict transitions. Yet, they were also pulled by the rich investment opportunities from
large-scale infrastructure projects, including deep seaports and new railroads, to resource rich
lands that include precious stones, oil, and teak. Alterations to the rules governing FDI in
Myanmar, along with increased length of land leases to foreigners broke down many of the
boundaries investors had previously faced.29 This resulted in an unprecedented wave of FDI to
Myanmar in 2010.30
The establishment of the National Ceaseﬁre Agreement (NCA) was the last act of Thein
Sein’s government and the ﬁrst multilateral ceaseﬁre ever secured within the country. This
ended much of the direct violence that had characterized the borderlands since independence,
including the solidiﬁcation of the peace between the KNU and the government, suspending the
world’s longest civil war.31 Although direct violence was suspended, the lack of compromise
between the EAOs and the Tatmadaw resulted in only the preliminary agreement being signed.
This has led many to note the agreement is “surface only” and that the complex framework that
25
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has been built around the NCA is there to ensure the military advantage at every stage.32 This,
in itself, was reminiscent of the previous bilateral ceaseﬁres which were more akin to business
transactions, suspending direct violence for economic gain than a substantial commitment to
the peace process they were trying to emulate.33
Peace and reconciliation were placed at the top of the National League for Democracy’s
(NLD) priorities when they took ofﬁce in 2015.34 Yet, it was the military negotiators that
maintained the major role within the peace talks, with the government taking on the role of
mediators.35 Despite increasing the number of talks and peace conferences, little has been
achieved in terms of results for Myanmar’s peace process. In 2018, hope seemed to arise as two
new groups joined the agreement, yet this was soon dashed by inter-signatory clashes.36
Concerns increased later that year when the KNU and Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS),
two of the largest groups within the NCA, decided to suspend their membership after a number
of confrontations with Tatmadaw in EAO deﬁned territory.37 Though the ﬁnal cause of
suspension, the incursions were not the sole reason for this decision. Both groups publicized
frustrations with the peace process and cited the government and the military’s unwillingness
to compromise, as well as the establishment of new preconditions they had been expected to
sign before negotiations could continue.38 This has reﬂected growing frustrations with the peace
process which for those involved has lacked the necessary compromise on both sides to
progress effectively.39
The common obstacle to effective change is the role of the military within transitional
processes. The military holds its allocated seats and sections within the political arena and is
able to override many government decisions with little established transparency to hold them
accountable for their interventions. Though ofﬁcials seated in the military blocks of each of the
houses have shown surprising independence and engagement with parliamentary process, on
several occasions, the military’s ability to override political process has been obvious.40 Most
notably, under Thein Sein, the government announced a ceaseﬁre with the KIO, only to have the
Tatmadaw completely ignore the government directive.41 It is this notion of elevated importance
that permits the military to act outside the law without impediment. Although the NCA has
reduced the levels of direct violence in many areas of the borderlands, the military continue to
wage war against non-NCA signatories. As identiﬁed by Jones, under the Kachin ceaseﬁre
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which ended in 2011, the military continued to pursue control of land and communities held by
EAOs through other means.42 The use of economic development and infrastructure projects as a
mechanism to permit the military to enter, secure, and control territory identiﬁed as under EAO
control has become a preferred strategy of the military.43 With the 2011 ceaseﬁre breakdown
occurring over a military outpost adjacent to one of the major dam projects along the KachinChina border.44 This created localized escalations in violence, including the forced relocation of
local communities either in the name of development or due to mistrust of the military. There
are now over 100,000 displaced people in Kachin State and along the China border.45 Thus, the
presence of ceaseﬁre did not alleviate the threat to society of slow genocide but rather altered
the methods to which it is being conducted.
Yet, direct or indirect violence are not the only methods of dispossession employed by
the state and military in relation to minority communities. Many communities in the
borderlands still face issues accessing justice and state services with many identifying
increasing crackdowns on their freedom of expression since 2015. There are three main reasons
for this. First, in conﬂict areas, justice is difﬁcult to achieve as often, would be cases are resolved
directly between perpetrators and victims and involve a ﬁscal settlement, rather than an
attempt to achieve justice.46 Second, should any case involve the military, the Tatmadaw will
ensure that it is heard in a military court where family and local leaders must gain permission
to attend and there is less accountability.47 In both these instances, though a form of resolution
may be offered to victims, there is a lack of accountability and transparency that leaves victims
and their families vulnerable to further intimidation and injustices. Yet, on the few times cases
do make it to civilian courts, there remains no guarantee of transparency or accountability—
over ﬁfty percent of judges have a military background in Myanmar, including both the Chief
Justice and the Attorney General.48 Further, all cases are heard in Burmese and although under
the law all minorities speakers may have a translator, many are not aware of their rights and so
remain vulnerable within the justice system.49 Thus, justice remains inaccessible to many.
Yet, institutional obstacles are not the only barriers ethnic minority communities face in
achieving justice for crimes committed against them. Traditional customs and cultural practices
have also prevented victims from seeking justice. There is a saying in relation to Myanmar’s
legal practice —“Keep the cases small, and make small cases disappear,” which is equivalent to
—“do not air your dirty laundry.”50 It discourages victims from coming forward, which is
already an issue due to the institutional, ﬁnancial, and accessibility barriers minority
communities already face in accessing justice in Myanmar. Further, the increasing use of new
laws to prosecute individuals criticizing the government has resulted in law being viewed as a
tool of oppression rather than one of liberation. This is particularly in reference to the use of
66d, a telecommunications law, which has been levied against numerous human rights
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defenders and critics of the NLD government.51 As one interviewee noted, “the laws have now
been established, but they are being used as a weapon of oppression.”52
Additionally, state-society relations appear to be deteriorating with the state
persistently refusing to listen or cooperate with active civil society organizations.53 While this
had been possible for many civil society groups during the Thein Sein era, many have found it
increasingly difﬁcult to be heard by government ofﬁcials. Some of the interviewees noted that
the change was merely a bureaucratic one, requiring civil society to request permission at least
three days before.54 Others claimed, due to their own afﬁliations or lack of ofﬁcial registration,
they were now unable to get meetings with government ofﬁcials or organize workshops.55 This
seemed to suggest a variable willingness by the government to engage with civil society and a
civil society space that seemed to be restricting since 2015. This not only impacts freedom of
expression but the ability of communities to mobilize and engage with the government on a
communal platform.
Changing Face: Patterns of Human Rights Abuses in Myanmar
In recent reports by Shan and Karen civil society, there has been a documented shift in the kinds
of human rights abuses committed against civilian populations.56 Previously, in periods of
conﬂict, the majority of cases have centered around extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests
and disappearances. Now, both communities report increasing cases of land conﬁscation and
forced relocation.57 In Kachin, it has become the most prominent issue as the ongoing war has
allowed for cronies and military elites to grab land in the name of security and development.58
The combination of displacement and land grabbing has resulted in abandoned villages being
sold to the Chinese; meaning, communities having no place to return to.59 In Karen, though
there is no active war, communities face similar abuses with land grabbing occurring in both
ceaseﬁre and non-ceaseﬁre territories. As one interviewee described, “since the signing of the
NCA there has been little change… because some groups are now legal, they can come and do
business. One group near my village have expanded mines a lot [sic] and it is not good. It is
ruining our water supply and we have many landslides; it has ruined crops and roads.”60
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This identiﬁes a pattern of change in the methods of control and domination
orchestrated by the Tatmadaw. When war and control by coercive means becomes a less viable
option, such control is maintained through other more indirect forms, such as economic
accumulation.
It is therefore possible to see a shift in the methods of oppression adopted and utilized
by the military in relation to the borderland communities. In the junta period, society as a whole
has faced a range of oppressive measures including limitations on their freedom of speech.
Those communities residing within the borderlands faced additional repressive policies
through the orchestration of Four Cuts and the human rights abuses that occurred because of the
wars ongoing around them. These policies of oppression disproportionately impacted the lives
of civilians within the borderlands causing many to be forcibly relocated or to ﬂee to Thailand.
Yet, this relocation in itself has become part of the oppression of communities and their
rights. First, the journey to relative safety held great risks due to the high density of mines in
many borderland areas.61 Forty years later, many remain in camps, with dwindling supplies and
even less to return for—they have been left reliant on humanitarian handouts which are
increasingly drying up as more international assistance focuses on the transition in Myanmar.62
Second, as part of displacement, these communities lost access to their farms and villages and
therefore, their cultural and traditional customs. A healthcare worker who grew up in one of the
camps noted that few of her generation wanted to return: “They do not know Karen State, we
cannot read or speak Karen, it is not our home. As we cannot farm in the camp, few would
know how to make a living if we went back. We do not know our own tradition this way.”63
Consequently, communities that ﬂed violence may have protected themselves from
direct repression but are still experiencing the impacts, albeit indirectly, of such violence as well
as the oppression of their cultural and traditional practices.
Since the transition began in 2008 and the ceaseﬁre singing in 2015, there has been a
substantial reduction in these directly oppressive policies that characterized the junta period.
Outright violence because of war has dropped almost completely in areas where ceaseﬁres have
been signed.64 The counterinsurgency policies of the 1960s are no longer used to try and root out
dissenting forces. Nevertheless, communities within the borderlands still face higher levels of
repression by state forces than those of the ethnic Barmar majority at the center of the state.
Indirect and structural violence continues to limit these communities’ rights to peaceful
living and accessing their human rights. Despite the ending, or freezing of armed conﬂicts,
human rights abuses continue to be committed. Sporadic deaths and arbitrary arrests continue,
as well as cases of rape conducted by Tatmadaw ofﬁcers.65 The most common abuses now
center on the conﬁscation of land and the use of forced labor, often characterized by the state as
voluntary labor carried out by villagers—laying roads, carrying heavy loads, and so forth.66
This increase is related to the new method of control the state is imposing on the borderlands:
control through economic development and state incursion into ethnic minority areas. By
auctioning off traditionally held lands, many of which are resource rich, the state is reaping
economic beneﬁts, gaining access to lands and communities, and asserting control previously
inaccessible to them. The consequence of such actions is creating a new wave of displacement as
people attempt to move away from state control and presence due to fear of state repression.
Despite the differing situations in Karen and Kachin State, the former experiencing a
reduction in violence due to the ongoing ceaseﬁre, the latter currently an active war zone after
ceaseﬁre breakdown, economic investment is being used as a weapon of oppression in both. As
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discussed earlier, the Kachin ceaseﬁre broke down in 2011 over damming sites in Kachin State
and the increasing presence of the Chinese investors and Tatmadaw in KIO territory. Unrest
over development projects in Kachin has not diffused, with the Myitsone Dam project being
permanently suspended due to civil unrest.67 Yet, ﬁghting continues over resource-rich land
such as Jade mines and land abandoned by those forced to ﬂee, now secured through plantation
projects.68 Karen interviewees noted that since the reduction in ﬁghting in Karen as part of the
ceaseﬁre, the Tatmadaw now fought for land through land rights and access, as one put it, “they
do not come with guns anymore, they come with letters.”69 Moreover, militarization in Karen is
not decreasing but increasing since the ceaseﬁre, so although there is less violence, communities
do not feel safer or more secure.70
The development of the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Law (VVFL) in Myanmar
exempliﬁes how legal practice and development are being utilized to marginalize and
dispossess minority populations in Myanmar’s borderlands. Historically, all land is owned by
the state and can be rented long term if it is registered by the land holder, this ignores all
traditional land ownership within the borderlands.71 Thus, effectively dispossessing whole
communities from the lands which they have resided on for generations.72 Further, registration
of land and land licenses is in the hands of village and tract administrators, as they have a say in
what is termed vacant or fallow and these administrators are often corrupt or biased.73 The basis
of which has left communities feeling dispossessed and helpless: “The law gives the
government a lot of authority now to take our land. They have taken it, it is already sold off.”
Lastly, the state and military forces are using the NCA to coercively co-opt the EAOs
into the state. By promising peace and providing the space for negotiation through a
multilateral framework, the transitional governments have been able to secure a further
reaching end to hostilities than ever before. This has been a positive development, but actions
since the establishment of the NCA have uncovered a darker side to the negotiations. Rather
than developing points of agreement and commonality between those involved, recent talks
have become stagnant, unable to move past the major obstacles to peace such as demobilization,
disarmament, and reintegration.74 This included new directives which include a commitment to
one national army and a reconﬁrmation of non-secession from the state.75 Such demands, even
after the failure of talks to produce any deﬁnitive outcomes in past years, highlights the
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superiority the military continue to hold, even at the negotiating table. They are not attending to
compromise; they wish to see all actors “brought into the legal fold.”76
The talks and peace conferences continue to be promoted as a place of open discussion
and debate with all armed actors and the support of the NLD government. This has legitimized
the actions of the military and government, both domestically and internationally, as they show
a commitment to peace. Consequently, it has left the EAOs in a precarious position. If they join
and engage with the peace process, they risk being co-opted into a single state and army under
the control of the Tatmadaw, an organization for which they have no trust. Or, should they leave
or not sign, they risk losing legitimacy and support both internationally and domestically for
being spoilers within the process.77 Being labelled a spoiler is a real concern as groups outside
the peace process complain of pressure to join from their counterparts within the NCA, noting
they are seen as stubborn and backward rather than legitimate or principled among their
peers.78
Legitimizing a Repressive State: Co-opting the International Community
So far, this article has highlighted how, while the methods have changed, the state and
military’s attitude towards ethnic communities has remained the same. Many borderland
communities continue to face high levels of repression through indirect means, leaving them
few options, either to be repressed and have limited to no rights, or to leave.79 This is despite the
triple transition process, that is supposedly aiming to create the idealistic peaceful, democratic,
market driven state. As Myanmar is opening to the international environment, they open
themselves to increasing oversight and intervention by the international community; an
environment typically not conducive to continuing human rights abuses and discriminatory
practices that go against the international norms.80 This section will postulate that Myanmar is
minimizing such concerns through a policy of co-optation with the international community. By
inviting investments through the auctioning of its globally ﬁnite natural resource deposits and
large-scale infrastructure projects. It has managed to create a competitive market where
investing states are more willing to overlook or negate humanitarian concerns in favor of major
investment opportunities. The presence and previous dominance of investment by nations
unencumbered by westernized international norms has also contributed to this position by
removing the possibility of investors to place steep conditions on their investment projects.
Thein Sein’s major package of economic reforms split Myanmar open to international
investment after an extended period of isolationism under the junta. The introduction of
competitive parliamentary elections provided a clear signpost of change to the international
community, with many choosing to drop their sanctions against the state in favor of providing
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Since the commitment by the junta to “disciplined
democracy” in 2008 and the reforms of the 2011–2015 government, Myanmar’s GDP has
steadily grown, averaging around eight per cent per year.81 As democratic practice began to be
institutionalized and reform realized, international interest and investment skyrocketed.
That is not to suggest that during its period of isolationism, both self-imposed
(pre-1988) and externally enforced (post-1988), Myanmar experienced no international
investment. During its isolation from the international community, many regional powers
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including Thailand and China invested heavily in their neighbor, though often, through
unofﬁcial methods. They beneﬁted from the black markets along the borderlands and the ability
to access the scarce resources such as teak and jade through cooperation with EAOs
consequently gaining from Burma’s war economy throughout the 1970s and 1980s.82 Though
the brutal state repression of the 8888 pro-democracy uprising did cause international outcry
and a ﬂurry of sanctions to be levelled against the government, the impact on the economy was
not as far-reaching as might have been expected. Having pursued a neutralist and isolationist
discourse with the international environment, the disruption the sanctions aimed to bring to
Burma’s economy was perhaps not as effective as the imposers of such policies may have
hoped.
Despite international sanctions, Myanmar’s neighbors took an alternative approach of
cautious engagement with the state. Rather, the regional powers began to invest and engage
economically with the government. Japan, India, Thailand, and China all became major
investors within the country’s large infrastructure and border investment projects.83 As the
government began to agree to numerous ceaseﬁres throughout its borderlands, it consolidated
control within such regions through economic means.84 By granting licenses to its regional
investors, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)85 was able to extend its control in
territory previously beyond its oversight while simultaneously removing revenue streams from
its ethnic rivals.86 This policy of economic domination has been well documented within the
ceaseﬁres in Kachin and later Karen State.87 The success of such policies demonstrated an
effective alternative to state expansion and control within the borderlands that did not require
the risk of retribution and disfavor the use of direct coercive means had created.
Developing the characteristics of a democratic regime does not ensure its institutional
embedding. Elections are now the primary method of state legitimation, both within
authoritarian and democratic states. Increasing numbers of states are falling into the typology of
a competitive authoritarianism which mixes traditionally democratic and authoritarian features
into a hybrid form of governance.88 Despite this knowledge, and the growing wariness of
elections in post-war and transitioning states, the presence of elections continues to be the most
notable signiﬁer of change for many within the international environment.89 The success of the
opposition to not only compete but to also win and be allowed to take power proved to be a
sufﬁcient level of development for much of the international community. From an electoral and
institutional standpoint, Myanmar seemed to be achieving its transitional goals; however, as we
focus on transition within the borderland, it becomes clear this is an attempt to protect the
central state and military rather than truly reform.
This alteration in regime and transition toward the democratic, market-liberal and
peaceful state encouraged investors from outside the region to step forward. The longstanding
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sanctions programs against Myanmar’s military state were eased by both the US and EU.90 Such
relaxation of sanctions has generated much needed investment in core infrastructure such as
Norway’s investment in Myanmar’s telecommunications which aimed to see mass extension of
mobile and internet infrastructure throughout Myanmar.91 This plan, and the subsequent
investment in it, opened the use of mobile phones to the mass market in a way that had
previously not been possible in Myanmar. Thus, the institutional transition attracted nontraditional, western investors to enter the Myanmar markets, as the minimum bars for
democratization were met.
Much of the investment Myanmar now receives is focused on and within its borderland
areas. These regions have remained extremely underdeveloped due to the harsh terrains,
distance from the center, and the continued insecurity caused by ongoing hostilities. These
regions are also the sites of many of Myanmar’s natural resource deposits which remain
relatively untouched. Many of the deposits Myanmar boasts within its portfolio are demanded
not only on a regional level but globally and this relative abundance has Myanmar dubbed as
the world’s last frontier.92 As such, there is both high interest and limited supply of the
resources Myanmar has for possible future investment, creating a highly competitive market for
outside investment.
In addition to the resources Myanmar’s land has to offer, Myanmar’s lack of
infrastructure and investment have proven similarly enticing to external funders. Myanmar sits
on the edge of South-East Asia, along the Bay of Bengal, a location of strategic importance that
has been noted since the colonial era.93 This positioning, and its proximity to regional powers
China and India, have made infrastructural development of Myanmar particularly attractive to
its neighbors. Notably China, Japan, and India have invested heavily in major infrastructure
projects including the deep-sea ports along the coast, the Asia Highway connecting India to
much of South Asia and train and gas lines from the its coast to China’s interior up across
Myanmar’s mainland.94 This is mainly to extend and further develop the investing countries
own trade routes as well as to help establish the investors stake within Myanmar and the
region’s infrastructure; which as we will see, has resulted in the marginalization of local
communities and a minimization of the local positive externalities such investment projects
have brought.
The State has granted long-term licenses to its natural resources, permitted the
damming of its rivers, approved developments on its ports and transport links. Myanmar itself
has been up for auction.95 Yet, the beneﬁt of such projects and investments has had little to do
with a vision of a modern Myanmar. As investment in Myanmar has increased, so has the
cronyism within the state.96 The ex-Generals of Myanmar’s infamous military have been able to
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guarantee a more than comfortable retirement through the development of partnerships with
investing parties.97 Their control and worth has skyrocketed along with Myanmar’s GDP and
FDI ﬁgures, giving them further personal freedoms as well as increasing control over the state
through alternative means; thus, helping them secure powerful positions to offset their loss of
power from the junta as part of the transition.
Increased investment in Myanmar, whether it is or not skimmed off by corrupt ofﬁcials,
should theoretically result in some beneﬁt to local communities through the provision of work,
improved infrastructure and services. The premise that economic development can be a catalyst
for change within society has led many civil society organizations to promote economic
development as a method to peace.98 However, this assumes that the positive externalities from
such projects permeate to the local communities around which such projects occur. Yet, the
practice of implementation by the state and military within Myanmar is disrupting the diffusion
of positive externalities to local communities in favor of redirection toward state-sympathetic
communities and the investing partners.
Primarily, in the borderlands such as Karen state, this has been done through the
resettlement and forced relocation of local populations. Since the establishment of the new
regime and the signing of the NCA in 2015, direct ﬁghting in much of the state has reduced. Yet,
there have been increased accounts of land conﬁscation and forced portering as Tatmadaw
forces clear areas for large-scale infrastructure and development projects.99 The reported land
conﬁscation and grabbing cases for purposes of development highlight how the state is altering
and utilizing its’ own policies to tactically marginalize minority populations by delegitimizing
their claims to the land on which they reside.
Due to the insecure environment, the Tatmadaw has effectively carved out a role for
itself as defender of large-scale investment projects. Their presence and security ensure the
safety and tenability of such projects for investors through guaranteeing such activities are
protected from insurgents. This role of the military has licensed and legitimized their presence
in areas previously inaccessible to them either through insurgent occupation or due to ceaseﬁres
with said groups. As many of the communities residing in these areas fear the military and the
possibility of reprisals or human rights abuses, many will choose to ﬂee, creating further
humanitarian issues due to the increasing numbers of IDPs.100 Thus, positive externalities from
such development projects cannot be realized by local communities as many ﬂee or are forcibly
relocated on the eve of such projects. Instead, communities experience the loss of livelihoods,
traditional lands and customs, and are faced with increasing insecurity.
For communities that do remain in the locality of large investment projects, there is still
little chance to access the beneﬁts of development. Many are forced to work for free through
forced labor by the military especially in relation to building roads and other access points.101
The military have recently defended themselves against such claims, publicizing the villagers’
willingness to volunteer for such projects, though little evidence can be provided to support this
claim. In many of the larger projects, especially those with regional investors, the workforce is
brought in from the investing country and as such, jobs are not offered to the local
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community.102 Though industrialization is increasing, communities are experiencing a loss of
livelihoods rather than a transformation as they are marginalized from the process.
Furthermore, for many of the projects, such as the damming of the Irrawaddy and
Salween rivers to create electricity, the outputs are not intended to beneﬁt the local community
but to provide resources for the investing nation.103 This lack of beneﬁt to the host communities
has been a cause of rising tension within Myanmar, escalating so steeply that the Chinese
backed Myitsone Dam project has been suspended entirely.104 Such projects therefore negatively
impact communities through forced displacement, forced labor, militarization and loss of
livelihoods; yet, they do not gain from the products of such large scale projects. Thus the notion
of development as peace is not present in Myanmar’s borderlands, it is a tool of oppression.
Local communities within Myanmar’s borderlands are ﬁnding themselves under threat
from the military occupation both within war and ceaseﬁre zones. Economic development is
playing a key role in ensuring the central state’s increasing inﬂuence, be it hostile, within
Myanmar’s borderlands. The continued investment and acceptance of state strategies has
legitimized the military’s actions, not merely within the borderlands in this newly transitioning
state but internationally. These (in)actions by the international community underline a sense of
acceptance, that use of force and oppression in the name of development and modernity is an
acceptable compromise when access to globally ﬁnite resources is at stake.
By opening Myanmar’s borders and resources up to international investment during a
period of ostensible democratic transition, the military have been able to create a competitive
market for some of the world’s most ﬁnite resources. The opportunity to invest on such a large
scale and in some of the most lucrative industries in a state so requiring of development has
proven too enticing for states once in opposition to Myanmar’s regime. Now the opportunity
has been offered, and the international community has not only accepted but celebrated such
progress, they ﬁnd themselves captured. Enticed by economic incentives that have been made
attainable by a level of political change, the international opposition to Myanmar’s autocratic
state has crumbled. Yet, the state itself has remained, camouﬂaged by layers of democratic
characteristics. Its actions against its minority people proves the superﬁciality of the changes
made within the institutions of government.
As such, the international community has been effectively co-opted into compliance
with the state. By creating a competitive market of investors, including regional and
international powers with differing perspectives on the usefulness and appropriateness of
sanctions, Myanmar has successfully positioned itself within the international economic
market.105 It has been able to defend itself from the possibility of punitive actions by ensuring a
backstop of alternative investors. The promotion of Myanmar as one of the last global frontiers,
especially in relation to its rich natural resources, has increased the incentives for partnerships
from investors that may have previously been more cautious regarding investing in such a
volatile environment.106 Now committed, such investors ﬁnd themselves within a system of
high-stakes for disinvestment—if they do not invest, they will not get to again and the
opportunity will be lost to another international investor.
For the communities that live in the villages and rural areas undergoing increased
international investment, the forms of state repression they face are changing. Rather than
experience the direct impact of violence from conﬂict related offensives and extensive counter102
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insurgency policies, they face a more indirect form of state repression. Under the new
transitional state, state repression is now formed of a system of co-optation that includes
incentives for both domestic and international elites, crimes against humanity related
predominantly to land conﬁscation due to investment and development projects and continuing
human rights abuses related to the presence of armed actors within these communities. These
communities are left at risk of continued practices of extensive state repression that obstructs
people’s ability to access their basic needs, livelihoods and basic human rights.
Conclusion
Mass state repression that has been ongoing since Myanmar’s independence is resulting in a
“slow genocide” of its ethnic minority peoples. Through a kaleidoscope of methods, including
the use of direct violence, indirect or systematic violence, and the restriction of rights and access
the Myanmar state has effectively severed the ties between many communities, their
livelihoods, and ways of life. Though the ongoing crimes against humanity may not result in
the skyrocketing deaths per annum typically related to genocide, the forced relocation and
removal of traditional lifestyles is stiﬂing minority culture, communities and common ties. By
creating environments where communities—tied to the land not only for their livelihoods but
also culturally and, for many, spiritually—are either forced to move or ﬂee from fear. Through
systematic and purposeful methods, the state is creating an environment that is effectively
ending a community without eliminating its members.
State oppression can take many forms and as regime type has changed within
Myanmar, so too has the application of state repression against the borderlands. Under the
military junta from 1962 to 2008, repressive tactics included the non-recognition of cultural and
social identity; as a direct consequence of the ongoing wars, and as part of the repressive
counter-insurgency strategies implemented by the state. As such, wars have been ended
through ceaseﬁre negotiation, both bilaterally and through the NCA process, and political
transition has begun to take hold, the forms of state oppression have altered to match this new
environment. Direct violence, typically related to wartime experiences, has dropped
signiﬁcantly. In its place, new, indirect forms of oppression have become the norm. The forced
removal of communities from their traditional lands, alongside continued cultural repression
and sporadic lapses into violence have become the new, preferred methods of the state.
By adapting to this new environment of the triple transition process, the military have
succeeded in co-opting parties previously against state action. Through the development,
signing and continued dialogue of the NCA, as well as the provision of ﬁnancial incentives, the
military and government have been able to co-opt EAOs. Through the offering of licenses, land
and natural resource deposits, they have been able to co-opt those within the international
environment into supporting a government undergoing transition. This leaves communities in
these regions vulnerable to aggressive state policies aimed at the restriction and elimination of
minority identities, by reducing the audiences and forums for them to articulate and advocate
for their rights and needs.
Myanmar’s triple transition process has altered the way that human rights abuses and
state repression is not only carried out but also characterized; both nationally and
internationally. Through the promotion of democratic characteristics and developments,
coupled with the economic incentives such a resource rich country can provide, the state has
been able to create a layer of protection for itself. It has co-opted national and international
opposition into its systems and methods of governance including, but not limited to, its policies
for the repression of minority rights and culture. In doing so, it has ensured itself the ﬁnancial
investment the country required to develop whilst maintaining enough institutional
independence from any one investor to be able to conduct itself without concern for the
investors’ preferences. Though Myanmar is in need of investment, investors must also be held
responsible for their roles and contributions to the legitimization of a regime that uses
democratic transition not to reach any democratic ideal but to become acceptable enough to be a
recipient of such projects.
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Introduction
Franco-Cambodian cartoonist Tian’s three-volume graphic novel, L’Année du lièvre (2011–2016),
recently released in English as Year of the Rabbit in a three-part single volume (2020), provides
witness to the events of the Cambodian Genocide from 1975–1979 in Cambodia.1 The graphic
novel, recounted through the eyes of Tian’s father, Khim, documents his family’s multiple
escapes from death under the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese Occupation, as well as in the
Khao-I-Dang refugee camp on the Cambodian-Thai border. L’Année du lièvre also addresses the
initial hearings against Khmer Rouge leaders in the 2009 Tribunal, and preserves family
memories from pre-1975 Cambodia, and his family’s resettlement in France in 1980 in the form
of hand-drawn photographs and photo albums.
This article seeks to demonstrate the dual function of L’Année du lièvre as what I call a
“Cambodian family album,” or a personal-collective archive used to transfer to subsequent
generations of the history of the Cambodian genocide; the collective memories of pre-1975
Cambodia which precede the Khmer Rouge takeover of Phnom Penh; and the Cambodian
humanitarian crisis and exodus of the 1970s–1990s. The conceptualization of the family album is
derived from the literal translation, from Khmer into English, of the term “photo
album” [ !ស#វ%&ស'(ប*បiទរ.បថត ]—“book designated for sticking pictures.” The translation of
the term emphasizes the fragmentary and creative nature of postmemory, or the secondgeneration’s experience of their parents’ trauma. Memory studies scholar Marianne Hirsch’s
concept of postmemory—originally conceived with second-generation Holocaust survivors in
mind—aptly applies to 1.5- and second-generation Cambodian genocide survivors:
“Postmemory characterizes the experience of those who grow up dominated by narratives that
preceded their birth, whose own belated stories are evacuated by the stories of the previous
generation shaped by traumatic events that can be neither understood nor recreated.”2 The
testimonial quality of Tian’s L’Année du lièvre is characteristic of autobiographical comics,
especially those used to recount genocide, trauma, and displacement such as GB Tran’s
Vietnamerica (2010), Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis (2000), and Art Spiegelman’s Maus (1980; 1991).3
Comics scholar Elisabeth El Refaie deﬁnes autobiographical comics as “a loose category of life
writing through the use of sequential images and (usually) words.”4 Other comics scholars—
notably Hillary Chute, Andrew Kunka, and Frederik Byrn Køhlert—have also emphasized the
testimonial aspect of autobiographical comics, in which the reader participates as witness.
While Tian’s graphic novel ﬁts the genre of autobiographical comics, this article reads L’Année
du lièvre as a family album in order to demonstrate how the Cambodian family album exceeds
1

Tian, L’Année du lièvre: Au revoir Phnom Penh (Paris: Gallimard, 2011); Tian, L’Année du lièvre: Ne vous inquiétez pas (Paris:
Gallimard, 2013); Tian, L’Année du lièvre: Un nouveau départ (Paris: Gallimard, 2016); Tian Veasna, Year of the Rabbit
(Montreal: Drawn and Quarterly, 2020).

2

Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997),
22. See also Ibid., 243–245.

3

Hillary L. Chute, Disaster Drawn: Visual Witness, Comics and Documentary Form (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2016), 157.
See also Laurike in’t Veld, The Representation of Genocide in Graphic Novels: Considering the Role of Kitsch (Cham:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 16. For graphic novels, see GB Tran, Vietnamerica: A Family's Journey (New York: Villard
Books, 2010); Marjane Satrapi, Persepolis (Paris: L'Association, 2000); Art Spiegelman, Maus I: A Survivor's Tale: My
Father Bleeds History (New York: Pantheon, 1980); Art Spiegelman, Maus II: A Survivor's Tale: And Here My Troubles
Began (New York: Pantheon, 1991).
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categorization; in other words, family albums can be autobiographical comics, but not all
autobiographical comics can be family albums. This article begins with an analysis of the
graphic novel as family album and moves beyond the comics medium and sequential art format
to show how Cambodian identity is being reshaped and renegotiated through what I call
“Cambodian new aesthetics.” The family album is thus considered more broadly and beyond
the medium of comics and argues that second-generation survivors take on an active role in the
process of (post)memory work through new and imaginative aesthetic forms. In closing, this
article considers the ways in which Franco-Cambodian and Cambodian-American artists such
as Franco-Cambodian ﬁlmmaker Denis Do, Cambodian-American choreographer Prumsodun
Ok, and Cambodian American poet Kosal Khiev contribute to redeﬁning Cambodian identity in
the 21st century.
Reading the Graphic Novel as a Family Album
Like the survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime, photos, memories, and keepsakes that existed
before the 1980s outlasted their intended destruction and continue to act as tools to recount
fragmented histories within Cambodian family albums [!ស#វ%&ស1'(ប*បiទរ.បថត]. The Khmer
term for “photo album” [ !ស#វ%&ស1'(ប*បiទរ.បថត ] may be broken down into several words, 1)
sierhpuhl [ !ស#វ%& ], or “book,” 2) sumraap [ ស1'(ប* ], or “[designated] for,” 3) buht [ បiទ ], either
“to close,” “to stick/to glue,” or “closed/blocked off,” 4) ruup [ រ.ប ], or “portrait,” or “photo,” 5)
tawt [ថត ], or “to record” (i.e. record document on camera), 6) ruup tawt [ រ.បថត], or “photograph”
(reversing the words, tawt ruup, would mean “to take a picture”). The family album, or “book
designated for sticking pictures,” thus suggests an invitation to enclose memories in the book—
rather than to close the book. The speciﬁcity of Cambodian postmemory may be illustrated
through the term buht [ បiទ ] in the photo album, or the family album. In Khmer, the word,
buht [ បiទ], has multiple meanings: Buht can mean “to close” or “to be closed,” or indicate
that something is walled off and inaccessible. Yet, it can also refer to the act of gluing or
sticking. The latter contradicts the act of closing, but both meanings in Khmer function to depict
the creative process of memory work. The function of buht in the expression “photo album”
emphasizes the creative act of assembling and fastening memories in a book. It is then, the act of
collating and gluing the fragments of “disparate sources” that generates and produces memory.5
The album, comprised of three volumes, contests the notion of 1975–1979 as a past
history and buried memory. In addition to enclosing within the album the narrative of his own
family’s survival in Democratic Kampuchea, Tian communicates where his family members
settled after 1980 (France and Canada), within a supplemental family album, at the close of the
trilogy. In doing so, Tian transmits to the reader the history of the Cambodian exodus, and the
Cambodian Diaspora, in the three volumes, published in 2011, 2013, and 2016. Within L’Année
du lièvre, the reader witnesses the narrator’s birth, near-death, and symbolic rebirth in France.
The overlap of the year of the author’s birth, 1975, with the historical association of 1975 with
the Khmer Rouge takeover of Cambodia, reveals the impossibility of separating the personalfamilial history from the larger History.6 In particular, the ﬁgure of le lièvre, alludes to the
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xii.
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The boundaries between the dual meanings of “histoire” in French (“story” and “history”) are often blurred. The
uppercase “h” in History refers to the chronicle sense of the term; the lowercase “h” alludes to a personal narrative.
The overlap between the history of Democratic Kampuchea and Chan Veasna’s autobiographical tale is depicted
via the author’s birth in Volume 1. See Tian, Au revoir Phnom Penh, 42; Veasna, Year of the Rabbit, 53. The trilogy
closes with a birth announcement, at the entrance-exit of the Khao-I-Dang Refugee Camp. The ﬁnal panel depicts a
family of four, framed by two tailless speech balloons. The balloon on the left-hand side of the panel reads: “Une
nouvelle vie en France allait s’offrir à nous! Et en cadeau…” To the right, the text reads: “Nous allions avoir un
petit frère pour Chan.” [We would be able to start a new life in France. And as a bonus…Chan would have a little
brother.] See Tian, Un nouveau départ, 110; Veasna, Year of the Rabbit, 368.

© 2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.3.1734.

92

So

trickster rabbit in Cambodia’s oral and written folktales.7 Additionally, the rabbit’s wit—used to
escape death countless times—reﬂects Tian’s survival story. Much like Br’er rabbit and trickster
tales from Africa, the Caribbean, and the U.S. South,8 Cambodian folktales are inundated with
the cunning hare that uses its wits to outsmart others. Khmer linguist Chhany Sak-Humphry
stresses the importance of the hare as hero in Cambodian culture, and includes the following
stories, in her compilation of Khmer folktales, Tales of the Hare, which include: “How the Hare,
Caught in a Snare, Escaped (& Rescued Some Fish!),” “How the Hare Escaped the Jaws of the
Crocodile,” “How the Hare Punished the Crocodile for Seeking Revenge,” “How the Hare
Rescued a Man and Punished the Crocodile,” “Judge Hare and the Fish Trap in the Tree,” “How
Judge Hare Helped a Man Get His Wife Back,” and “How the Hare Tricked a Spirit.”9 Judith
Jacob also notes that the rabbit is “Brer Rabbit in a different setting,” emphasizing his ability to
“[escape] from death over and over again.”10 Thus, Tian’s Cambodian Family Album not only
reproduces but, as I would argue, creates and reconstructs Cambodian memories—including
the literary and oral histories preceding 1975–1979—and reimagines the trickster rabbit in the
form of repeated survival tests depicted in his family album. Even for survivors of the genocide,
the repetition of an escape from death follows them in the form of survivor’s guilt, or in what
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub call a second holocaust, upon re-experiencing a traumatic
event.11
The title of the trilogy, L’Année du lièvre, is engraved in the Cambodian collective
memory as the beginning of the Cambodian Genocide. The takeover of Phnom Penh starts the
three-volume narrative and precedes the author’s birth in the graphic novel. The very ﬁrst page
of the trilogy depicts a framed, full-page panel. Beneath the chapter heading, a representation of
faceless men standing on a tank with raised ﬁsts, guns, and ﬂags, is accompanied with the
caption, “LE GLORIEUX 17 AVRIL 1975.”12 The family album thus begins with a familiar
illustration of The Fall of Phnom Penh which appears similar to the historical recounting of the
Cambodian genocide. In particular, the album opens with the monumentalization of 1975 as a
historical event. The caption, which is written in capital letters, “LE GLORIEUX 17 AVRIL
1975,” mimics the inscription of tombstones, and commemorative plaques. Moreover, the
Khmer Rouge takeover mirrors the domination of Tian’s personal history and memory of 1975.
1975—the start of the erasure of time and the entry into the Year Zero—also overshadows
Cambodians’ celebration of the New Year.13 The ﬂashbulb memory of the Cambodian Genocide
—synonymous with the Fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge, April 17, 1975—nearly
overlaps with the three-day celebration of the Cambodian New Year. In Khmer, Chaul Chnam
Thmey [ បuណ4ច1ល789ថ:; ] “festival to enter the new year,” refers to the beginning of the (Lunar)
New Year, typically celebrated on April 13–14. The New Year comprises an important part of
Cambodian culture, and Cambodians of the Diaspora associate the date with the New Year. Yet,
the commemoration of the Fall of Phnom Penh, and the Khmer Rouge takeover of Cambodia on
April 17, 1975 overshadows Cambodian New Year as well as the other cultural and historical
7
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traits of Cambodia that precede and follow 1975–1979. The historical date of la chute de Phnom
Penh (the Fall of Phnom Penh) thus affects how future New Year celebrations will be shaped by
the memory of the genocide. In particular, the overlapping events come to resemble the cyclical
nature of a traumatic repetition compulsion: The birth of a (new) year is also synonymous with
the death of a city and nation—the beginning of genocide. Time and chronologizing history are
further complicated considering the Khmer Rouge’s erasure of time and restarting of the clocks
to Year Zero.14 1975 thus marks the start of its own erasure. The pre-Democratic Kampuchea15
form of keeping time would not return to Cambodia until 1979. Thus, L’Année du lièvre belatedly
writes into history the erasure of the historical records preceding 1979. Though Tian cannot
separate 1975 from his own history, the creation of the H/historical Cambodian Family Album
can be read as a conscious attempt of reclaiming his and Cambodia’s history beyond the
containment of 1975–1979. Moreover, L’Année du lièvre represents “the conﬂation of private and
public memory.”16 What appears as crystalized and an illustration of a historical record
transforms, especially in Volume 3, into a commemorative album that ﬁnds itself in-between
private and public art—past and present memory. Young’s reﬂections on the memory-work
from the Holocaust context may be applied here to Tian’s graphic novel.
Instead of allowing the past to rigidify in its monumental
forms, we would vivify memory through the memory-work
itself—whereby events, their recollection, and the role
monuments play in our lives remain animate, never completed.
In this light, we ﬁnd the performance of the Holocaust
memorials depends not on some measured distance between
history and its monumental representations, but on the
conﬂation of private and public memory, in the memorial
activity by which minds reﬂecting on the past inevitably
precipitate in the present historical moment.17
By the close of Volume 3, Un nouveau départ, the album re-opens itself, through the
inclusion of a supplemental family album, entitled “Un nouveau départ après 1980.”18 Rather
than closing the three-volume album with a linear recounting of the Khmer Rouge history, the
narrative moves forward, and beyond, with Tian’s family’s renaissance. In a 2011 podcast
interview with France Culture, Tian—who spent the ﬁrst ﬁve years of his life in displacement
from 1975 to 1980—notes that he has few memories of his childhood. His creation of L’Année du
lièvre enabled him to trace his forgotten history.
J’ai eu très peu de souvenirs de mon enfance. Je les ai retrouvés
en réalisant cette bande dessinée, L’année du lièvre. Et du coup,
quand j’étais petit, j’avais beaucoup de souvenirs en France.
Donc, j’avais l’impression que ma naissance a commencé dès
que je suis arrivé en France. [I had very few memories from my
childhood. I found them by creating this graphic novel, Year of
the Rabbit. And when I was little… I had many memories in
14
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France, so I felt as though my birth began as soon as I arrived
in France.]19
The desire to forget and to begin anew is a common and shared experience in ﬁrstgeneration, and child survivors of the 1.5 generation. Tian’s association of his birth with his
arrival in France is comparable to ﬁlmmaker Rithy Panh’s experience as a child survivor.20 Tian
and Séra’s graphic novels, and Panh’s ﬁlms reconstruct and reframe history from the point of
and for members of the Cambodian Diaspora. The graphic novel, like ﬁlm, offers the possibility
of freeing oneself of the weight of the past and lingering unconscious memories. It is worth
noting that Franco-Cambodian artist and Cambodian Genocide child survivor Séra (Phousséra
Ing) was the ﬁrst graphic novelist to visually narrate the personal and collective traumas of the
Cambodian genocide, in Impasse et rouge (1995).21 He also recounts the Khmer Rouge occupation
of Phnom Penh while referring to the New Year of the Hare on Monday, April 14, 1975 in his
graphic novels, L’Eau et la terre: Cambodge, 1975–1979 (2005), Lendemains de cendres: Cambodge,
1979–1993 (2007), and Concombres amers: les racines d’une tragédie, Cambodge, 1967–1975 (2018).22
Tian’s L’Année du lièvre, however, is the ﬁrst Franco-Cambodian graphic novel intended as a
trilogy. While both 1.5-generation graphic novelists, Tian and Séra, visually recount the
atrocities of the Cambodian genocide in the graphic novels, their styles are vastly different.
Séra’s photo-realistic style and use of somber colors to capture the violence of the Cambodian
genocide differ from Tian’s cartoonish style and juxtaposition of pastels with shades of black. As
genocide scholar Caroline D. Laurent notes, the spatial layout of L’Année du lièvre allows for an
active reader participation.23 The reader’s active involvement in the reading/viewing process
emphasizes the collaborative and creative aspect of the postmemorial album. In “Un nouveau
départ après 1980,” Tian inscribes into the sub-album the following encounter with his mother.
Turned towards his mother, Tian asks, “Alors, maman, tu l’as lu?,” [So, Mother, have you read
it?] to which she responds, with the album in her hands: “J’ai essayé, mais je n’ai pas réussi à
dépasser le 3e chapitre. Ça doit correspondre à ta naissance…” [I tried, but I could not get past
the third chapter. That must be around the time of your birth…] Tian’s mother thus closes the
album prematurely before her son’s belated rendering of his own birth.24 The seemingly
contradictory overlap between premature and belated experiences of memory reﬂect Tian’s
status as being a member of the 1.5 generation, which is characterized by both “premature
bewilderment and helplessness.”25
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Family Uprooting Under the Khmer Rouge Regime
What I refer to as the “Khmer Rouge Family Album” appears brieﬂy within the greater
Cambodian Family Album. Situated at the halfway point of Volume 1, Au revoir Phnom Penh,
and immediately following the chapter dedicated to the memory of the author’s birth, Chapter
4, “Angkar,” the Khmer Rouge Family Album emphasizes its place within the Cambodian
common memory without becoming the dominant narrative. The juxtaposition of the two
albums is observable through the Chapter 3 and 4 titles, “Veasna,” and “Angkar.” The reader
witnesses the birth of Chan Veasna, the author known as Tian, in the village of Ta Prom. The
Chan tree, to which the author owes his name, reappears throughout the chapter and stands
over Chan and his family as a protector. His name reveals his family’s attempt to merge his past
and future destiny: “Chan Veasna, Chan c’est le nom de cet arbre qui pousse tout près de la
cabane et Veasna veut dire destin, en espérant que sa vie sera heureuse.” [Chan Veasna, Chan is
the type of tree outside the hut, and Veasna means destiny, in the hope that he’ll have a happy
life.]26 Chan’s birth in 1975 occurs on Democratic Kampuchean soil—the site of mass murder
and destruction—but the Chan tree, deeply rooted in the soil and watching over Chan Veasna’s
family, pre-dates the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Chan’s parents attempt to override their
misfortune by naming their child after the tree. Moreover, Chan’s shared birth-place and time
with the historical event of 1975 indicates that his personal-family album is also a survival tale
in which generation occurs from destruction. Moreover, the author’s birth, which occurs
alongside the Chan tree, on Democratic Kampuchean soil, functions as a part of the endless
Buddhist life cycle of life-death-rebirth.27
The visual and verbal play on cultivation—in the form of the Chan tree in Volume 1,
and the family trees in Volumes 2 and 3—as well as the visual and verbal depictions of Khmer
Rouge ideology of uprooting in Volumes 1–3 speak to the themes of survival and destiny.28 The
subsequent chapter following the birth of Chan Veasna must be considered in regard to its
symbolic and literal meaning. Chapter 4, “Angkar” [ អង>?រ ] , o r “ T h e O r g a n i z a t i o n , ”
immediately follows the preceding chapter, entitled “Veasna” [ @សA], or “Destiny.” Angkar,
which refers to the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, can be interpreted in at least
two ways: The political organization controlling Democratic Kampuchea, and the structured act
of organizing, ordering, and arranging.
The Khmer Rouge Family Album reads as a separate narrative a part of the trilogyAlbum: It interrupts the reading process, visually and narrative-wise. The uniformed panels,
minimalistic design, and use of gutters—which appear for the ﬁrst and only time throughout
the trilogy—complement Angkar’s ﬁxation on organization and structure. The Khmer Rouge
Family Album is limited to two pages, in which each page includes clearly deﬁned gutters used
to separate three tiers of two panels.29 In the two-page spread, Khmer Rouge propaganda is
succinctly exclaimed in each panel; the outline of Angkor Wat, and dramatic red shading, is
repeated to symbolize Democratic Kampuchea, blood, and communism. Remaining true to The
Angkar’s “faceless” organization, the Khmer Rouge members are featured without any facial
features, aside from the mouth—which is either represented by a single line in the form of a
smile or a neutral expression, or a left- or right-angle bracket used to indicate a mouth agape.30
While it is tempting to separate it from the rest of the whole of Tian’s Cambodian Family
Album, the history of destruction must be read as a part of the History of family memories and
survival.

26

Tian, Au revoir Phnom Penh, 42; Veasna, Year of the Rabbit, 54.

27

Tian, Au revoir Phnom Penh, 41–42; Veasna, Year of the Rabbit, 53–54.

28

The family trees are included in the front matter of volumes 2 and 3, in the original French edition. In the English
edition, the ﬁrst family tree follows the preface, and the second family tree follows the postface. Note: These pages
are unnumbered in both editions.

29

Tian, Au revoir Phnom Penh, 49–50; Veasna, Year of the Rabbit, 61–62.

30

Ibid.

© 2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.3.1734.

96

So

Volume 2, Ne vous inquiétez pas, expands on the Khmer Rouge’s attempts of suppressing
genealogical family ties under Angkar. The recurring appearance of trees throughout the volume
stands against Angkar’s intentions of uprooting and eradicating Cambodian genealogy, culture,
and identity. Like the Khmer Rouge Family Album in Volume 1, Tian demonstrates the
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) ideology by inserting into the narrative an
organizational chart of Angkar’s classless hierarchy.31 At ﬁrst, the organizational chart appears to
contest the author’s family trees—which the reader encounters in a two-page spread at the start
of Volumes 2 and 3; yet, after reading the organizational chart in relation to the Khmer
translation of “organizational chart” and “destiny,” the Khmer Rouge and Cambodian Family
Albums merge together. The top of the chart, labeled “Angkar,” and represented by a
monstrous and watchful eye, replaces the protective Chan tree represented in Volume 1. The
redundancy of the “organization” appears in the translation of Angkar: it also sprouts from the
tentacle of the watchful eye in the form of a speech balloon that reads, “Tout est organisé […],”
or “Everything is organized,” and manifests itself in the form of an organizational chart.32
Translating the Khmer expression for “organizational chart” reveals the Khmer Rouge’s
inability to rid itself of Veasna, or destiny. The combination of the words, Angkar [ អង>?រ ] ,
“organization,” and leik [ eលខ], which means “number”, as well as “position” and “rank,” forms
angkar leik [ អង>?រeលខ ], or “organizational chart.” Yet, leik also refers to what could be translated
into English as “destiny,” “chance,” or “fortune.” For instance, in colloquial Khmer, to have a
“big” or “tall” leik (i.e.: leik thuum [ eលខធ9 ]; leik khpuurh [ eលខខEស* ]) means “to be lucky,” or to be
blessed with a good destiny. Thus, the organizational chart that represents Angkar in Chapter 3
could be read as an unintentional, or inevitable, return to destiny, or Veasna [ @សA]. Despite the
Khmer Rouge’s attempt of writing over Khmer genealogy and suppressing familial ties, the
Chan tree persists despite its ordered destruction.
Throughout the trilogy, Tian juxtaposes the Khmer Rouge slogans and Angkar’s
organized massacres with Cambodian proverbs, symbols of cultivation, Veasna, and survival.
Reading the Khmer Rouge slogan in all uppercase letters: “COUPER UNE MAUVAISE HERBE
NE SUFFIT PAS, IL FAUT LA DÉRACINER” [Cutting a weed is not enough—it must be pulled
up by the roots]—against the Khmer proverb: “Il faut planter le kapokier puis le palmier”—the
Cambodian Family Album offers an alternative memory of persistence, and escapes typical
victim narratives.33 The Khmer Rouge slogan in capital letters highlights the extremism of
Angkar’s ideology. The metaphor of cultivation must be considered in relation to Cambodian
agricultural history—from the Khmer Empire, and the Democratic Kampuchea regime—in
order to demonstrate the role of production and peasantry in the Khmer Rouge’s recruitment
strategies and self-deﬁnition. Historian David Chandler notes that between 1945–1979, the ﬁnal
years of French colonial rule and the end of the Democratic Kampuchea, “some four-ﬁfths of the
population were farmers.”34 While it is known that the Communist Party of Kampuchea’s
recruitment strategy entailed targeting poor peasants, the role of French archaeologists’
inﬂuence on the CPK ideology is often overlooked. The Khmer Rouge’s ﬁxation on rice
cultivation and the peasantry is in part due to the circulation of the “intensive irrigation
theory,”35 which historian Ben Kiernan describes as “the view of French archaeologists and
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scholars who pioneered study of the ‘lost world’ of medieval Khmers.”36 According to Kiernan,
the theory, which was responsible for the old Khmer Empire’s economic wealth, “was accepted
as fact until the 1980s.”37 The Khmer Rouge ideology of the 1970s—which included “abolishing
class distinctions, destroying prerevolutionary institutions, and transforming the population
into unpaid agricultural workers”—is thus connected to pre-Democratic Kampuchean, and
French colonial history.38
Reading the plant metaphor in the Democratic Kampuchea context reveals that élagage
(pruning), and the removal of weak and damaged branches in order to promote the general
health of the tree is insufﬁcient to the rebuilding of Kampuchea. Angkar’s role as the “mother
and father”39 to the Khmer people under the Khmer Rouge regime would thus entail a radical
uprooting, rather than pruning. The déracinement (uprooting) by the Khmer Rouge would result
in damaged roots, and decades of trauma to the people and the nation. The Khmer proverb, “Il
faut planter le kapokier puis le palmier,” embraces the process of rooting anew and rebuilding
after destruction. In particular, the proverb refers to survival, as one must feign ignorance in
order to survive. The ﬁgurative and literal meaning of the proverb implies the protection of
Cambodian genealogy through the act of cultivation of the Kapok tree, the (sugar) palm tree,
and eventually the rebuilding of Cambodia’s culture and nation. Tian’s family album—a
survival tale of re-rooting—represents Cambodia’s past and present traumas, and its
regenerative identity.
The Khmer Rouge slogan and the old Khmer proverb reveal Cambodia’s complex
national identity, which may be deﬁned by its (auto)destructive and self-preserving tendencies.
First, it should be noted that under the Khmer Rouge, trees were converted into weapons and
tools. The use of trees was deemed “a technique cheaper than using bullets,” according to
population geographer James Tyner: “During the genocide, the Khmer Rouge simply smashed
infants and small children against trees—a technique cheaper than using bullets.”40 The
transformation of the national tree of Cambodia, the sugar palm tree, daom thnaot [ FដHមJK8ត ], into a
killing machine is rendered on the cover of Volume 2, Ne vous inquiétez pas. Palm trees,
alternated with the bright red Democratic Kampuchea ﬂags, align the background of the cover.
Two speakers are fastened to each palm tree, which represent how the trees now serve as an
extension of Angkar’s eyes, ears, and mouth.41 The Khmer Rouge slogans which are integrated
into the album in capitalized letters, can thus be read as the diffusion of Khmer Rouge
propaganda, slogans, songs, and orders through the nature-turned-machine sound systems.
Moreover, the Khmer proverb, “Il faut planter le kapokier puis le palmier,” which translates to
the Three Wise Monkeys’ maxim, “See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil,” may be read in
parallel to the Khmer Rouge slogan, “L’Angkar a les yeux de l’ananas” [Angkar has the eyes of a
pineapple]; the watchful eye of Angkar. In other words, the trees, which serve to amplify and
transmit Angkar’s orders, also become chlops [ ឈMប ], or child informants, used to report
individual and transgressive acts—such as picking and pocketing fruit, vegetables, and ﬂowers
—to Khmer Rouge leaders.
Cambodian Resilience and Rhizomatic Identity
The Kapok tree, which is well-known in Ta Prom [ 'NOទK'ពហ: ], Siem Reap, for its impressive
and invasive roots that weave their way into and over the historic temple illustrates the cyclical
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and circular notion of death, which converges psychoanalytic theory and Buddhist philosophy.
Post-1970s Cambodian identity, which is based largely on survival, complements critic Cathy
Caruth’s reﬂections on trauma, including the question of whether trauma is “the encounter with
death, or the ongoing experience of having survived it.”42 The resilience of the Cambodian root
systems also matches the survival story of Volume 1, Chapter 5, entitled “Il faut planter le
kapokier, puis le palmier,” as well as the three-volume Cambodian survival tale. The Kapok’s
roots, which simultaneously devour and maintain the structure of Ta Prom, illustrate French
philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s conceptualization of the anti-genealogical
“rhizome,” which “assumes very diverse forms, from ramiﬁed surface extension in all
directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers.”43 Ta Prom serves to concretize the grandeur of
the Khmer Empire, yet it also represents the entanglement of life and death, as the Strangler Fig
and Banyan trees’ root systems wrap around and make up the structure of the temple in Siem
Reap, Cambodia.44 Rather than simply recycling the Khmer origin myth of past grandeur,
however, Ta Prom and its root systems depict the inseparability of past, present, and future
histories. The superimposition of life and death further illustrates the intertwining of histories
and family relations, in the form of the cultivation of crops over the human remains from the
Khmer Rouge regime. Southeast Asian anthropologist Anne Yvonne Guillou notes: “After the
trauma of the Khmer Rouge regime, people gradually became more involved in making a living
and rebuilding their lives. Rice ﬁelds and fruit trees were planted again over the mass graves,
which symbolically meant that the life-cycle was starting again.”45 The Chan tree, which shares
the author’s site of birth and name, also shares a history with the Kapok’s root system that
symbolizes and deﬁnes Ta Prom—Chan’s village natal. Furthermore, the Kapok’s complex root
systems complement the mangrove forests in Cambodia, which are also under threat, and
demonstrate how Cambodian identity cannot be conﬁgured in the same way as a European
family tree system. The national tree of Cambodia, daom thnaot [ FដHមJK8ត], or Borassus ﬂabellifer,
and the California palm, Washingtonia ﬁlifera, represent Cambodian rhizomatic identity, which is
largely shaped by displacement. Since the ﬁrst wave of Cambodian immigration to America, the
palm tree has doubled as a symbol for the Cambodian nation, as well as Cambodians of the
Diaspora.46 In particular, Long Beach, California, the largest hub of Cambodian Americans, is
integral to the Cambodian collective memory.47 Considering the complex root systems of the
Kapok tree, and the Cambodian mangroves, as well as the displacement of Cambodians in the
U.S., Canada, France, and Australia, uprooting proves to be a difﬁcult, if not an impossible, task.
Moreover, the unforeseeable effects of the Cambodian exodus following the Cambodian
Genocide have muddled the boundaries of national, ethnic, racial, linguistic, and generational
boundaries.

42

Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience. Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996),
7.

43

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 6–7.

44

“Ta Prohm: Krong Siem Reap, Cambodia,” Atlas Obscura, accessed June 19, 2019, https://www.atlasobscura.com/
places/ta-prohm/.

45

Anne Yvonne Guillou, “An Alternative Memory of the Khmer Rouge Genocide: The Dead of the Mass Graves and the
Land Guardian Spirits [neak Ta],” in “Life After Collective Death in South East Asia: Part 1—The (Re-) Fabrication
of Social Bonds,” special issue, South East Asian Research 20 no. 2 (2012), 216.

46

For more information on Cambodia’s national symbol, see Caroline Huot, “As National Symbol, Palm Trees Inspire
Pride and Proﬁt,” The Phnom Penh Post, Oct. 24, 2003, accessed November 23, 2020, https://
www.phnompenhpost.com/national/national-symbol-palm-trees-inspire-pride-and-proﬁt/.

47

To further illustrate how the palm tree constitutes Cambodian identity and displacement, I offer my father’s statement
on re-rooting in California in the 1970s. While driving down the tree-lined streets in Los Angeles in 2008, he
remarked that, the Californian palm trees, water, and warm climate reminded him of his childhood and hometown
in Battambang, Cambodia.

© 2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.3.1734.

Cambodian Family Albums

99

Cambodian Displacement and Postmemorial Albums
Postmemorial Cambodian family albums—or the creative art forms used to commemorate
personal and family histories—are useful in activating memories, burying the ghosts of one’s, or
one’s family’s past, and burning one’s own demons. While postmemorial albums conﬂate
private and public memory, they primarily serve second-generation survivors. Unlike the
physical cremation process, Cambodian family albums invite the successive generations to
contribute to the endless memory-work by: a) transforming the postmemorial text/album itself
through active participation, and b) constructing their own family albums in literary and art
forms, such as ﬁlm, graphic novel, essay, poetry, and music; what Cathy Schlund-Vials calls
“Cambodian American memory work.”48 The reader, like the visitor of a memory-site or
memorial contributes to the reconstruction of the text through her or his own presence and
experience of the site/text.
Chapter 5, “Il faut planter le kapokier puis le palmier,” of Volume 1, Au revoir Phnom
Penh offers a vignette of one of the many near-death encounters escaped by Tian’s family. By the
end of the chapter, the reader witnesses how Tian’s family passes one of many survival tests—
by refusing to board a boat destined towards death.49 The narrative juxtaposes the inside and
outside of a temple: In a single full-page panel, the reader looks straight on to the center of the
page. The focal point, which takes up nearly half of the page, is the back of Buddha’s head,
which is recognizable by the etchings of carved stone and his long ear lobes.50 The reader takes
on the perspective of Buddha, becoming his eyes and ears, and looking over the characters in
the scene: The only ones that appear in color—in hues of purple—are the members of Tian’s
family, including baby Tian, lying in between his parents. Directly across from Buddha are the
open doors that lead to two Khmer Rouge ofﬁcials in all black. The faceless Khmer Rouge
leaders are framed by the doors in front of them and by the two ends of the Pont des nagas (Naga
Bridge) in the background. Upon closer observation, small splashes of red frame the
photograph. To the upper left and upper right hand, red and white striped cones adorn the
columns. A pair of small Buddhas is placed in the foreground—one to the left of the larger
Buddha, and one to the right. What nearly goes unnoticed appears in the foreground, on the left
and right shoulder of the Buddha overlooking the temple, and in-between the two smaller
Buddhas. Despite being in the foreground, the following four characters appear hidden due to
the focus on Buddha and the movement in the mid-ground and the background: A silent prayer
ritual takes place, with the burning of incense. A man to the larger Buddha’s left meets his eyes
as he walks by, while three others—to Buddha’s right—pray in silence. A man and a woman in
a sampot (traditional Khmer garment, worn from waist to ankle), with her legs to her side, are in
the middle of praying, while the other woman is knelt over facing the ﬂoor indicating that she is
either at the start or the end of her prayer. Upon closer inspection, small touches of red appear
in between the larger Buddha and the four characters. The straight lines, evenly spaced out
between red specks, represent incense sticks and the process of duht tuup—to call on one’s
ancestors, to ask for protection, and/or to ask for forgiveness. In juxtaposition to this scene, the
panels on the adjacent page depict the faceless Angkar, represented by the two Khmer Rouge
ofﬁcials at the edge of the entry and doorway, whose voice appears in the form of speech
balloons shooting out from palm tree-audio systems. The funeral ritual depicted in this scene
confronts the Khmer Rouge’s takeover of Cambodian value systems and symbols.51 While the
color red in the Cambodian context is often associated with the Khmer Rouge, its pre- and postDemocratic Kampuchean connection to traditional marriage ceremonies counters its symbol for
communism, blood, and mass murder. What Cambodians refer to as a “Knot-Tying Ceremony”
is an important step in Cambodian marriage rituals, in which family members and guests tie a
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red string (“blessing string”) around the bride’s wrist and the groom’s wrist. The red string
“blesses” the couple with good health and fortune, and must not be removed as it protects the
couple from bad luck. The association of red with tradition and protection also appears in the
form of offering incense, in the form of red batons, at the pagoda. Its subtle inscription within
the middle of Volume 1, Au revoir Phnom Penh can thus be interpreted as an attempt to
commemorate and protect Cambodia and its survivors. Moreover, the scene of prayer in the
pagoda serves to reclaim the color red, which has since the Khmer Rouge regime become
associated with communism, mass murder, and blood, through the association of the following:
the red and white krama (traditional Khmer scarf) worn with the all-black uniform during the
Khmer Regime; the red and yellow Democratic Kampuchea ﬂag; and the Khmer Krahaam, or the
Khmer Rouge [ Rខ:រ'កហម ].
Up until the last chapter of Volume 2, Tian narrates the events of the Khmer Rouge as
they unfold, starting from 1975. By dividing what feels like a series of never-ending and
impossible tests of survival in the span of four years—into three volumes of seven chapters each
—the text allows the reader to experience how time drags on and also witness the impossibility
of surviving each test. This is why the album-souvenir at the end of Volume 2 is so surprising:
Time equal to, or exceeding the amount, recounted in the three volumes collapses to a two-page
spread selecting moments from a course of four years before 1975. What Tian labels an “Albumsouvenir avant 1975,” at the close of Volume 2, Ne vous inquiétez pas includes a scrapbook of his
unframed snapshots that were lost and/or never taken, arranged out of order, and meant to be
offered and passed on to the next generation. The album-souvenir illustrates what life was like in
Cambodia before the Khmer Rouge takeover of Phnom Penh: He presents a collage of his
parents’ marriage in Phnom Penh in 1974, his grand-uncle strumming an acoustic guitar, a
snapshot of a traditional Khmer dance at the marriage ceremony, and his grand uncles in the
middle of a game of hacky sack—le seï.52 Unlike the square-framed panels within the chapters,
and like the family portraits in the family tree, the recreated photographs in the album-souvenir
take the shape of an oval, resembling portraits intended to be framed as keepsakes. The photos
pre-exist 1975—the event of his birth and the historicized start date of the Cambodian Genocide.
The album-souvenir deﬁes both the categorization of Tian’s family history to the period of 1975–
1979 and the reduction of Cambodian identity to the history of the Khmer Rouge regime. A
couple of factors are useful towards reading the a-chronological organization of pre-1975 family
photographs—Tian’s age at the time of the takeover of Phnom Penh and his family’s escape to
France, and Tian’s role as both a child survivor and a child of adult survivors. As noted earlier
in this paper, in an interview with France Culture, Tian reveals that he recalls little of his
childhood and that the 1984 ﬁlm The Killing Fields53 enabled his parents to talk about the Khmer
Rouge regime. Four years after having immigrated to Lyon, Tian’s parents presented him with
stories of his life in Cambodia, and their shared history under the Khmer Rouge regime. When
asked how he was able to construct a graphic novel from an absence of memory, Tian remarks
that after the release of The Killing Fields in France, his parents provided him with anecdotes
about the Khmer Rouge, linked to his childhood: “Ils me parlaient des petites anecdotes sur les
Khmers Rouges mais liées à mon enfance.” [They told me about little anecdotes on the Khmer
Rouge—but linked to my childhood.]54 After the screening of The Killing Fields and asking his
parents about their life in Cambodia, he engaged in a quest for knowledge of Cambodia—
beyond the killing ﬁelds.55 Tian’s reﬂection on “l’histoire de [ses] parents” and Cambodia can be
interpreted as a desire to remember and to understand what happened during the ﬁrst few
years of his life. Referring to his discovery of Cambodia’s rich history, which was not only
“linked to this tragic history,” Tian states: “Quand j’ai découvert que c’était vraiment une
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grande civilisation avant, et puis que, par la force des choses, il a eu cette tragédie-là, je
commençais quand même à réﬂéchir sur l’histoire de mes parents.” [When I discovered that it
was a great civilization before and then that by the force of things, it had this tragedy, I began to
think about my parents’ history.]56 Rather than being read as out-of-order, the hand-drawn
photos in the pre-1975 album may actually follow the order in which the histories were
received.
While photographs predating 1975 occur within an album-souvenir at the end of Volume
2, an album of post-1980 memories is placed in the ﬁnal pages of Volume 3. The multiplication
of albums within the family album turns into an abyssal self-reﬂexivity, with the reproduction
of L'année du lièvre, in two photographs of the third and ﬁnal album, “Un nouveau départ après
1980.”
Like Volumes 1 and 2, Volume 3 holds a 7-chapter narrative that sequentially elaborates
on the 1975–1979 saga. Volumes 2 and 3 share the same layout—both are framed within family
portraits and albums either preceding or following 1975–1979. Volume 3, in particular, offers an
alternative account of life after 1975–1979. In other words, the Cambodian family album
transforms into a postmemorial book and offers the reader a glimpse of 1.5- and secondgeneration postmemory. Initially, the family tree inscribed at the beginning of Volume 3 appears
to be a replica of Khim and Lina’s57 genealogical tree at the start of Volume 2. Upon closer
inspection, however, Volume 3’s tree signals to the reader who survived the genocide—and who
did not—through the subtle fading out of certain family portraits juxtaposed with colored
individual portraits hanging from the adjacent branches.58 Upon this discovery, the reader
receives the residual affective hauntings transferred over from Tian and his ancestors. In
addition, the post-Narrative scrapbook that closes Volume 3, “Un Nouveau départ après 1980,”
differs from the album-souvenir in Volume 2, and the 7-chapter narratives of the trilogy. For the
ﬁrst time, the family appears in motion. Left unframed, the family members—depicted in the
bonus family album within the larger three-volume album—appear in conversation. Moreover,
the transmission of histories occurs in the form of various mediums drawn by Tian, including a
tape recorder, telephone, the exchange of family photos, direct oral transmission between
characters, and even a replication of L’Année du lièvre.59
Tian’s use of the mise en abyme—what Lucien Dällenbach refers to as “the repetition
within a work of ‘the subject of the work’ ‘on the level of the character’”—occurs within the
graphic novel through his illustration of L’Année du lièvre in the third volume.60 In addition to
recording his father’s narration of the family history, Tian depicts his very own book, L’Année du
lièvre, being passed down and shared with those depicted in the narrative. In order to illustrate
Tian’s album, which is placed into abyss, to literally translate the French term referring to the
ﬁgure of style, I will present a verbal photograph of its insertion into the post-1980 album, “Un
nouveau départ après 1980.” On pages 2 and 3 of the book, the appearance of the physical
album is passed along, in the hands of three family members: 1) Tian’s mother, Lina, whom he
addresses as “Maman,” 2) One of his maternal uncles, or one of Lina’s brothers—either Uncle
Koliane, or Uncle Samay, and 3) Tian’s maternal grandmother, Vanny, whom he addresses
affectionately as “Yeay” [Tយ]. The ﬁrst replication of Volume 1, Au revoir Phnom Penh occurs
on the second page, in which Tian, now an adult, stands to the right of his mother. Dressed in a
bright red, long sleeved and collared shirt, he asks, “Alors maman, tu l’as lu?” (So Mother, have
56
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you read it?) Lina, dressed in a patterned lilac shirt, and what appears to be—from the half of
her body depicted—a Khmer sampot, responds by stating that she could not advance beyond the
third chapter. Upon closer inspection, the mother-and-son portrait captured by the author
resembles the cover of Volume 1 itself. The “original” cover depicts Lina in the same patterned
lilac shirt, which ends above her hips and slightly surpasses her biceps on the cover.61 Yet, now
that Lina and the shirt has aged, the sleeves reach her lower biceps. Though Tian is depicted as
a baby in his mother’s arms on the front cover, he resembles his father, Khim, in the handdrawn photograph of him in conversation with his mother. On the cover of Volume 1, his father
is turned away, looking off to the right. The reader thus receives a still frame of his family on the
day of the takeover of Phnom Penh and a proﬁle shot of his father’s right side. Tian, in
conversation with his mother, is also turned to the right, presenting the reader with a view of
the right side of his face. He shares with his father a prominent nose, from his proﬁle, as well as
the same noticeable bangs swept upward in the direction of his gaze. Like Tian, his father is
dressed in a long-sleeved shirt, which is left unbuttoned at the neck, forming a V-neck shirt and
tucked into blue jeans. Khim's style of dress in 1975, seen on the cover of Volume 1, matches
Tian's clothing, which is depicted in a borderless panel in “Un nouveau départ après 1980” in
Volume 3.62 The subsequent page in “Un Nouveau départ après 1980” depicts, in the upper lefthand corner, a scene in which Tian presents his maternal grandmother and uncle each with a
copy of L’Année du lièvre.63 Though the cover is difﬁcult to decipher in the snapshot, it appears
to be Volume 1—based on the silhouette of smoke drawn in on the cover of the book held
between his grandmother’s hands. Tian stands in the middle of one of his uncles (Uncle Koliane
or Uncle Samay), and his grandmother, who is seated partially upright in a reclining bed. In
addition, he ﬁnds himself between two of the replicas of L’Année du lièvre, pointing to a picture
in the album that his Yeay holds in her hands. While the reader does not see the picture, it is
implied that the photo is self-referential, and one from the “album-souvenir avant 1975,” as Tian
remarks: “Yeay, je t’ai dessinée avec Ta dans votre maison…” [Grandma, I drew you with
Grandpa, in your home...]64
The mise en abyme of the album illustrates the active and creative quality of postmemory.
In addition to the replication of albums depicted in the pages of L’Année du lièvre, the author
circulates and transmits the family narrative that he received from his parents in the 1980s. The
act of transmitting the narrative, in the form of the graphic novel, back to the original “actors”
of the history, serves ﬁrst to confront the family silences and to prevent perpetuating the
unconscious transmission of family trauma, then to demonstrate how ﬁrst-generation testimony
is a collaboration of ﬁrst and 1.5- or second-generation encounters. It should be noted that the
collaborative memory work between Tian and his parents begins with a family discussion,
following the release and the screening of The Killings Fields in 1984. Yet, the discussion is
endless—described by Tian as coming one-after-the-other; linked to one another [s’enchaîner]:
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“Je commençais quand même à réﬂéchir sur l’histoire de mes parents. Donc, il y a eu au départ
une petite, euh, une discussion, puis, après, ça s’est enchaîné…” [I started to reﬂect on my
parents’ history/story. So, there was, at ﬁrst, a little discussion, and then, after, things came one
after another…]65
Finally, the role of the tape recorder represents the conﬂation of past and present, and of
ﬁrst- and second-generation memory. The Franco-Cambodian tape recorder mirrors the shared
history between father and son in Spiegelman’s Maus. Hirsch notes the following: “Vladek talks
into a tape recorder and Art asks him questions, follows up on details, demands more minute
descriptions. The testimony is contained in Vladek’s voice, but we receive more than that voice;
we receive Art’s graphic interpretations of Vladek’s narrative.”66 Tian’s graphic novel is
different as the recorder appears only once, at the end of the trilogy, within the six-page surplus
album, “Un nouveau départ après 1980.” In Tian’s case, the tape recorder appears in a single
panel, at the end of the trilogy, within the surplus album, after the 1975–1979 narrative.
Moreover, the three-volume novel includes more than his father’s direct testimony—but also his
mother’s inability to read her son’s rendition of their lived experiences in Cambodia. Yet, the
trilogy closes with the post-1980 album, which begins with a visual-verbal, or photographic,
reproduction of the start of his family’s oral narrative. The simple display of the recorder, and
the conversation between father and son in the 1980s represented by speech balloons without
lines represents the fragmentary nature of testimony. Moreover, the recording, which is
“played” and/or shared with the reader decades later in 2016, within the third volume of
L’Année du lièvre, follows the structure of Cambodian oral narratives—characterized by nonlinear narration, digressions, and repetition. Tian’s album thus closes with a verbal-visual
photograph of a return to oral narration that mirrors the circular and cyclical aspect of
Cambodian storytelling.
By the end of the trilogy and on the last page of “Un nouveau départ après 1980,” the
reader witnesses a still frame of Tian and his son, and the transmission of history, orally, from
father to son. Tian (Chan Veasna) indicates to the reader: “Chan est devenu papa à son tour et
pour transmettre son histoire, il parle du Cambodge à son ﬁls.” [Chan became a father, himself,
and in order to transmit his history, he tells his son about Cambodia.] With their eyes locked, his
son exclaims in a speech balloon, “Papa! Un jour j’irai dans ton pays, le Cambodge!”67 The
album thus closes with the intersection of ﬁrst-, 1.5-, second-, and third-generation memories
and dialogues. Moreover, his son’s last words allude to two things: The stress on the possessive
adjective, ton, or “your,” paired with the substantive, pays, or “country,” subtly reveals the
complexity of second- and third-generation identity. While many second- and third-generation
Cambodians of the diaspora are immersed in their parents’ culture, language, and history, a
distance and gap remains, and a desire to “know the world of [their] parents” dominates.68 In
addition, the fact that Chan’s (Tian) son has the last say in the trilogy alludes to the Cambodian
diasporic literary-arts and new aesthetics movements, in ﬂux, and in the process of being
created and recreated. This endless movement of memory, and postmemorial work, is evident
on the cover of Volume 3, Un Nouveau départ, and within the album. The ﬁnal page of the album
presents a panorama of Phnom Penh shot from above with the author’s remarks on the present
and future of Phnom Penh. In three paragraphs, Tian reﬂects on the economic development and
changes in the capital, commenting on the conﬂation of tourism and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
in the 21st century.
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Beyond the Graphic Novel: Cambodian New Aesthetics and the Personal-Collective Archive
Returning to Deleuze and Guattari’s characterization of the “rhizome,” Cambodian identity
may be interpreted as growing endlessly in various directions: The conjunction of Cambodian
displacement following the 1970s, the “new” identities born in and beyond Cambodian
communities in France, Canada, the U.S., and Australia, and the urbanization of Phnom Penh in
the late 20th and 21st centuries, emphasize the difﬁculty of deﬁning Khmer identity. Turning to
the cover of Volume 3, which illustrates Tian’s family in displacement, the reader notes that
what appear to be branches are actually Kapok roots. The roots resurface—bursting from the
center of the temple and its rubble, and also appearing in Lina’s left hand. Lina can be seen
sweating, following behind Tian and Khim, and holding the roots for balance. Enveloped by
trees, Tian and his parents, Lina and Khim, and two others are shown walking atop a temple. In
juxtaposition to the ﬁrst album cover, which depicts the family frozen in fear and turned in the
opposite direction of the incoming trafﬁc, the cover of the third and ﬁnal album, Un Nouveau
départ, shows the family in movement, rushing forward towards what is out of frame, and
imperceptible to the reader. In addition, Tian is pictured as an infant, asleep on Khim’s back.
The representation of child survivor Tian as asleep and facing forward evokes the activation of
1.5- and second-generation dormant memories. Moreover, the snakelike roots bursting from the
temple that provide Lina balance illustrate Cambodian rhizomic identity, which is endlessly
transforming itself upon the mixing and merging of the diverse memories of Cambodians
across various generations, locations, and experiences.
This article concludes with a deﬁnition of Cambodian rhizomatic identity and
Cambodian ontology—beyond the comics medium, generational and geographical boundaries,
and the genealogical notion of family. The postmemorial family album is derived from Hirsch’s
conceptualization of the “aesthetics of postmemory,” which she deﬁnes as “a diasporic
aesthetics of temporal and spatial exile that needs simultaneously to (re)build and mourn.”69 In
addition, this section examines Cambodian identity in relation to the potentiality of rupture, as
well as the evolving and collaborative quality of the rhizome.70 Postmemorial aesthetics also
resonate with Martinican philosopher Edouard Glissant’s concepts “creolization” and “identitérhizome,” which emphasize the multiplicity of cultures, identities, and timelines: “Instead of
electing one past, these Caribbean civilizations build a functional métissage, situated in the
present (‘today’) and branching out to an open-ended future.”71 The aspect of creolization is
useful in understanding the relation between Cambodian identity and 21st century diasporic
artistic production. Like the overlapping of past, present, and an open-ended future, ﬁrst-, 1.5-,
second, and third-generational memories converge. The entanglement of memories leads to
new artistic possibilities. Such art forms demonstrate the creative potentiality of displacement
and fragmentation—as characterized by Deleuze and Guattari’s principle of asignifying
rupture: “A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one
of its old lines, or on new lines.”72 Postmemorial aesthetics chooses the latter, interacting with
old lines to form new possibilities. In the case of Cambodian new aesthetics, pre-Democratic
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Kampuchea forms of art are restored, preserved, and reimagined. Asian American scholar
Khatharya Um demonstrates the fragmentary yet continuous quality of second-generation
memory through the metaphor of a broken chain.
The metaphor of a ‘broken chain’ [depicts] the sense of
discontinuities that all of us refugees feel in our lives—the
physical loss, the sense of dislocation and displacement, the
disruption, rupture and loss in cultural transmission based as it
is so much on oral tradition, the absence of closure; many of us
have no way of knowing what happened to our loved ones—
only that they had disappeared. There can be no marker of
remembrance save on mass graves. Despite the severance—in
the historical, in the generational, in the cultural sense—there is
something fundamentally innate that continues to bind us as a
refugee generation. Perhaps for many of us, the war—
especially within ourselves—is far from over.73
It should be noted that while rupture activates the creative component of postmemory, it can
never be completely full, nor should it seek to be. However, this shared sense of loss—combined
with the overlapping of timelines and trans-generational memories—contributes to forming a
cohesive sense of identity in second-generation survivors. This fragmentary yet cohesive quality
of postmemory thus illustrates the Cambodian family album, or “book designated for sticking
pictures.” The creative aspect of rupture can also be visualized through 1.5-generation
Vietnamese artist Binh Danh’s chlorophyll prints of S-21, or Tuol Sleng prisoners in Phnom
Penh.74 The artist manipulates organic and manmade materials—using leaves, resin, and
sunlight—to recreate prisoners’ photographs. The 2006 exhibit, “Ancestral Altars,” which was
held in the Haines Gallery in San Francisco, California, nods to the French technological
inﬂuences, borrowed and practiced by the Khmer Rouge, in the form of archiving “criminal”
daguerreotypes. In addition, the chlorophyll and resin recreation of S-21 portraits allude to the
re-appropriation of the space that held the prisoners: What served as a high school to
Cambodian students prior to April 17, 1975 transformed into one of the deadliest prisons—S-21,
under the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979—and into a museum, in 1979, used to
document the Khmer Rouge atrocities during the Vietnamese Occupation of Cambodia. Danh’s
exhibit thus captures the transnational and trans-generational component of postmemorial art,
and also demonstrates the imaginative and creative quality of loss.
The interlacing of absence and excess, and rupture and suture, should be considered in
relation to the growth of artistic production by members of the second-generation of
Cambodian genocide survivors.75 The surge in postmemorial art serves multiple purposes: to
examine and to express one’s hybrid identity in multiple “ethnic” or transnational forms, and to
connect and discover one’s history through the creative artistic process. The new aesthetics of
Cambodian postmemory, like the Khmer sampot [ ស9ពត* ] and krama [ 'ក( ], embody the mixedness and intersection of old and new. In particular, their composition and role as cultural and
national symbols vary across time and space and undergo continual change. In the case of the
krama, the quotidian accessory transformed into a symbol associated with the Khmer Rouge
regime—as depicted in Tian’s L’Année du lièvre through the black uniforms paired with red and
white checkered kramas. Yet, it is the sampot—the “national garment of Cambodia”—an
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aesthetic form itself that demonstrates the postmemorial generation’s contributions to
rebuilding and shaping Cambodian-ness.76 From its intricate weavings to its various styles and
the innumerable ways to fold it, the sampot represents what Roger Nelson refers to as a “hybrid
contemporaneity.”77 Interpreting Cambodian artist Chan Dany’s exhibit, “Sampot: The Collection
of Small Things,” Nelson remarks the “multiplicity of contemporaneity in Cambodia,” adding:
“A vision of Cambodia emerges that is at once old and new, local and global. The articulation of
contemporaneity refuses the dominant narrative about nation, centered on the temples of
Angkor Wat and the traumas of the Khmer Rouge. Yet it also resists the tendency to overlook or
downplay historical continuities.”78
Though the Cambodian family album must be considered beyond the comics medium,
it is worth noting the history of Cambodian comics, which continues to be shaped by French
and Belgian inﬂuences. The ﬁrst Cambodian comic book is credited to Khmer cartoonist Uth
Roeun in the 1960s: His popular comic based on the Cambodian trickster Torn Chey circulated
widely in Cambodia in the 1980s and continues to be read by Cambodians of the diaspora.79
Despite having lanced the graphic novels scene in Cambodia, his advice to Cambodian artists,
“[d]on’t write about killing and war,” has been largely disregarded, as illustrated by Tian and
Séra’s representations of genocide in the graphic novel.80 The 21st century Cambodian arts
scene can thus be understood as a creative process born from the intersection of Cambodia’s
past colonial and Khmer Rouge histories, and the collaborative efforts of “local” Cambodian
and diasporic Cambodian communities.
The continued displacement of Cambodians—including the movement of Cambodian
Americans from the U.S. to Cambodia—illustrates the unpredictable and transnational aspect of
Cambodian new aesthetics. Cambodian American prison poet Kosal Khiev—who was born in
the Khao-I-Dang refugee camp in 1980, raised in California, served time in the U.S. prison
system, and deported to Cambodia in 2011—is representative of the group of Cambodian
American refugee deportees.81 This sudden expulsion is particular as it causes 1.5- and secondgeneration Cambodians to experience arguably the most traumatic aspect of “postmemory,”
which is “the condition of exile from the space of identity.”82 What was once considered the
world of their parents—one which they sought to understand but could never fully know—
becomes their own. Khiev’s spoken word poetry affectively communicates this sense of loss—
and documents his experiences of navigating and rediscovering Cambodian language, culture,
and identity.83 Crisis and exile is conveyed through a new aesthetic in ﬂux with the
displacement of second-generation Cambodians—whether by choice or through forced exile.
French ﬁlm director Denis Do also communicates historical elements of the Khmer
Rouge regime through the medium of animated ﬁlm. Do’s ﬁlm, Funan, also serves to examine
his Franco-Sino-Cambodian identity.84 Funan depicts the personal and collective events of the
Khmer Rouge regime as experienced by his mother, Chou. The medium is arguably more
accessible to viewers—as scenes of graphic violence are never fully visible to the audience.
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Rather, scenes of rape and murders are implicit.85 For instance, gunﬁre is heard and reﬂected in
the form of bright ﬂashes on Chou’s face.86 In addition, the ﬁlm follows a non-linear form and
illustrates how memories are “ﬁlled in,” in the form of blank spaces which slowly become
saturated with pigment: When Chou’s son, Sovanh, is separated from his parents, the audience
experiences the young boy’s daydream, in which he re-experiences his birthday with his
parents. A white space takes over the screen; Sovanh appears smiling in a birthday hat, then
one-by-one, his parents are drawn in.87 Do’s conscious sensitivity to the sights and sounds—and
the pacing of the narrative—allow the viewer to participate as a willing witness.
The Cambodian new aesthetics is perhaps best exempliﬁed through Long Beach,
California-born and Cambodian ex-patriot choreographer Prumsodun Ok’s artistic renderings.
Since 2017, Prumsodun Ok & Natyarasa, Cambodia’s ﬁrst all-male and LGBTQ dance
production, has been reshaping Cambodian identity through a contemporary take on Khmer
classical dance.88 In their performance, Vajramala: Spirit of Khmer Dance, dancers perform to
traditional Khmer music as well as “foreign” and popular contemporary music, such as UK
singer-songwriter Sam Smith’s 2014 hit song, Lay Me Down.89 Ok’s contributions to the arts has
allowed for inclusivity within the dance world—as prior to 2017, Khmer classical dance was
comprised of a predominantly female cast, with Cambodian Princess Buppha Devi in the
Cambodian imaginary.90 His revival of Khmer classical dance serves to preserve a once dying
art and narrative form, which faced near annihilation during the Khmer Rouge regime. More
importantly, Ok revamps a traditional aesthetic form, and in doing so, he calls for a more ﬂuid
deﬁnition of Khmer-ness beyond a monolithic and genealogical model.
The creative aspect of postmemory—always in movement—allows one to become an
active subject rather than an inactive viewer or listener. The 21st century processes of
remembering, mourning, and (re)creating in the Cambodian diaspora demonstrate postmemory
work, which exchanges with, and builds off of ﬁrst-generation memory. The purpose of the
Cambodian new aesthetics is not to fully recover memory; nor does it function to reconstruct
the past. Rather, it serves as a testimony to the experience of second-generation Cambodian
genocide survivors and demonstrates how 21st century Cambodian identity moves beyond
national and generational boundaries. In closing, it must be noted that while the Khmer and
Buddhist form of mourning is circular, the Cambodian postmemorial album attempts to break
the cycle of the unconscious transmission of trauma by actively involving the subsequent
generations in the process of mourning.
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Introduction
Though scholars of genocide have addressed the role of gender in these horrors, scholars of the
Holocaust have only recently examined this issue. Fear of seeming to minimize the horrors of
the Holocaust for all Jews made discussions of gender differences “irrelevant and even
irreverent,” as one writer remarked.1 Death for all Jews was the aim of the Germans and their
allies, whether the Jews were male or female, young or old. And yet, as in all other aspects of
life and death, gender and age mattered. “Even though the Germans were committed to
sending all Jews to their deaths, for a variety of reasons women and men traveled toward that
destination on distinct roads,”2 Nechama Tec has written. I will examine those distinct roads by
looking at sex differences in deportation and survival of Italian Jews with a particular focus on
the intersection of gender with age.
Gender and the Holocaust
Previous research has illuminated some aspects of the inﬂuence of gender on Jewish life and
death in the Holocaust. As more survivors came forward to tell their stories and as women’s
history became more mainstream, the discussion of the experiences of women in the ghettoes,
labor camps, and in hiding became more frequent.3 Most of the work that has been done on the
role of gender in the Holocaust is based on personal testimonies through interviews, diaries and
autobiographies, ghetto histories, and other textual records and have focused on changes that
each stage of the Holocaust brought about in women’s and men’s roles and on sexual violence.4
Very little of what we know about gender is based on larger collections of information.
Indeed, until recently, most empirical social science, including political science, has avoided the
study of the Holocaust entirely despite its centrality to other interests of political scientists.5 It
may be that scholars believed that translating the horrors of the Holocaust into facts and ﬁgures
somehow diminished the inhumanity of what was done. Or they believe that the overall
numbers are so horriﬁc, nothing can be learned by studying them.6
But Tec’s “distinct roads”7 have many branches that need to be explored. Geographers
of the Holocaust have described the gendered nature of many of the Holocaust’s important sites
and processes, including the transports that carried millions and in so doing led to the
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separation of men from women and broke families apart.8 Whether Jews were in
ghettos or camps, or on trains, or hiding in forests, gender mattered. In almost every setting,
women were more vulnerable and able to be exploited even as they took on new roles outside
the home as workers and, often, as representatives of their families.9 Throughout the war,
women were at risk for rape and sexual violence. Many were forced to trade sex for survival;
and the rape of Jewish women by both German soldiers and rescuers was, if not common,
certainly not rare.10
Demography was also at the root of those distinct roads. Jewish women, like gentile
ones, were in the majority of their communities in most countries that fought in World War I.11
The “women surplus” was a much-discussed social phenomenon during the interwar years. In
Italy, in 1931, there were 792 men for every 1,000 women in the population.12
And women were an increasing proportion of the Jewish population in nations under
Nazi control.13 For example, Jewish women were 52% of the German Jewish population in 1933,
but 58% in 1939.14 This increasing imbalance occurred partially because women were more
likely to stay behind to take care of elderly relatives or other family members, while men had
more opportunities and incentives to emigrate.15 A majority of those emigrating from Germany
were men.16 Men were subject to greater physical threats during Kristallnacht and in the early
part of the war. They were more likely to be rounded up and deported to labor camps. In this
early period, men were more likely to commit suicide.17
Gender differences were most striking among the aged. Of elderly widows and
widowers left in Germany and Austria in 1939, more than 80% were women.18
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Women were less likely to die from malnutrition and diseases caused by poverty,
starvation, and ﬁlth. For example, in the Lodz ghetto, the male death rate was more than three
times as great as the female in the 20–25 age group.19 Women were more likely than men to
“pass” for Aryan and be able to hide among the Christian community.20
On the other hand, evidence suggests that women were more likely than men to be
rounded up and slaughtered in mass killings and possibly sent to extermination camps.21 An
analysis that examined gender differences in the destination of Jewish deportees from Western
Europe to the east found that women were more likely than men to be sent to extermination
camps, and at Auschwitz, to be murdered on arrival. By a small but signiﬁcant margin, they
were also less likely to survive the war.22
In most cases, we know little about gender differences in the locations where men and
women were sent; the differences in the treatment of men and women as the war went on, and
the relative fate of men and women sent to labor camps and ghettos.
Age and the Holocaust
The fate of the elderly has been told myriad times. Nazi principles called for death of those Jews
unﬁt to work, and the elderly and the very young were both consigned to that category.23
“Selections” took place repeatedly: in ghettos, labor camps, and Auschwitz.24 Hundreds of
survivor testimonies reveal their separation from their elderly parents or younger siblings upon
arrival at Auschwitz, for example, and learning that they had been murdered within hours.25
Others report elderly and middle-aged parents being rounded up in local Aktionen26 while they,
as working-age teens or young adults, survived,27 or watching a parent die on a death march,
from starvation, violence, and disease.28
We have only limited data on specific survival rates of older people on arrival at
Auschwitz or through the war. Reportedly, 91% of prisoners over 51-years-old were murdered on
arrival in a few transports of Jews from the Lens area of France to Auschwitz compared to 59% of
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those from the same transports aged 16–40.29 But beyond that, we have little information
beyond anecdotal evidence about age differences in that ﬁrst selection at Auschwitz or survival
overall.
A study of survival rates of the Jews of Amsterdam based on comparing registries of
Dutch Jews with lists of survivors and victims found no signiﬁcant differences in survival of
men and women but signiﬁcant differences among age groups.30 The very youngest group (5years-old or younger) had a higher survival rate than other groups, and groups over thirty, and
especially over 50, the lowest rates.31 Tammes’ earlier study documented much higher survival
rates among those less than 15-years-old than among older adults,32 while his most recent
complex analysis indicated that women and older people were more likely to die in the ﬁrst
three years of the war than men and younger people, but less likely after July 1943.33
But studies of survival in other locations are rare, if available at all. The scope of the
Holocaust was so vast and data so incomplete. Just as with gender differences in survival, in
most cases, we have little beyond anecdotal evidence to document age differences in survival.
Italian Jews and the Holocaust
Each country’s experience during the war was unique, of course. Italy’s was quite different from
its Western European neighbors because, as an ally of Germany, Fascist Italy was not occupied
until late in the war.
Italy’s relatively small Jewish community is one of the oldest in the world. Many of the
nearly 48,000 Italian Jews were descendants of families who had lived there during the Roman
Empire. Others had ancestors who had ﬂed there when expelled from Spain and Portugal in the
late 15th century. On the other hand, as many as 10,000 were Jews from other countries who had
migrated there before the war or ﬂed as refugees during the 1930s.34
Most of those born in Italy were well assimilated into Italian society. In fact, about 10%
of Italian Jews were members of the Fascist party, about the same percentage as the non-Jewish
population.35 Others, however, were active in the resistance against the Fascists.
After signing an alliance agreement in 1937, and with only modest popular support, the
Italian government promulgated a series of anti-Jewish measures starting in 1938.36 The new
laws prohibited Italian Jews from holding public jobs, marrying non-Jews, owning large
factories, attending public schools, or traveling freely. The Italian state “started down the path
of state racism and antisemitism….”37
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As long as Italy was a combatant in the war, the Italian government did not deport Jews
nor threaten their lives despite the sanctions against them.38 Foreign Jews in Italy were interned
in both the small towns and concentration camps;39 but outside Italy, Italian troops largely
protected Croatian Jews under their control along the Croatian coastline, Greek Jews in the part
of their country occupied by Italy, and French Jews living in the southeast of France under
Italian occupation.40
In August 1943, King Victor Emmanuel removed Mussolini’s Fascist government from
power. When the new government signed a truce with the Allies the next month, German
troops quickly entered Italy from the north, moving down the peninsula to occupy northern
and central Italy and installing Mussolini as head of the Repubblica Sociale Italiana (RSI), also
known as the Republic of Salo. Mussolini’s government controlled the part of Italy occupied by
Germany and German troops.
Jews were then at great risk. 97% of Italian Jews lived in Rome and regions north of
Rome.41 The Allies had invaded Sicily in July and mainland Italy in early September but were
far south of Rome and meeting tremendous German resistance as they very slowly moved
north. Most Jews who had been interned in southern Italy were safe but not the rest.
Once they were in Italy, the Germans moved quickly to imprison Jews and ship them to
camps in the east. Transporting Jews by train to Eastern Europe to be murdered en masse was a
key part of the Holocaust.42 By October 1943 when the Germans and their Italian collaborators
began the roundup of Italian Jews, the Nazi murder camps—Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka—
had already closed after killing more than 1.75 million Jews in just twenty-one months.43 Eighty
percent of those Jews deported from Italy were transported to Auschwitz, both a killing center
and a slave labor camp.44
The ﬁrst to be sent were Jews living in Rome. In mid-October, the German SS captured
more than 1,250 Roman Jews.45 Within two days they sent 1,020 of them to Auschwitz where
nearly 60% of them were murdered immediately and almost all the rest were eventually
murdered or died from starvation and disease during the next several months (only sixteen
people survived).46
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These actions were legitimized by the Manifesto of Verona, written by the Congress of
the Italian Fascist party meeting in November 1943, declaring that Jews were foreigners and
enemies. This gave the imprimatur of the RSI to the roundups, deportation, and murder of Jews
in Italy.47
After the arrest of Jews in Rome,48 the Italian police, or the German SS, or sometimes
both, arrested Jews in other cities and towns. They were taken to local prisons or other sites
nearby to be held until they could be deported. Many were sent on to a transit camp in Fossoli
(near Carpi), Bolzano, or Trieste. A few hundred were sent to an RSI concentration camp in
Borgo S. Dalmazzo in Piedmont.49 Piera Sonnino, for example, writes of her family’s arrest in
Genoa.50 The family’s ancestors had lived in Italy for generations. On October 12, 1944, after
being taken to a local Gestapo headquarters and questioned, the family was moved later that
night to an Italian prison in Genoa, which Piera found shockingly primitive. They were
imprisoned there for a week, then taken by truck to Bolzano. The next day, SS guards oversaw
their journey to Auschwitz in sealed freight trains.51
Unlike the Sonninos, a large family with few resources, many native Italian Jews were
able to hide in rural villages, in churches, or with friends.52 Nearly 90% escaped deportation.53
Foreign Jews were more vulnerable. Their networks with Christians were smaller and many
could not speak Italian so hiding with natives was difﬁcult. More than one-third of those Jews
transported from Italy were foreign born.54
Ranging in size from a handful of prisoners to 1,020 people, 42 transports left Italy for
Auschwitz (31 transports), Ravensbruck (5), Bergen-Belsen (4), Flossenberg (1), and Buchenwald
(1). The largest transports went to Auschwitz (see Table 1 below); only two of the eleven
transports to the concentration camps took more than one hundred prisoners. The rest carried
fewer than ﬁfty each. The last transport to Auschwitz left with four prisoners on November 1,
1944; after that, three transports took a total of 56 Jews to Ravensbruck, the last on February 24,
1945.
To

Date

Size

Survivors

Rome

Auschwitz

October 18, 1943

1,020

16

Fossoli, Mantova,
Verona

Auschwitz

April 5, 1944

609

50

Milan Verona

Auschwitz

January 1, 1944

605

22

Fossoli

Auschwitz

May 16, 1944

581

60

Fossoli Verona

Auschwitz

June 26, 1944

523

35

Fossoli

Auschwitz

February 22, 1944

510

24

Borgo S. Dalmazzo

Auschwitz, via
Drancy

November 21, 1944

309

10

Table 1. Largest Transports of Jews from Italy.55
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Those deported to Auschwitz were subject to an immediate selection where some were
selected for labor, but most were immediately murdered. Primo Levi, who was deported from
Fossoli in February 1944, describes the terror:
The door opened with a crash, and the dark echoed with
outlandish orders in that curt, barbaric barking of Germans in
command which seems to give vent to millennial anger….In
less than ten minutes all the ﬁt men had been collected together
in a group. What happened to the others…,we could establish
neither then nor later: The night swallowed them up, purely
and simply. Today, however, we know…that of our convoy no
more than ninety-six men and twenty-nine women entered the
respective camps of Monowitz-Buna and Birkenau, and that of
all the others, more than ﬁve hundred in number, not one was
living two days later.56
Those not sent to Auschwitz were sent to other concentration camps in Germany. Most
of these were Libyan Jews who had been brought to the Italian mainland in 1942.57 The
Germans had set up camps such as Buchenwald, Bergen-Belsen, and Flossenberg before the
war, mainly as places to send dissidents and criminals. As the war progressed, more and more
people, including Jews, were sent there from the camps in the east now overrun by the Soviet
Army. By late 1943 until the end of the war in 1945, overcrowding and consequent disease and
starvation killed tens of thousands.
The exact mortality rates in these camps may never be known. However, inmates sent
to concentration camps did have some chance of surviving; while most died of starvation,
disease, and overwork in the camps, some escaped to the forests where they were hidden by
peasants or fought as partisans, others ﬂed to larger cities and hid or passed as Christians, and
there were others who had valuable skills and were protected until late in the war, giving them
a greater chance of survival.58
Data and Methods
Data for this paper include information on all 6,775 Jews deported from Italy from September
1943 to March 1945 during the German occupation. The data are drawn from Liliana Picciotto’s
compilation of basic biographies on all Italian Jews rounded up and sent east.59 Around 95% of the
deaths of Italian Jews (and foreign Jews living in Italy) occurred among those on the transports.60
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Our database consists of information on the transport and the individual deported.
Transport characteristics include the departure point, date, and destination. Individual
characteristics include age, gender, and fate, that is, whether they were liberated, gassed on
arrival, died on the transport itself, or died in Auschwitz or one of the other camps. Those who
died in the camps a few days after liberation were coded with deaths other than gas. Where
known, the place of death was also coded, but 40% were unknown.
We will test two hypotheses concerning gender, three hypotheses concerning age, and
two hypotheses looking at interaction of gender and age:
1. We expect that women were more likely than men to a) be
gassed on arrival at Auschwitz and b) to have higher overall
mortality rates.
2. We expect that those over 60 (the old) and under 15 (the
young) were more likely to be sent to Auschwitz than the
middle-aged group.
3. We expect that the old and the young were more likely to a)
be gassed on arrival at Auschwitz and b) be less likely to
survive than those in middle age groups.
4. Finally, we expect an interaction between sex and age, with
women in child-bearing and child-rearing ages (15–44) more
likely than similar aged men to be gassed on arrival at
Auschwitz and less likely to survive.
Findings
Table 1 indicates that 53% of those transported from Italy were men, quite different from the
overall Western European transports where 56% were women.
The impact of gender on the fate of Italian Jewish deportees
Men and women were deported in roughly similar proportions to Auschwitz, on the one hand,
and concentration camps on the other (see Table 2). A few more women than men were sent to
Bergen Belsen and Ravensbruck, which was mostly a woman’s camp. No women were sent to
Flossenberg. Equal proportions were sent to Buchenwald, and equal proportions were
unknown.
%

% Men

% Women

Auschwitz

82

83

81

Bergen-Belsen

6

5

7

Ravensbruck

2

1

3

Flossenburg

1

1

0

Buchenwald

0.3

0.6

0

Unknown

9

9

9

Total

100 (6,775)

100 (3,557)

100 (3,197)

Table 2. Destinations of Deported Italian Jews.

These ﬁndings can be compared to another analysis of transports from all over Western
Europe where women were somewhat more likely to be sent to both Terezin and the killing
camps.61 However, these differences appeared to be due to the time in the war that deportations
occurred. By the time that the Italian Jews were deported, the killing camps and the ghettos,
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except for Lodz, were closed. Most of the rest of Western European Jews had already been
transported. Terezin was open but Germans chose not to direct Italian transports there. The late
arrival of Germans in Italy after the killing camps had all closed may explain much of the
difference between Italy and the other Western European countries.62
To examine the proportion gassed, we will examine only deportees to Auschwitz, since
none of the other camps to which the Italian Jewish population were sent had a selection
process on arrival where some were sent to be immediately gassed. In most Auschwitz
transports, before anyone was registered in the camp, amidst shouts, screams, beatings, and
snapping dogs, the passengers were sent to one side for an immediate walk to the gas chamber,
or to the other, for temporary reprieve as a slave laborer. The shock of arrival overwhelmed
most people who survived to write about it. Piera Sonnino, for example, writes of her family’s
arrival on a freezing end-of-October day:
I feel like I had entered a dimension where nothing is human,
that is utterly hostile to everything human, a dimension that
has absorbed even its own creators…a cold machine muddy
and dark, fatal and inexorable, topped by a small ﬂame that I
see for an instant as in the distance it breaks the darkness, as if
the sky were burning. I don’t know yet what it is.63
Hundreds of survivors’ reports indicate that old people, children, mothers with
children, those with evidence of even mild disabilities, such as wearing glasses, and others who
did not look ﬁt to work were sent directly to the gas chambers. Working-aged men and women
who looked ﬁt, except for women with small children, were often kept alive for slave labor.
There were many life and death moments for prisoners at Auschwitz, and this was the ﬁrst.
Piera Sonnino describes how she and her sisters were placed in one group and taken away, her
older brothers in another group, and her parents in a third. It wasn’t until later that day that she
learned from another prisoner that her parents had likely already been murdered.64
Men and women assigned to slave labor were registered and given a number. Those
sent directly to the gas chambers were not registered. An analysis of 253 transports to
Auschwitz from all over Western Europe found that about 57% of the prisoners were gassed
immediately.65
Overall, Italian Jews were sent to immediate death at Auschwitz at a much lower rate
than those prisoners on other Western European transports. Italian Jewish women were
signiﬁcantly more likely to be gassed on arrival at Auschwitz compared to their male
counterparts (see Figure 1 below), a ﬁnding consistent with overall Western European patterns.
The difference between men and women is about 10% and is statistically signiﬁcant. Our
expectation is supported by these data.
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Figure 1. N=5566. Gender differences in surviving the ﬁrst selection are signiﬁcant at .01,
gender differences in overall survival are not signiﬁcant.

However, contrary to our expectation, as the ﬁgure also shows, the overall survival rate
of men and women sent to Auschwitz was nearly identical. The starvation, murders, disease,
brutality, and inhumane working conditions at Auschwitz and its subcamps killed nearly ﬁve
out of six women who were sent to slave labor and an even higher proportion of men.
Survival rates of Italian Jews not sent to Auschwitz were considerably higher. Of the
557 deported Italian Jews not sent to Auschwitz, 74% survived to liberation. Women were
signiﬁcantly more likely to survive than men, 78%–70% (sig at < .05). Unfortunately, around
90% of those whose destinations we know were sent to Auschwitz.
Taking into account both those sent to Auschwitz and those who went to labor camps,
the overall survival rate of Italian Jews was 12% for men and 13% for women (difference not
signiﬁcant). The slight advantage for women is entirely due to the better survival rates of those
sent to labor camps.
The impact of age on the fate of Italian Jewish deportees
Though ofﬁcial statistics collected at Auschwitz do not record information on ages of
individuals, voluminous anecdotal evidence tells us that elderly people and children were
much more likely to be immediately murdered than working-age men and women. One study
of survival among Amsterdam Jews also documented the much smaller chances of survival
among older people. The study, based on the entire Jewish population, not just those deported,
documented higher rates of survival among the very young who were often hidden and
deported in smaller proportions than those who were older.66 But we have no information about
how general this pattern was.
In Figure 2, we examine the relationship between age and the probability of execution
on arrival at Auschwitz and on survival among all the Auschwitz deportees. We coded age into
broader groups reﬂecting likelihood of survival: less than 5-years, 5–14 years, 15–30 years, 31–45
years, 45–59 years, and older than 60.
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Figure 2. Age differences in surviving ﬁrst selection and surviving the war are each
statistically signiﬁcant at .001. N’s range from 208 for the youngest group and 440 for the
5–14 group; to 1,334 for the 45–59 age group, 1,257 for the 60 and over group, and 1,250
for the 30–44 cohort. There were 959 aged 15–29.

Less than 10% of toddlers survived the initial selection. Most of those aged 5–14 years
were also immediately murdered. Those few who survived at this stage were teenagers who
must have looked older than they were. Indeed, more than 70% of those aged 12 but less than
20% of those aged 13 and 14 were immediately murdered. Many young teen-aged survivors
report they told the selection ofﬁcer they were older than they were or were advised to do so.
During the initial selection at Auschwitz, Elli Friedmann, aged 13 from Somorja, Hungary, was
told by Dr. Joseph Mengele himself to say she was 16. He exclaimed “Goldenes Haar,” (Golden
Hair) and touched her blond braids.67 Ruth Kruger, from Vienna, was forever grateful to a
young women clerk assisting with selection in her Auschwitz barracks. She whispered to Ruth
to say she was 15, not 13, and then commented to the ofﬁcer making the selection that Ruth
looked strong.68 Almost all of those in the 15–44 age groups survived the initial Auschwitz
selection, along with nearly 80% of those in the 45–59 group.
On the other hand, only 8% of those sixty and older survived their ﬁrst day at
Auschwitz. There were no clear patterns by age among those 60 and over suggesting that it was
the appearance of strength and vigor that mattered.
As we saw in Figure 1, being sent to slave labor on the prisoner’s ﬁrst day did not mean
that one would survive Auschwitz. After surviving the ﬁrst selection, chances of survival until
liberation were only one in eight if one was under 15-years-old, but only one in about ten for
those from 30–44 and almost one in twenty for the 45–59 group. The highest survival rate was
17% among those aged 15–29. Among those 1,257 Italian Jews who were 60 and older, no one
survived Auschwitz.
The possibilities of survival in the other camps were considerably better than
probabilities of survival at Auschwitz in all groups. All of the 43 young children survived, and a
majority of the rest did too except among the oldest cohort. Even though the N’s are small, the
survival of the youngest cohorts is remarkable.
Taking into account those who were sent to Auschwitz and those sent elsewhere,
chances of survival until liberation were low (see Table 3 below), though it varied substantially
among age groups. Only 2% of those over 60 and 6% of those from 45–59 survived to the end of
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the war. The hardships of the labor camps, the starvation diets, and the typhus and other
diseases took their greatest toll on the oldest. But the survival rate of young adults was not high
either. The highest survival rate was among the 15 to 29-year-olds where 24% survived, onethird more than either the next youngest or next oldest cohort.
Overall, then, we have seen large differences among men and women in the ﬁrst
selection at Auschwitz, signiﬁcant gender differences in survival in labor camps, and small to
negligible gender differences in survival at Auschwitz and overall survival. Now we turn to the
interaction of gender and age and its impact on survival.
Years of age

Less
than 5

5–14

15–29

30–44

45–59

60 and
over

% of deportees to
labor camps who
survived to
liberation

100

90

79

78

55

45

% all deportees
who survived to
liberation

17

16

24

17

6

2

86; 547

128; 1,554 142; 1,497 96; 1,579

N’s of labor camp; 43; 264
all deportees

49; 1,526

Table 3. Italian Jews’ Survival in Labor Camps and Overall.
*Both relationships signiﬁcant at .01. N of those deported to labor camps=544,
overall=6,566.

The combined impact of gender and age on the fate of Italian Jewish deportees
Figure 3 further illustrates the relationship between sex, age, and being murdered on arrival at
Auschwitz and on survival. Age is arrayed by ﬁve-year increments, with the youngest being
younger than ﬁve and the oldest category, 85 and older.

Figure 3. Includes only those sent to Auschwitz (N=5,588).
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Figure 3 conﬁrms dramatically the common wisdom about selection at Auschwitz and
speciﬁes the differences that were found. The fate of very young men and women (and girls and
boys) and older men and women was nearly identical, with almost all being sent immediately
to the gas chambers to be murdered. There are striking differences between the 5–9 age group,
where almost all are murdered and the 10–14 cohort, where a signiﬁcant minority of both boys
and girls survive that initial selection. At 15, the proportion sent to immediate death falls again.
At the other end of the age structure, most men and women aged 55 survive the selection and
most 60 or over die. There is only one anomaly in the data, with a few men in the oldest
category (85 and over) not being immediately murdered.
The signiﬁcant gender differences come in the young adult and adult categories.
Women are much more likely than men to be executed if they are between 15 and 44. Some
women of these ages are pregnant and many had children of less than 15, factors leading to
immediate death. It would be surprising that women in their mid-teens ﬁt this proﬁle, but some
of them may have looked childish and been treated like children slightly younger, while the
older members of this 15–19 cohort may have had infants or toddlers or been in care of younger
siblings.
The anomaly here is that women and men differ in the 55 to 59-year-old span too, an
age when women are unlikely to have small children. In this age group, men are executed at a
rate more like those in the immediately younger cohort, while women are part way between the
younger and older cohorts. Of course, the brief biographies do not report the health status of
anyone, and it may be that women in this age group are sicker, frailer, or appear older than the
men. They may have been with grandchildren. By 60, both men and women are clearly seen as
not able to work and the proportion murdered immediately increases dramatically. Our
expectation about gender and age differences in the initial selection at Auschwitz was
conﬁrmed.
As we indicated above, men’s larger chance of surviving the initial selection does not
give them a bigger chance of survival. Figure 4 below illustrates overall survival at Auschwitz.
In only one age cohort, ten to fourteen, are gender differences signiﬁcant and in that case, girls
are more likely to survive than boys. In the next older cohort, 15–19, somewhat more men than
women survive, but the difference is not signiﬁcant. In the young and middle age cohorts there
are no differences between men and women. And as we noted, no one from Italy in the oldest
age cohorts survived Auschwitz.

Figure 4. Includes only those sent to Auschwitz (N=5,588).
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As we described earlier, survival was much higher among those sent to labor camps
than those sent to Auschwitz. An examination of the 544 people sent to labor camps for whom
we have age and gender data indicates there are no gender differences in survival in each age
category. Age, rather than gender, determined survival in these camps. The slightly greater
chance of women surviving labor camps overall is because a higher proportion were in the 15–
29 age group where survival was higher and less likely to be in the oldest group which had the
lowest survival rates.
Examining differences in survival amongst both of those sent to Auschwitz and those
sent to labor camps, we ﬁnd that, in most age cohorts, a slightly greater proportion of women
than men survive (see Figure 5 below). The exception is the very oldest cohort (85-years and
older), where men appear more likely to survive the war. That is because the only person
surviving in the 44-person cohort was a man. In most age cohorts, men and women’s survival
rates were about equal, with 4% more women surviving in the 35–39 age cohort.

Figure 5. N=6,554. No gender differences were signiﬁcant within age categories except
the 5–9 year olds.

Of note, in the age categories where women were more likely to be immediately
murdered at Auschwitz, gender differences in overall survival were nil.
In the ﬁnal analysis, we add the year of transport to factors predicting being gassed on
arrival at Auschwitz and overall survival. We regressed whether or not one was gassed on
arrival on dummy variables measuring gender, the age categories used in Table 1, interaction
terms for gender and the ages where women are more likely to be murdered immediately, and
the time of the transport: in 1943 (the omitted category), early 1944, late 1944, and 1945. The
1945 dummy variable is not included because arrivals were not sent to Auschwitz after
November 1944 and the Soviet army liberated the camp in January 1945.
Table 4 below summarizes the impact of these factors. Being deported in early 1944
reduced chances of being sent to the gas chamber by 4% compared to 1943. Age was a
signiﬁcant factor throughout, with those aged 5–14 and those 60 and over being signiﬁcantly
more likely to be gassed on arrival than the up-to-4 age group. As documented in the earlier
analysis, all other groups, from 15–49, were signiﬁcantly less likely to go to the gas chambers.
Controlling for age, women were about 3% more likely than men to be selected for the
gas chambers on arrival but women in the 15–29 age group were 10% more likely and in the 30–
44 group 6%.
Of note, the factors in this equation predict over half the variation in those selected to be
murdered on arrival. But other factors also made a difference, especially appearance. Those who
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appeared weak or disabled were likely to be sent to be murdered no matter what their ages
were. Then, there is a matter of luck, as exempliﬁed by the stories of Ruth and Elli cited above.
Looking like an older teenager rather than a younger one or a younger woman instead of an
older one; having blond hair; or being able to hide a minor disability all mattered.
This model illustrated in Table 4 does not ﬁt survival very well. That is because time of
transport is very highly correlated with being sent to Auschwitz and we have seen that the
survival rates of those sent to Auschwitz are much lower than those sent to labor camps. All
Italian transports that left in 1943 went to Auschwitz as did 90% of those in the ﬁrst half of 1944
and 76% in the second half of 1944. Conversely, no 1945 transport went there.
Unstandardized Coefﬁcients

t

b

Std. e

(Constant)

.61

.02

29.75*

Transport, ﬁrst half 1944

-.04

.01

-4.13*

Transport, second half 1944

-.03

.02

-1.63

Age 5–14

.16

.03

6.20*

Age 15–29

-.53

.03

-20.92*

Age 30–44

-.52

.02

-22.04*

Age 45–59

-.38

.02

-17.83*

Age 60 and over

.33

.02

15.31*

Women

.03

.01

2.70*

Women age 15–29

.07

.03

2.61

Women age 30–44

.03

.01

2.79

Table 4. Predictors of Selection for Murder on Arrival at Auschwitz
*F=549.6, signiﬁcant at .00, R2=.50. Omitted categories are ages 0–4 and 1943. N=5,543.

In Table 5 below, we examine gender differences in survival by year of transport. From
the 1943 transports, men were signiﬁcantly more likely to survive, but in the 1944 transports,
women were. In the ﬁrst half of 1944, the peak of the Italian transports, women’s survival rate
slightly exceeded that of men, an advantage that grew in the second half of the year. As we saw
in Figure 1, overall survival was almost identical. These patterns are mirrored if we add
transports to labor camps to those from Auschwitz. Men had a signiﬁcantly higher survival rate
from the 1943 transports and women in 1944. Survival rates in the forty-three people on the
1945 transports was about equal.69
Men

Women

N

1943

5

1*

1,838

1944-ﬁrst half

6

9*

3,127

1944-second half

8

16*

544

Overall

6

6

5,566

Table 5. Percent Surviving at Auschwitz by Gender and Year of Transport.
*Gender differences signiﬁcant at .01.
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I initially thought that these differences could reﬂect age differences between men and women in each year, but they
do not. For example, women comprised more of the elderly even in 1944 where their overall survival rate was
higher.
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Conclusions
Tracking the fate of European Jews who lived through or died in the Holocaust is a monumental
task. We have a rough idea of how many died in each country, but accurate data on who lived
and who died in communities are still being painstakingly compiled. Without such analyses, it
is impossible to assess the fate of different populations within the Jewish community.
Though the Italian Jewish men and women who were deported were only a small
fraction of all Jews sent to labor camps, death camps, and Auschwitz, having a complete picture
of each on an individual basis allows us to home in on the factors that led to survival or death.
The data included in this article are inclusive of all Jews deported from Italy to Germany and
the east.
The analysis sheds new light on old verities but also offers different perspectives. Our
understanding of gender and survival in the Holocaust was sharpened. As many have reported,
women and children were much more likely to be sent to the gas chamber on arrival at
Auschwitz. We documented substantive and statistically signiﬁcant differences between men
and women in immediate execution at Auschwitz. Differences in the 15–44 age group were
large, yet most Italian Jewish women survived the ﬁrst day’s selection for the gas chambers.
However, men’s higher survival rates on their ﬁrst day did not lead to better overall
survival rates at Auschwitz. The conditions of labor at Auschwitz and its subcamps sentenced
almost everyone who survived their ﬁrst days to death before liberation. And thus,
unexpectedly, overall survival rates at Auschwitz for women and men among the Italian Jewish
deportees were equal. The toll of starvation, disease, ﬁlth, and later selections on the survival of
those sent to do hard labor meant that death came to most of those initially spared from the gas
chamber.
The analysis also increased our knowledge of the proportions of different age groups
who were put to death on arrival at Auschwitz. The overall impressions that it was the young
and old and women were certainly conﬁrmed, but there were a few children who were not
executed on arrival. We can only guess about why that was. We know that some children,
especially twins, were taken for medical experiments.70 We have argued that some of those aged
13 and 14 might have been judged to be older and able to work.
However, also as we had expected, survival rates for the elderly were negligible. Most
sent to Auschwitz were murdered on arrival. Why were some spared? Perhaps they looked
younger than they were. Even so, all those elderly who survived that ﬁrst selection died in
Auschwitz before liberation. A few survived in other labor camps but overall, the survival rate
was very low for all cohorts over 60.
The period of deportations in Italy was short compared to other countries and that fact
increased overall survival rates. By the time Italian Jews were transported, the killing camps
were closed. That said, in 1943, all were sent to Auschwitz where the probability of survival was
minimal. Probabilities of survival were higher for those transported in 1944, even for those sent
to Auschwitz. These data support the conclusions about all transported Western European Jews,
based on transports, not individuals.71 Survival rates were tiny for those transported in 1941
and 1942, were slightly higher in 1943, and then much higher in 1944. Almost everyone
survived 1945 transports.
There are signiﬁcant caveats to our ﬁndings. The study did not look at overall survival
of Italian Jews, only those who were deported. However, almost all Italian Jews who died did so
as a result of deportation. About three hundred died in Italy.72 The great majority of the Italian
Jewish population was not deported, and thus the 87% survival rate of Italian Jews is estimated
to be the highest in Western Europe except for Denmark. The low death rate within Italy
contrasted with the high mortality of those deported is similar throughout Western Europe but
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very different from the Shoah in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the ﬁndings of gassing and
survival for those who were deported may be relevant to other national populations where
larger proportions of the Jewish population were deported.
Despite these caveats, we have learned more precisely the relative fate of men and
women and older and younger Italian Jews. We have also estimated the impact of timing of
deportation on the survival rates of those deported. Thus, our ﬁndings, while limited, add to
our understanding of history’s largest genocide.
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In Extraordinary Justice: Law, Politics and the Khmer Rouge Tribunals,1 Craig Etcheson
combines his personal experience as chief of investigations in the Ofﬁce of Co-Prosecutors at the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) with research he undertook for
more than two decades to analyze how the relationship between law and politics may explain
the creation and functioning of war crimes tribunals. In particular, Etcheson presents a detailed
analysis of how Cambodians and the international community sought to bring Khmer Rouge
leaders to justice by emphasizing the relationship between these two distinct, yet intertwined,
concepts.
The thread throughout the book is based on the analytical framework presented in the
introduction, which considers ideological approaches to the relationship between law and
politics. Etcheson distinguishes between three general approaches, namely classic legalism,
strategic legalism, and instrumental legalism, which differ in their orientation towards the
inﬂuence of politics. Given the implications of this framework for understanding the
development and functioning of past, present, and future war crimes tribunals, there are many
reasons why those interested in the ECCC and war crimes tribunals more broadly are
encouraged to read this book; of which a few are discussed below.
The book devotes attention to many facets which explain how the ECCC eventually
came into existence and how it operates as a result of the struggles between the three ideologies
mentioned above. Before attention is drawn to the ECCC, however, Etcheson considers how
Cambodia reconstructed its legal system after the fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979 and which
legal ideologies inspired its reformed legal system. Hereafter Etcheson addresses the dynamics
at play when the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT) was set-up to prosecute two leaders of
the Khmer Rouge for genocide in 1979. Both the criticism the Tribunal faced in relation to its
legitimacy and effectiveness, as well as the legal challenges the Tribunal encountered are
discussed. Etcheson analyses how this Tribunal, its proceedings, and aftermath nevertheless led
to negotiations that would eventually lead to the creation of the ECCC.
The negotiations that took place in order to create the ECCC form a large part of this
book. Etcheson considers in great length and detail the negotiations that took place between
Cambodia and the UN, which eventually led to an agreement to create a mixed tribunal.
Particular attention is devoted to the tension between ensuring international standards and
respecting Cambodian sovereignty. As Etcheson indicates, “the ECCC would be established in
cooperation with the UN, but the international standards in legal affairs that the UN sought to
protect was at odds with the Cambodian insistence on maintaining political control over judicial
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proceedings.”2 The subsequent tension between Cambodia and the UN led to another two
years of negotiations, hereby “making it much less likely that aging potential defendants would
survive long enough to see their day in court.”3 Other negotiations addressed by Etcheson
include those that took place over the budget of the ECCC, its venue, and how the court would
be, and eventually was, staffed. In addition to the negotiations that took place, the book also
offers an analysis of the more legal challenges that occurred before, during, and after the
initiation of proceedings before the ECCC. Legal and evidentiary challenges and opportunities
surrounding the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge are
meticulously analyzed by Etcheson, and he in particular discusses defense strategies and their
implications for proceedings.
In his conclusion, Etcheson also critically engages with discussions on the legacy of the
ECCC and whether there should be follow-up transitional justice activities in the wake of the
ECCC. In relation to the legacy of the ECCC, he remarks that almost none of the evidence
admitted at trial has been released to the public via the courts website or through any other
means, and stresses the importance of making this evidence available for historians and other
researchers.4 Although not explicitly mentioned, victims and witnesses may, of course, also have
an interest in the public availability of the evidence admitted at trial.
Etcheson’s analysis of the relationship between law and politics offers not only a
framework to understand the dynamics at play when individual criminal responsibility is
sought for those who commit international crimes, such as genocide, but it also draws attention
to the signiﬁcant lapse of time that may occur as a result of the struggles inherent to the
confrontation between the three general ideologies presented in the introduction. As mentioned
above, Etcheson found that the time that passed as a result of negotiations made it less likely
that aging potential defendants would survive long enough to see their day in court. The lapse
of time therefore raised the important question who could still be prosecuted. The number of
individuals who would eventually be indicted by the ECCC would be determined, amongst
others, by precisely this. As Etcheson mentions, “one thing that made these decisions a little
easier for the co-prosecutors was the fact that thirty years after the fall of the Khmer Rouge
regime, there were simply not many senior leaders remaining alive to answer criminal
charges.”5 This may indeed make the decisions a little easier for the co-prosecutors or others
involved in the prosecution of the crimes, but for the victims and witnesses this may mean that
justice will have been delayed and may therefore be denied.
This may lead the reader to question how the concepts or ‘justice’ or ‘truth’ may also
play a role in the framework of law and politics the author offers throughout his analysis. In the
introduction, Etcheson writes that one of the things he learned along the way “is that certain
words, words that may seem quite simple from the face of it – like ‘truth’, ‘justice’, and ‘law’ –
are in fact very complicated. They mean different things to different people. Consequently,
getting people to agree on them can be exceedingly difﬁcult and time-consuming.”6 Although
the book is already extraordinarily detailed in its analysis of the relationship between law and
politics, a (brief) critical analysis of how these concepts may also be intertwined with how war
crimes tribunals come into existence, operate and unfold would have been interesting. Even
more so since they are brieﬂy addressed in the introduction and draw attention to very
fundamental concepts underlying international criminal justice.
Built on personal experiences and scholarly research, the book makes a signiﬁcant
contribution to existing scholarship on not only the ECCC, but also transitional justice more
broadly. This is predominantly a result of Etcheson’s approach towards the relationship
between law and politics and how he incorporates and intertwines his ﬁndings with primary
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sources and anecdotes. Key lessons can be learned from the book about the dynamics between
law and politics in the creation and functioning of war crimes tribunals. This makes the book
essential for a broad audience, including academics and practitioners with an interest in
international criminal law, transitional justice, the ECCC, and potentially those working in the
ﬁeld of international relations and international organizations.
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